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This dissertation examines the shape, objectives, and fate of the anti-immigrationist movement 
from 1955 to 1981. During this period, groups and individuals operated within the confines of 
the British political system to advocate for the restriction of non-white immigration to the UK 
and also to minimize the perceived negative impact these immigrants were having upon the 
social and economic fabric of the UK. The study argues that by attaching their anti-
immigrationist objections to existing political concerns, including anxieties about the welfare 
state, and by advocating for anti-immigrationist policies and legislation within the confines of 
established techniques of political activism and protest, anti-immigrationists were far more 
successful than they might otherwise have been, and indeed more successful than academic 
studies and popular opinion have portrayed them. However, their reliance upon a language of 
active citizenship and genuine democracy to justify their arguments to restrict immigration 
proved to be less popular with elite politicians and senior civil servants than a language of 
inclusivity and civil rights. As such, while much of the substantive legislation which anti-
immigrationists advocated for was implemented at the highest level of government, the anti-
immigrationist ethos, and the language in which they expressed their views, was not adopted by 
these powerful individuals, resulting in a foreclosure and minimization of the role of anti-
immigrationists in agitating for the implementation of this legislation and body of policy. 
Furthermore, the decline of the anti-immigrationist movement was less the result of the success 
of the left in persuading the right to abandon its commitment to anti-immigrationism than of the 
 
 
success of the extreme right in claiming anti-immigrationism as its own, to the dismay of the 
more moderate right and centre-right. 
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“I think it is the most important subject facing this country, but I cannot get any of my ministers 
to take any notice.” 
— Sir Winston Churchill to Sir Ian Gilmour on Commonwealth immigration to England in 19551  
 
When the news came in, the blood drained from Harold Wilson’s face; Marcia Williams, his 
political secretary, “burst into tears.” Even the Conservative Quintin Hogg “merely raised an 
eyebrow and walked away.”2 It was eight minutes to midnight on 15 October 1964, and Patrick 
Gordon Walker had just been defeated at his seat in Smethwick, in the West Midlands, by a man 
named Peter Griffiths. The campaign had been a fraught and deeply contested one: Griffiths, by 
all accounts, had come to power in the wake of an ongoing diatribe against the presence of New 
Commonwealth immigrants in his new constituency. This was certainly not the first time social 
tensions had emerged surrounding immigration: the riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958 
were all too recent memories. A Smethwick branch of the Birmingham Immigration Control 
Association had been founded a few years prior for precisely the reasons that Griffiths was 
emphasizing. In 1962, the House of Commons had introduced legislation to limit yearly arrivals 
of new immigrants. Peter Griffiths, however, was the first man (or woman) to successfully run 
for parliament with explicit anti-immigration planks forming the most central part of his 
platform.3 Where other Conservatives, many of whom were in favour of varying degrees of 
                                                          
1 Ian Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London: Hutchinson, 1977), 134. 
 
2 Patrick Gordon Walker, Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries 1932-1971, ed. Robert Pearce (London: The 
Historians’ Press, 1991), 41. 
 
3 Oswald Mosley attempted to run in North Kensington on an anti-black immigration platform in 1959. He was 




control on immigration, had previously feared to tread, Peter Griffiths pressed his campaign to 
new extremes. Most alarmingly to some, he did so with a groundswell of popular support. 
Certainly the West Midlands were known for producing some rather extreme 
personalities: Oswald Mosley, noted anti-Semite and leader of the British Union of Fascists 
during the interwar period, had formerly served as MP for Smethwick, albeit before the heyday 
of the BUF. The region was known more generally for its support of the staunchly imperialist 
MP Joseph Chamberlain. Enoch Powell, one of the rising stars of the Conservative Party, 
represented Wolverhampton, also located just outside of Birmingham. Yet none of these men 
were precisely the type of politician that Griffiths was. While Griffiths returned to Parliament 
under Margaret Thatcher and served for nearly twenty years from 1979 to 1997, he was never 
promoted to the front bench, and indeed seems to have made little impression on the House or 
the Conservative Party. Yet his name is still invoked as shorthand for a set of ideas and a mode 
of operating: a 2003 article in the Guardian refers to his election in an article on racism in the 
police force as foundational evidence for the existence of racism in Britain.4 How did a man who 
is now popularly remembered as an extremist and a bigot operate within the context of a political 
party, and indeed a parliamentary system, that officially rejected the use of such language? 
 This study will address the shape, objectives, and fate of the anti-immigrationist 
movement from 1955 to 1981. It begins in the year that Cyril Osborne first attempted to 
introduce legislation to restrict the entry of non-white New Commonwealth citizens; it ends with 
the introduction of Thatcher’s 1981 British Nationality Act, which definitively altered the 
structure of citizenship for residents of both the UK and the Commonwealth. During this period, 
groups and individuals operated within the confines of the British political system to advocate 
                                                          




for precisely this restriction of non-white immigration to the UK, and also to minimize the 
perceived negative impact these immigrants were having upon the country’s social and economic 
fabric. I argue that by attaching their anti-immigrationist objections to existing political concerns, 
including anxieties about the welfare state, and by advocating for anti-immigrationist policies 
and legislation within the confines of established techniques of political activism and protest, 
anti-immigrationists were far more successful than they might otherwise have been, and indeed 
more successful than academic studies and popular opinion have portrayed them. However, their 
reliance upon a language of active citizenship and genuine democracy, which served to justify 
their arguments to restrict immigration, proved to be less popular with elite politicians and senior 
civil servants than a language of inclusivity and civil rights. As such, while much of the 
substantive legislation which anti-immigrationists for which advocated was implemented at the 
highest level of government, the anti-immigrationist ethos, and the language in which anti-
immigrationists expressed their views, was not adopted by these powerful individuals, resulting 
in a foreclosure and minimization of the role of anti-immigrationists in agitating for the 
implementation of this legislation and body of policy. 
While scholars have conducted research on the sociocultural transmission of popular 
racisms, and on the high politics trajectory towards an exclusive immigration policy, less has 
been said about the grassroots movement to exclude non-white individuals from participation in 
British society, and less still about the relationship between this grassroots movement and 
electoral politics. Anti-immigrationism was both bolstered and defeated by a reliance upon 
existing political structures. An emphasis upon electoral politics as a means to achieving their 
goals granted anti-immigrationists access to the power and influence attendant upon holding 
political office. Furthermore, by confining itself to established methods of political protest, for 
4 
 
many years anti-immigrationist activism fell within the realm of respectable behaviour, and as 
such was not rejected overtly either by society at large or by the political elite. By subjecting its 
proposals to approval and endorsement by numerous levels of political elite oversight, however, 
respectable anti-immigrationism was virtually demolished when the tide of popular opinion 
began to reject the framing of anti-immigrationism as respectable, and began viewing it instead 
as affiliated with violence and destruction. 
*** 
 
This project sits at the intersection of studies of race and immigration; of citizenship and rights; 
of the emergence of a New Right in the last quarter of the twentieth century; of conservatism and 
Conservatism; of the UK in a global context during the postwar period; and of the history of 
activism and organizing as demonstrated by a wide range of groups and individuals. Most 
prominently, it addresses many of the questions which have occupied those in the fields of 
immigration history and studies of race in the UK. Some of the earliest attempts to grapple with 
the question of postwar immigration to the UK emerged from the field of cultural studies. In the 
late 1970s, members of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) 
turned their attention to the nature, composition, and challenges of a multi-racial Britain. They 
applied the tools of the growing field of cultural theory, notably a focus on capitalism and 
Gramscian analysis, to the experience of men and women of colour living in a still largely white 
Britain. Volumes such as Policing the Crisis and The Empire Strikes Back developed 
comprehensive analyses of the ways in which British society, including organs of the state, 
functioned to exclude or pathologize immigrants and Britons of colour.5 Individual members of 
                                                          
5 Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, 
and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978); Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, The Empire Strikes 
Back: Race and racism in 70s Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1982). One important follow-up text not published by 
the CCCS is Becoming National, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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the CCCS, including Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall, picked up some of these themes in their own 
work: drawing attention to the production of culture in the UK, in the case of Gilroy; and to the 
emergence of the New Right, in the case of Hall.6 Many of the themes and issues the CCCS 
addressed in the late 1970s and early 1980s will be re-examined here, with the added benefit of 
archival materials to which the Birmingham members did not at that time have access. 
Social scientists also conducted early major studies of postwar immigration, among 
which Zig Layton-Henry’s was one of the earliest and most influential. His 1984 book The 
Politics of Race in Britain, and its 1992 reissue, The Politics of Immigration in Britain, were 
designed to serve as introductions to the subject, and provided a largely chronological overview 
of the main events in immigration legislation and controversy, including Powellism and the 
election of Peter Griffiths, up to the respective dates of publication.7 While Layton-Henry’s 
organization was historical, his source base was not deeply archival as a result of access 
restrictions. Together, Layton-Henry and Paul B. Rich also produced a 1986 collection of essays 
entitled Race, Government and Politics in Britain, which drew together a range of scholars with 
a particular emphasis on the relationship between race and contemporary politics.8 Rich also 
produced a monograph in 1986 entitled Race and Empire in British Politics, which reflected his 
own historical training, and utilized archival sources to argue that race as a concept was deeply 
                                                          
 
6 Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The cultural politics of race and nation (London: Routledge, 
2002); Paul Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Stuart Hall and 
Martin Jacques, eds., The Politics of Thatcherism (London: Lawrence and Wishart in association with Marxism 
Today, 1983). 
 
7 Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984); The Politics of Immigration: 
Immigration, 'race' and 'race' relations in post-war Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). David Mason’s sociological 
text Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) also emerges from this sub-
field. 
 





influenced by shifts within the discipline of social science through the twentieth century.9 With 
the exception of Rich’s work, the periodization of which ended long before its publication, these 
scholars worked using the methods of the social sciences, and without the benefit of many of the 
archival sources that have been available to later scholars.  
Among those scholars who came to the question of immigration from a strictly historical 
perspective, Colin Holmes was the first to produce a comprehensive overview of immigration to 
the UK from the late eighteenth century, a study which remains one of the best references on the 
immigrant population of the UK.10 John Bull’s Island is distinguished by its focus on the 
immigrants themselves, and was part of a growing movement among scholars to invoke, and 
indeed, emphasize, the “voice of the immigrant” in their academic research.11 Studies by Panikos 
Panayi and John Solomos reflected this trend.12 Other scholars chose to focus on the long history 
of discrimination in British society, with Tony Kushner and others concentrating especially on 
the history of anti-Semitism.13 
                                                          
9 Paul B. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
 
10 Dilip Hiro’s Black British White British was published earlier, but addresses only twentieth-century immigration, 
and is much less comprehensively researched. Dilip Hiro, Black British, White British (Bristol: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1971). While both these texts are preceded by Ira Katznelson’s Black Men, White Cities: Race, 
Politics and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1976), the British section of Katznelson’s comparative study is based chiefly on non-archival sources, including the 
testimony of his own friends and colleagues, and addresses a much more limited period of time than Holmes’s. In 
both content and argument, Katznelson’s account bears more similarities to the work of the CCCS. 
 
11 Colin Holmes, John Bull’s Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Education, 1988). 
 
12 Panikos Panayi, Immigration, ethnicity, and racism in Britain, 1815-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1994); John Solomos, Race and racism in Britain, 2nd ed. (London : Macmillan, 1993); see also Geoff Eley 
and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds, Becoming National (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) and Tony Kushner and 
Kenneth Lunn, eds, The Politics of Marginality: Race, the Radical Right and Minorities in Twentieth Century 
Britain (London: Frank Cass, 1990). 
 
13 Tony Kushner, The Persistence of Prejudice: Antisemitism in British society during the Second World War 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989). See also The Politics of Marginality: Race, the Radical Right and 




In the last two decades, scholars have had increased access to archival records dealing 
with immigration in the postwar period. The result, initially, was a fixation with the conduct of 
“high politics” on this question. A number of earlier studies, including those by Carter, Harris, 
and Joshi, sought to emphasize the role of senior politicians and civil servants in facilitating, 
indeed encouraging, restrictive immigration policies from an early date.14 Subsequent research 
by Kathleen Paul, and later James Hampshire, followed this examination of elite political 
involvement. In the case of Paul, this took place in the context of a comparative framework that 
emphasized the role of race and processes of racialization in establishing in-groups and out-
groups, such that white immigrants were treated better than non-white immigrants.15 In the case 
of Hampshire, elite politics was examined in the context of a Foucauldian study of demographic 
governance and its iteration in British politics.16 Randall Hansen followed in the tradition of 
earlier social scientists, albeit with the benefit of access to archival resources, and offered a 
political science perspective on the same period as Paul and Hampshire, stressing the influence 
of grassroots popular racism on senior politicians and policymakers.17 
Much of the literature that impinges upon the study of postwar anti-immigrationism is 
framed to refer explicitly not so much to immigration, but to race. This includes, evidently, the 
work of the Birmingham CCCS, but also that of historians who have emphasized the role that 
                                                          
14 Bob Carter, Clive Harris, and Shirley Joshi, “The 1951-55 Conservative government and the racialisation of black 
immigration” (Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, 1987). 
 
15 Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997). 
 
16 James Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of Democratic Governance in 
Postwar Britain (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
 
17 Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain: The institutional origins of a multicultural 




race, and the empire, have played in shaping Britain and its history. Chris Waters’ earlier work 
extended a conceptual framework established by Benedict Anderson to a study of nationhood 
and national identity into the second half of the twentieth century, and argues that the sense of 
unified national identity that pervaded the Second World War began to crumble in the postwar 
period, particularly as the empire began to collapse and migration increased.18 Tony Kushner has 
produced a sweeping account of the roles that successive generations of immigrants have played 
in changing the definition of Britishness, and of how racial identity played a central role in these 
transformations.19 John Belchem, while employing a local and more limited chronological scope, 
also emphasized the role of empire in shaping Liverpool society through the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.20 Bill Schwarz has argued forcefully that memories of empire in particular 
played a central role in shaping British society and culture even during the years following its 
collapse. Paradoxically, Schwarz claims, the omission of empire from historical memory, as well 
as nostalgia for and an emphasis on the ostensibly positive legacies of empire, coincided to 
produce the particular brand of Conservatism embraced and propounded by Enoch Powell in the 
postwar period.21 From a popular culture perspective, Gavin Schaffer has been particularly 
attentive to the ways in which race-related controversies and popular ideals played out in the 
media.22 
                                                          
18 Chris Waters, “‘Dark Strangers’ in Our Midst: Discourses of Race and Nation in Britain, 1947-1963,” Journal of 
British Studies 36, no. 2, Twentieth-Century British Studies (April, 1997), 207-238. 
 
19 Tony Kushner, The Battle of Britishness: Migrant Journeys, 1685 to the Present (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012). 
 
20 John Belchem, Before the Windrush: Race relations in 20th-century Liverpool (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 2014). 
 
21 Bill Schwarz, Memories of Empire, vol. 1: White Man’s World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 8-9. 
 
22 Gavin Schaffer, The Vision of a Nation: Making Multiculturalism on British Television, 1960-1980 (Houndmills, 




This project also intervenes in scholarly debates about the nature of citizenship, its 
constituent elements, and the ends to which the exercise of citizenship have been deployed, 
particularly in latter part of the twentieth century. Citizenship as an area of research has grown 
substantially among both social scientists and historians since the postwar era, when publications 
by Titmuss and Marshall, coincident with the establishment of a new universal welfare state, 
sparked interest in the promises and premises of the relationship between state and citizen. 
Historians have since offered important qualifications of the relatively mechanistic frameworks 
offered by Titmuss and Marshall. Titmuss’ theory that the Second World War “in itself induced 
heightened government awareness of social welfare either as a tool of national efficiency or as a 
means of enhancing social solidarity” is tempered by José Harris’ historical analysis,23 just as the 
stages of citizenship outlined by Marshall - civil, political, and social24 - were taken up and given 
historical context by a number of scholars, including Wendy Webster and Sonya Rose. Both 
Webster and Rose, however, emphasized the ways in which race and gender functioned as 
contingencies in citizenship regimes, making the egalitarian promises of Marshall’s regime in 
fact restrictive and uneven.25 These lines of inquiry have been coincident with a growing body of 
literature on the nature of the welfare state and the premises and limits of its organs, which has 
                                                          
23 José Harris, “Some Aspects of Social Policy in Britain During the Second World War,” in The Emergence of the 
Welfare State in Britain and Germany 1850-1950, ed. W.J. Mommsen (Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm on behalf of 
the German Historical Institute, 1981), 258. 
 
24 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto Press, 1992). 
 
25 Wendy Webster, Englishness and Empire 1939-1965 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Sonya O. Rose, 





also interrogated the legitimacy of claims to universality and egalitarianism in welfare-state 
operations.26  
The end of this study coincides with the emergence of a New Right in the UK, and a new 
brand of Conservatism, and conservatism, under Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, many of the 
historical actors who populate this history of anti-immigrationism were also major players in the 
emergence of the New Right; as such, one must conclude that there are significant links between 
anti-immigrationism and the New Right during this period. As historical records for the later part 
of this period have become available, there has been an increase in historical research on race, 
immigration, and their relationship with the New Right and earlier iterations of conservative and 
Conservative identity. Anna Marie Smith undertook an early study of this subject in 1994, 
offering a discursive analysis of the ways in which the New Right adopted exclusionary language 
relating to race and to sexual identity as a critical element of their political regime and 
worldview.27 Subsequent studies, including Alice Ritscherle’s “Opting Out of Utopia” and Amy 
Whipple’s work, have also emphasized the role gender has played in underpinning the origins of 
the New Right.28 Camilla Schofield has focused on Enoch Powell’s formative role in the 
                                                          
26 See notably Susan Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 
1914-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class 
bases of the European welfare state, 1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
27 Anna Marie Smith, New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality: Britain, 1968-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
 
28 Amy C. Whipple, “‘Into Every Home, Into Every Body’: Organicism and anti-Statism in the British Anti-
Fluoridation Movement, 1952-1960,” Twentieth Century British History 21, no. 3 (2010), 134; Amy C. Whipple, 
“Speaking for Whom? The 1971 Festival of Light and the Search for the ‘Silent Majority’,” Contemporary British 
History, 24, no. 3 (2010): 319-339; Alice Marie Ritscherle, “Opting Out of Utopia: Race and Working-Class 





establishment of the New Right, utilizing the conventions of biography to draw attention to a 
range of themes present in New Right thought.29 
In recent years a substantial body of literature has emerged on the origins of Thatcherism, 
as distinct from the New Right more generally. Beginning, often, from E.H.H. Green’s Thatcher, 
if not from Stuart Hall’s “Thatcherism,” scholars have begun to excavate the bases of Thatcher’s 
support on a number of grounds. They have been attentive to the social and cultural content and 
appeal of Thatcherism, looking beyond traditional methods of psephological and political 
analysis.30 Amy Whipple’s argument that the origins of the New Right and of Thatcherism in the 
UK lie in the period of high anti-immigrationist activity, and involve many of the same actors 
referenced here, fruitfully leads us to consider the extent to which anti-immigrationist politics 
maps onto the course of the emergence of the New Right. Whipple argues that the New Right 
came to power on the force of a cultural reaction against the liberalism of the 1960s, that 
Thatcher and her allies successfully claimed to represent this reaction, and that they came to 
power in 1979 as a direct result.31 This is a compelling argument, and one supported by many of 
my conclusions, although it is important to note that the fortunes of anti-immigrationism as a 
movement do not exactly mirror those of Thatcher and Thatcherism. 
This study also examines the interaction between anti-immigrationism, conservatism, and 
Conservatism. Anti-immigrationism was in many respects a fundamentally conservative 
                                                          
29 Camilla Schofield, Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
 
30 Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, eds, Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); E.H.H. Green, Thatcher (London: Hodder Arnold, 2006); Stuart Hall, “The Great Moving Right Show,” 
Marxism Today (January 1979). 
 
31 Amy Whipple, “‘Ordinary People’: The Cultural Origins of Popular Thatcherism in Britain, 1964-1979” (PhD 




movement: one which sought to preserve and protect a status quo, or which appealed to an 
apocryphal past. Among the major political parties, anti-immigrationists also had the strongest 
relationship with the Conservative Party. These relationships between anti-immigrationism, 
conservatism, and Conservatism are of particular significance with respect to class: popular 
perceptions have often framed anti-immigrationism as the preserve of working-class young men 
who may have voted for the National Front, or even Labour, if they voted at all. I argue in 
contrast that part of the appeal of anti-immigrationism was that it fell within an established 
tradition of Conservative appeals to small-c conservatism within the working class, as well as to 
Conservatism’s more widely-acknowledged bases within the middle class. There is a substantial 
body of literature that has addressed the relationship between class identity and the modern 
Conservative Party from the late nineteenth century onwards. While in the nineteenth century 
working-class support for the party was contingent upon working-class perception of the 
Conservative Party as the natural ruling party, and of a sense of deference to this natural 
authority, this began to change through the twentieth century.32 The Conservative Party remained 
highly anxious about the potential radicalization of working-class supporters throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. It responded by actively targeting C2 (or skilled) workers, 
and by the 1950s “[t]he working class voted Conservative because it regarded Conservative 
governments as competent economic managers,” not out of deference to social superiors, and not 
because postwar affluence allowed them to acquire more consumer goods (home ownership was 
the sole exception to this rule).33 The basis of this voter preference is significant: affluent 
                                                          
32 E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics, and Ideology of the British Conservative 
Party, 1880-1914 (London: Routledge, 1995), 128. 
 
33 Andrew Taylor, “Speaking to Democracy: The Conservative Party and Mass Opinion from the 1920s to the 
1950s,” in Mass Conservatism: The Conservatives and the Public since the 1880s, eds. Stuart Ball and Ian Holliday 
(London: Frank Cass, 2002), 94. 
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members of the working class chose to vote Conservative because of the party’s policies, not 
because of deference or some other social relationship. Heath, and later Thatcher, were symbolic 
of a sea-change in the class identification not just of Conservative supporters, but of the 
Conservative Party itself. In 1970, the Conservatives again identified their target voter: “fairly 
young, slightly inclined to Labour, largely belonging to the skilled working class, primarily 
concerned with problems of housing, coloured immigration, and the economy (prices and costs) 
rather than the condition of old-age pensioners. Only one in six was bothered about international 
affairs.”34 At times, Conservative voting patterns among the working class were associated with 
ethno-sectarian concerns, as Ross McKibbin identifies in the case of anti-Irish affiliations with 
Conservatism up to the 1950s.35 The brand of Conservatism that was most appealing to members 
of the middle class who also found themselves drawn to anti-immigrationism is discussed at 
greater length in chapter four: its chief emphases were upon a traditional family structure and 
gendered constrictions for men and women’s labour, as well as a rejection of the “permissive” 
society and support for a morally conservative version of British culture. 
British anti-immigrationism did not occur within a geographical or cultural vacuum. The 
study of race in the British context, particularly in the postwar period, often involves 
comparisons to the American example, and this study has found that references to America were 
particularly prevalent within anti-immigrationist circles. There have been a number of studies of 
the American civil rights movement and its relationship to British culture and politics. The 
relationship between Malcolm X and British activists has attracted particular attention; others 
                                                          
34 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major, rev. ed. (London: Heinemann, 1997), 304. 
 




have emphasized the civil rights movement more generally.36 While anti-immigrationism 
evidently bore an important relationship to the emergence of the New Right in the UK, it also 
coincided with the rise of the American New Right. Lisa McGirr’s account of the emergence of 
the American New Right in Orange County during the 1960s bears many parallels to the manner 
in which anti-immigrationism organized and conceived of itself in the UK. Perhaps the most 
obvious difference between Californian conservatives and British anti-immigrationists was the 
wealth that pervaded Orange County during this period, as well as the dominating influence of 
evangelical Christianity.37 Christianity, or at least Anglicanism, was not frequently invoked by 
British anti-immigrationists in any serious way, perhaps because the Archbishop of Canterbury 
(then Michael Ramsey) had declared himself a supporter of immigrants and an opponent of the 
Commonwealth Immigration Acts; he served on the pro-immigration National Committee for 
Commonwealth Immigrants until 1968, when he resigned in protest at the 1968 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act. But the self-proclaimed grassroots nature of both campaigns is significant, as is 
their shared appeal to a return to genuine, representative democracy. McGirr’s Orange County 
actors saw themselves as defending the “true” American way of life, and fighting the corruption 
and compromise of this ideal by villainous, often liberal, sources.38 Some British anti-
immigrationist politicians were also among the architects of their own branch of the New Right; 
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while the connection between the two movements was not entirely direct, it existed 
nonetheless.39 
Anti-immigrationism is by no means an isolated or fringe phenomenon. Both in the 
second half of the twentieth century and in other periods, it drew heavily upon the techniques, 
convictions, and organizational philosophies of a host of contemporary and historical movements 
and groups. I have chosen to indicate throughout the text the parallels to these movements, which 
in some cases emerged in order to address seemingly very different causes, to demonstrate that 
anti-immigrationism, in fact, sits within a long tradition of related movements. These movements 
may have differed superficially, but anti-immigrationism is not simply a question of race, or of 
migration; rather, it sits at the intersection of a much broader range of issues. Often these 
movements have called into question the policies of the state or its agents, but rarely have they 
sought to overturn the state’s authority wholesale, more frequently preferring to implement their 
goals by influencing state-affiliated agents. That anti-immigrationists appealed to these 
techniques indicates the extent to which they sought to operate within an established mode of 
political activism. 
Most notably, anti-immigrationism as a movement sits within a tradition of local activism 
and moral reform that has often been led by middle-class women. This trend has been most 
strongly associated with the settlement house movement that emerged in the UK in the 
nineteenth-century. The moral reform movement in nineteenth-century Canada also drew 
inspiration from the settlement house movement; the links between these international 
movements are indicative, anticipating the links that existed between anti-immigrationist groups 
in the UK and like-minded associations worldwide. In the twentieth century, race relations 
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experts and anti-immigrationists intersected in the realm of social science. The methods of social 
scientific research created the foundation for much of the debate about immigration, informing 
arguments both in favour and against. Even more dramatically, the long history of the creation of 
social science, of the study of humans and their interactions, with its roots in the settlement 
houses and social surveys of the nineteenth century, has evident successors not only in the 
militant women who sought to enforce British norms of housekeeping and child-raising as a 
means of excluding immigrants from British society, but also in those (typically women) who 
did exactly the same thing as a means of integrating immigrants to British society within their 
roles as “race relations experts” and immigrant advocates. 
 Paul Rich has underscored the essential role played by, particularly, the women members 
of the Liverpool School for Social Science Research in laying the groundwork for legitimate 
“official” intervention in the lives of non-white residents of Liverpool 8 (a postal district with a 
substantial immigrant population) during the interwar period.40 John Belchem also underscores 
the vital activity of social workers in establishing the hostels and support groups that formed the 
bedrock of immigrant life, and of official intervention into that life, in the Liverpool area.41 
While the Liverpool example represents one of the earliest relationships between social work and 
immigration, social workers in the early twentieth century drew upon long-standing traditions of 
female and middle-class involvement in the lives of those deemed “disadvantaged.” Jane Lewis 
outlines the long history of the Charity Organisation Society/Family Welfare Association, which 
focused in its early years on self-help and moral improvement, with an emphasis on the essential 
role to be played by the family in these endeavours, followed in later years by the adoption of a 
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formal casework strategy and the ongoing professionalization of social work itself.42 The 
strategy adopted by the COS in its early years paralleled the nineteenth-century moral reform 
movement in Canada. The so-called “social purity movement,” Mariana Valverde argues, “was a 
loose network of organizations and individuals, mostly church people, educators, doctors, and 
those we would now describe as community or social workers, who engaged in a sporadic but 
vigorous campaign to ‘raise the moral tone’ of Canadian society, and in particular of urban 
working-class communities.”43  
Tactics used by the moral reform movement were influenced by, but not wholly linked to, 
contemporary British social reform movements, including settlement houses. The aim of the 
moral reform movement was to, by example and persuasion, convince women of immigrant and 
working-class backgrounds to adopt the practices and values of middle-class society. The agents 
of this movement were largely middle-class women, often of a religious bent, supported by the 
expertise and social clout of professionals. The way in which the moral reform movement was 
structured, and the background of its members are among the most relevant parallels to the anti-
immigrationist movement.44 The members of the moral reform movement also had important 
contemporaries in Josephine Butler and the women who protested the Contagious Diseases Acts, 
many of whom were also involved with the Charity Organisation Society.45  
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Despite the range of causes they supported, all of these groups provided legitimate ways 
for women to engage in political and social activism, but in support of a very particular view of 
the way that society ought to operate. Similarly, the British anti-vaccination movement of the 
nineteenth century operated on the basis of loosely affiliated groups, often emerging from wildly 
different political traditions, including the Liberal Party and the labour movement, and working 
to achieve related goals, albeit for dramatically different reasons. Anti-vaccinationists operated 
on the same basis as anti-immigrationists, drawing upon the political expertise and legitimacy of 
middle-class individuals and organizations that were often already established to serve other 
purposes.46 Collectively, these groups and others like them provided a body of techniques and 
strategies already defined as legitimate for the purposes of social and political activism, and 
which could then be invoked and utilized by later groups and causes, including the anti-
immigrationists. 
One of the most ardent lines of historiographical debate in the field of immigration 
history has been whether an illiberal public or a discriminatory political elite did more to foster 
anti-immigrationist feeling. Kathleen Paul and James Hampshire agree that the fault lies chiefly 
with the politicians and officials of Westminster and Whitehall; or, in other words, that 
illiberality stemmed from the top of the political ladder. Randall Hansen, conversely, identifies 
public pressure on political representatives as the primary cause of restrictive immigration 
legislation. I will argue that both of these contentions are, in a sense, correct. Anti-immigrationist 
politicians and the public existed in a symbiotic relationship. Restrictive legislation received 
popular support because it reflected the views of the general public, and anti-immigrationist 
activists found a receptive audience in many members of the political elite. Most significantly, 
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the public-politician relationship was seen as the primary conduit for effecting change on the 
subject of immigration. Electoral politics and the petitioning of political representatives through 
established channels were viewed as the best and most effective methods for achieving anti-
immigrationist goals. That elected representatives saw fit to endorse anti-immigrationist policy, 
and that the public had faith in politicians’ capacity and willingness to do so, highlights the 
centrality of the established British political system as the primary theatre for anti-immigrationist 
activity. 
Taken independently, both these views are problematic. A number of scholars, including 
Paul, Hampshire, Carter, Harris, and Joshi, have argued that the earliest stages of restrictive 
immigration legislation emerged from the convictions of elites, who “foresaw” immigration as a 
“problem” as early as the late 1940s, but who delayed the introduction of legislation until public 
opinion had “matured” sufficiently to view immigration in a similar manner, in contrast to their 
apparent complacency in the 1940s and 1950s. This view, in my opinion, discounts the capacity 
of the public to think independently of elite will, and fails to take seriously the voting public as 
political actors. By contrast, Randall Hansen’s conviction that the 1968 Immigration Control Act 
in particular was the result of elite opinion bending to public will frames politicians as nothing 
more than pawns of the electorate, incapable of acting independently of public opinion. A more 
tempered version of this view exists in Stephen Brooke’s study, where he argues that  
Opposition to non-white immigration of course existed, at the level of cabinet, party and 
rank-and-file, but it was matched by visions of a multiracial presence abroad and, more 
tentatively, a multiracial nation at home…The turning point for the party was after 1960, 
when rising concern with the level of immigration gave increased weight to defensive 
voices from below, revealed through discontent among Conservative supporters, to whom 
the Macmillan government responded reluctantly with the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act.47  
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Both these perspectives seek to position the electorate and the government in opposition to each 
other, to make a villain of one side or the other, and are focused on the “origin story” of 
restrictive immigration legislation in order to establish a kind of original sin. This is, in my view, 
an overly restrictive and simplistic view of how politics works; and even if, as is often the case, 
the appearance of political activism on a public stage does not have much to do with how 
legislation actually gets implemented behind closed doors, I am convinced that it is essential to 
take political actors seriously on their own terms. Did elites invent anti-immigrationism? Even if 
they did, many of the people who enacted anti-immigrationism, who joined anti-immigrationist 
organizations, who spent hours, days, and weeks of their lives engaged in activities dedicated to 
the aim of ending, and even reversing, immigration, did not consider it an elite-led project. 
Indeed, I am less interested in the particular origins of anti-immigrationism for this immediate 
period, since I am convinced that anti-immigrationism is a phenomenon that emerges and abates 
cyclically over the course of many years, and that the period under study is but one iteration of a 
phenomenon that began in a proper sense many hundreds of years previously. The view of 
political engagement that I think is most accurate in representing the operations of anti-
immigrationism is that of a series of networks linking grassroots members of the electorate to the 
political elite by the means of elected representatives. In short, the fact that anti-immigrationism 
operated through democratic channels matters more than determining at which end of the 
democratic relationship the sentiment originated 
*** 
One of the conceptual currents running through the sources used for this study, sometimes 
implicitly, sometimes explicitly, is race. Race, as conceived by these historical actors, is a salient 
category of human identity. Indeed, race was universally accepted as a category of difference, if 
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not the category of difference, by virtually every individual who commented on immigration 
during the period at hand. While some individuals offered a more nuanced division, the two 
fundamental categories of analysis were “white” and “not-white.” “Black” or “coloured” also 
stood in for “not-white,” both underscoring semantically the not-whiteness of the individuals to 
whom it referred. And it was broadly, if not altogether universally, accepted that what mattered 
about immigrants to Britain in the postwar period, the so-called “New Commonwealth” 
migrants, was that they were not white.48 What one might call their “failure to be white” – a 
formulation that captures both the normativity of whiteness and the tendency to blame non-
whites for their racial identity – was understood as the prime and fundamental source of the 
“immigrant problem”: the cause, if you like, of the symptoms of overcrowding, stress on 
services, and social issues. Even those individuals who, in contemporary terms, positioned 
themselves well to the left of popular opinion, emphasized race as the determining factor in 
shaping these issues – hence the need for a race relations industry staffed by social scientists, 
activists, and seconded civil servants. 
 In popular parlance, the word “immigration” was often used as a synonym, or 
euphemism, for race. Individuals who were deemed insufficiently white were, throughout this 
period, objects of study, rather than subjects with whom to interact. Anti-immigrationism would 
not have taken the precise form that it did had the immigrants been white, or at least categorized 
as “like” the “indigenous” population. All anti-immigrationist discourse in this period is 
predicated upon a definition of Britishness that is exclusive of non-white individuals. The 
question of whether it was possible to be both black and British was, in the view of 
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contemporaries, very much unresolved, if not answered definitively in the negative.49 Even those 
who argued that the root of the problem was financial, not cultural – that Britain simply could 
not afford all these new people – demarcated along racial lines those who were “worthy” of 
access to British resources. So while this study is not, specifically, a study of racism, it is the 
case that a particular, exclusive, and at times pernicious understanding of race underpins the 
worldview of the actors at hand. 
 It should be noted that my emphasis on non-whiteness, and particularly upon populations 
originating in the Caribbean and South Asia, seeks to capture – albeit with critical distance – the 
perceptions of contemporary actors. While Irish migration continued into this period, the way in 
which the Irish were perceived in Britain shifted across the course of the twentieth century. Enda 
Delaney’s tracing of migration patterns between the Republic of Ireland and England indicates 
that large groups of Irish men and women were resident in many of the same towns and cities as 
New Commonwealth migrants for much of this period.50 However, the pattern of Irish migration 
by this period was largely that of temporary work periods followed by a return to Ireland, 
sometimes repeated for a period of several years until sufficient money had been earned to set up 
a household in Ireland. The geographical position of Ireland and the low price of transportation 
between the two countries made this pattern possible. It is also significant that unlike New 
Commonwealth citizens, citizens of the Republic of Ireland were granted freedom of movement 
into and within the United Kingdom. The British government’s toleration of Irish mobility raised 
no small amount of complaint, particularly as legislation was introduced through the 1960s to 
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dramatically limit the numbers of colonial citizens.51 The government responded by highlighting 
the difficulties in patrolling the border between, particularly, the Republic of Ireland and the 
counties of the North, as well as the fact that many families were spread across both sides of the 
border. To require international travel documents would thus be a significant hardship, although 
as the Troubles began that border nonetheless became intensely patrolled. The Troubles also 
marked a period of change for British, and particularly English, perspectives on the Irish. In the 
immediate postwar period, attitudes towards the Irish had relaxed, and become less 
discriminatory. The factors behind the Irish transition from “other” to “white” have been 
extensively documented elsewhere; it is worth noting in this context that the pattern of Irish 
migration, involving frequent returns to the country of origin and relatively low rates of 
permanent settlement, left the Irish less open to the complaints frequently levelled against New 
Commonwealth migrants about housing and excessive reliance on social services.52 The negative 
attitudes towards the Irish through the 1970s and 1980s were instead very much influenced by 
the increased violence of the IRA and paramilitary bombing campaigns conducted on English 
soil.53 
 The general exclusion of the Irish from my discussion is thus because they were generally 
not included in these debates by contemporaries. However, it is indeed significant that the Irish 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as Jews in the same period and Eastern 
Europeans in the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, have been the targets of anti-
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immigrationist impulses that bear high degrees of similarity to the one assessed here.54 Indeed, 
anti-immigrationist campaigns around the world, including those in twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries targeting migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, North African migrants to France, 
and Turkish populations living in Germany have taken much the same shape. While I have 
limited my study to a particular movement in a particular context both for the sake of brevity and 
of clarity, it is worth noting that this phenomenon was, and is, by no means isolated. The 
specifics of anti-immigration will of course vary by location and period, but arguments about 
limited resources and insurmountable cultural difference can be found in many, if not all, 
Western states at some point between the nineteenth century and today. The exclusion of New 
Commonwealth immigrants from a national British identity in the postwar period was different 
from other periods and targets of exclusion because these immigrants were not white, but also 
because the mechanisms for exclusion had both changed and multiplied. The formalized 
exclusion of non-white immigrants took shape at border controls, as well as through the state-led 
formalization of previously ad hoc services including medical care and housing. 
The exclusion of individuals of West Indian, African, and South Asian origin from the 
British polity can, and should, be read as racial exclusion; but an understanding of how an 
exclusionary British identity operated, and operates, must take account of the widely varying 
definitions of race that have obtained for the past two hundred years at least, noting antipathies 
towards, variously, Catholics, Jews, the Irish, and, most recently, Eastern Europeans. All of these 
groups have at various times not only been deemed unacceptable members of the British polity 
and considered unfit to act as citizens, but have also been used as scapegoats for such familiar 
issues as epidemics, unemployment, and housing shortages. Rather than relying on a static 
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conception of race to explain immigration policy, then, it is perhaps more useful to understand 
that definitions of British identity and British citizenship have always been exclusionary, but to 
emphasize that the groups who have been excluded have varied, and will surely continue to vary, 
over time. 
*** 
Many of the archival collections used in this research are not those of anti-immigrationist groups 
or individuals. A great many of them are in fact the papers of campaigners who were great critics 
of anti-immigrationism: members of Community Relations Councils, the Race Relations Board, 
the Indian Workers’ Association, and local immigrant support groups. In other cases they are the 
deposited research files of academics working on topics related to immigration. In still others, 
they are the records of government departments and agencies whose portfolios related to some 
aspect of immigration and demographic change. Many files are routinely-generated government 
documents: reports of committees and so on. The largest archive used for this project, that of the 
Conservative Party, is vastly more comprehensive than any other on this subject. In all but a very 
few cases, the collections in which this research has been conducted are not the result of the 
depository efforts of self-identified anti-immigrationists. That these records are now available is 
not their doing, nor have they been deposited in a format subject to their approval. As a result, 
the archival record on anti-immigration is largely the work of others, and in many cases the work 
of its opponents. It is thus massively incomplete. 
 There are two primary reasons for this state of affairs. The first is structural: a great deal 
of anti-immigrationist organizing took place at a local or regional level, and as anyone who has 
tried to work at a non-university repository outside of London can probably attest, many local 
and regional archives are massively underfunded. This compromises the quality of staff training; 
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inhibits investment in storage facilities which, in order to accept new accessions, must 
periodically be expanded; and stretches staff time so dramatically as to compromise both the 
quality of research advice and comprehensive cataloguing practices. It also means that once 
things are lost, they are unlikely to be found – as indeed a large proportion of the files I had 
identified in Yorkshire turned out to be.  
 The second reason has to do with the dynamics underpinning archival deposits. Archives 
can, and do, actively seek out material to add to their collections. But the majority of items are 
donated by groups or individuals. Thus, in order for an item to make it into an archive, it must 
pass at least two approval phases: first, the donor must wish the records to be available to future 
generations; second, the archive must deem the items worthy of the expense of adding them to 
the collection, a determination generally made on grounds of historical significance or interest. 
Many local councillors’ and aldermen’s papers, as well as backbench MPs’, do not get deposited. 
This is probably a matter of effort on the part of the donors, although not necessarily. The 
personal papers of anti-immigrationist campaigners and groups have also not been donated, 
although likely for different reasons. Britain’s legacy when it comes to immigration is, from the 
perspective of the early twenty-first century, embarrassing at best and abhorrent at worst: as 
such, it is not clear that those who were directly involved in the anti-immigrationist movement 
would feel encouraged, able, or proud to deposit the evidence of their participation in this 
movement.  
 Historians have struggled with making sense of unpleasant and objectionable historical 
topics across a wide range of locations and periods. In some cases the records of atrocities, such 
as the Holocaust, were the domain of government agencies, and thus generally are more 
comprehensive and complete, if not always available to researchers. Other issues, such as the 
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trans-Atlantic slave trade, incurred a certain amount of related, routine documentation, such as 
bills of lading and sale, which can be mined for information by the diligent historian. In terms of 
source base availability, anti-immigration movements represent elements of both trends, insofar 
as immigration was a topic of great concern to government agencies, and the process of 
immigration and local efforts to in response to its increase are reasonably well-documented. 
What these records do not capture is what was said behind closed doors. Shame is a powerful 
force, particularly with respect to memory. When individuals are ashamed of something in their 
past, because they or society have changed their mind(s) about the appropriateness of that 
behaviour, there is a tendency to eliminate that event from their personal historical record. As a 
result, those documents are very rarely available to the public.  
I have, when terminology varies, aimed to replicate the language used by many members 
of the anti-immigrationist movement. Many present-day readers will likely find this language 
jarring, if not outright upsetting. So they ought; so I was, when I read it myself. But that the 
language used then can be so upsetting to readers today is among the best indications of how 
dramatically popular mindsets about the appropriate limits of political language have changed 
since mid-century. It is tempting to read our present-day awareness of how language functions to 
enforce difference and to entrench hatred as common to the whole of the second half of the 
twentieth century.55 Certainly there were those in the period in question who rejected this use of 
language and who agitated against it while propounding a new vocabulary of empowerment and 
respect. But it would be a mistake to assume that this attitude was found among more than a few 
select groups. Even the state typically used the term “coloured immigrants,” with no notion that 
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this was anything other than respectful or appropriate.56 Words and phrases such as “nigger,” 
“wog,” “putty-coloured” (for biracial) and “Paki” were all in use by a substantial proportion of 
Britons in this period. These words were occasionally expressed with a specific, malicious intent; 
for others, they were simply the only relevant words they knew. It is essential to remember that 
this vocabulary, entrenched as it is in notions of social Darwinism, scientific racism, the legacies 
of colonialism and slavery, and a deeply-rooted sense of insuperable racial difference and 
superiority, was to a certain extent the lingua franca of the period.57 People used these words 
because they were enmeshed in the mental world with which we continue to associate them; they 
used them because very many of them were still convinced that the references they contained 
were true. Tony Kushner has argued that “[t]here persists a strong tendency to deny racism and 
exclusion – past and present – and therefore a need still to study its impact and importance in 
British society and culture, especially on the minorities concerned.”58 My intent in using the 
language of contemporaries is not to further entrench or empower that language, but rather to 
underscore the extent, and perceived legitimacy, of its use in British society, even at a relatively 
recent date. 
The so-called “voice of the immigrant,” by contrast, is largely absent from this account. 
This silence is one that pervades anti-immigrationist accounts, and it is a silence that is 
significant enough to be preserved. Anti-immigrationists did not think individual immigrants 
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were worth talking about, unless to specify some complaint; certainly, they were not deemed 
worthy of a chance to defend themselves, or to respond to the claims made by anti-
immigrationists. Many immigrants did defend themselves, vociferously and effectively, in a 
number of public and private venues, but these efforts were not of interest to anti-
immigrationists. Other scholars have conducted painstaking research to reconstruct the lives of 
these immigrants, and while it may seem appealing to include the “counter-argument,” as it 
were, to anti-immigrationism, it is unfortunately true that anti-immigrationists did not take these 
counter-arguments seriously, and there is no evidence that they were bothered to respond in any 
way. So, I have not imported the “voice of the immigrant” although research on this subject 
increasingly exists: I believe that it is important that readers be struck, as I was, by its absence, 
and that this absence matters and ought not to be retroactively compensated for. Anti-
immigrationists spoke about, and on behalf of, immigrants; they did not acknowledge that 
immigrants had a voice of their own, and their arguments about immigration reflect this 
foreclosure of immigrant representation and its assumption by non-immigrants. Thus, part of the 
aim of this project has been to reconstruct the worldview of anti-immigrationists, to recreate their 
thought processes, and to understand the source of their successes. This process necessarily 
involves drawing attention to the lives of individuals whose values and actions would in the 
twenty-first century be deemed specious and destructive by many. My intent is not to glamourize 
or to valorize these individuals. Rather, my desire is to understand how and why destructive and 
exclusive processes, even those which verge into the abhorrent, operate and become appealing to 
individuals of various backgrounds.  
*** 
This dissertation examines how, and why, anti-immigrationism operated as an integrated part of 
the established political system and culture from the 1950s through to the introduction of the 
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1981 British Nationality Act. These years trace the evolution of anti-immigrationism from a dull 
rumble to a massive outcry, as well as a shift from a commitment to Commonwealth principles 
to a virulent opposition to a multiethnic Britain, and finally to a retreat of anti-immigrationist 
language in the face of a new wave of violent extremism and a global emphasis on a language of 
inclusion and diversity. I argue that this story is less one of the success of the left in persuading 
the right to abandon its commitment to anti-immigrationism, than of the success of the extreme 
right in claiming anti-immigrationism as its own, to the dismay of the more moderate right and 
centre-right. Anti-immigrationists succeeded because they were able to integrate their platforms 
into an existing political system, and to attach that platform to a more broadly relevant set of 
complaints. Much research thus far has focused on the national iterations of immigration policy 
and anti-immigrant sentiment. My focus is primarily that of the local, where local councils bore 
responsibility for implementing many programs designed to serve, or exclude, immigrant 
populations, and which served as a focus for a large proportion of anti-immigrationist organizing 
and campaigning.  
Chapter one provides a brief overview of the history of immigration and citizenship 
legislation, followed by a summary of the shifting notions of Britishness and exclusion that 
underpinned trends in legislation, as well as the general worldview of anti-immigrations. The 
chapter proceeds to outline the geographic and political affiliations of anti-immigrationists, 
followed by a summary of the positions of the three mainstream political parties on immigration 
through this period. It then details the various subgroups of the major political parties and the 
independent organizations which advocated in favour of anti-immigrationist legislation and 
policies, as well as the anti-immigrationist groups of the extreme right. This is followed by an 
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enumeration of some of the most frequently invoked proposals for anti-immigrationist policies 
and legislative intervention. 
Chapter two focuses upon the view of citizenship and democracy advanced by anti-
immigrationists, and the tactics they utilized to conduct their campaigns. According to anti-
immigrationists, their activism was part of the exercise of their own active citizenship, and the 
grounds for their complaints, and utilization of the established political system, were part of their 
view of what constituted a genuine democracy. The tactics and organizational structures adopted 
by anti-immigrationists reflect their commitment to working within the existing democratic 
system, and their conviction that their activism was a reflection of this commitment. The vast 
majority of anti-immigrationists’ refusal to adopt illegal or violent tactics was essential in 
ensuring any degree of success in appealing to the highest levels of government, and it was the 
networks forged between grassroots supporters and the governing elite that underpinned the 
extent to which anti-immigrationists were successful in advancing their views. The careers of 
four prominent anti-immigrationist politicians are then examined to understand how anti-
immigrationism came to enjoy as much success as it did on the basis of these tactics, but also the 
limitations imposed by operating within a democratic system. 
For anti-immigrationists, knowledge was indeed power. The types of knowledge that they 
used and the ways in which this information was deployed were essential both to framing the 
successes of the movement, and to underpinning their self-image as genuinely democratic 
citizens speaking on behalf of a disempowered, disenfranchised majority. Chapter three 
examines the ways in which anti-immigrationists deployed anecdotal and statistical information 
in order to counter the claims by government and community agencies that immigration was of 
net benefit to the nation, and instead to frame immigration and immigrants as a burden that the 
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British state and the British people could not possibly sustain in the long term. It also examines 
the role played by social scientific research in legitimizing anti-immigrationists’ claims, by 
placing them within an established tradition of political advocacy. 
Women figured as defenders both of the nation and of the home, and the anti-
immigrationist movement drew upon this view to argue against the admission of non-white 
people to the UK. Chapter four examines the ways in which women participated in the anti-
immigrationist movement, as well as the gendered nature of anti-immigrationist arguments. Anti-
immigrationist campaigns referred to a strictly gendered notion of families and domesticity that 
echoed views promoted by contemporary organizations such as the National Viewers and 
Listeners Association (NVALA). Indeed, the gendered nature of anti-immigrationism in this 
period was part of a broader set of movements promoting a morally conservative agenda, many 
of which featured women in a leadership role. Despite the fact that these groups have often been 
positioned as marginal and ineffective, I argue that the taking up of such arguments by a range of 
organizations indicates a much more significant role for moral conservatism through the 1960s 
and 1970s than has previously been suggested. Furthermore, the fact that government policy 
provided a framework that functioned to bolster anti-immigrationist claims about the “right” way 
to be a family in Britain indicates that anti-immigrationist arguments were more closely aligned 
to mainstream values, at least as reflected in policy, than is generally accepted. Despite this 
government endorsement of anti-immigrationists’ gendered view of the world, I conclude that 
women’s participation in the anti-immigrationist movement was constrained by their gender, 
even as their gendered identity was used by the movement writ large to demonstrate its 
legitimacy. A series of examples from Smethwick in the West Midlands will be used to trace the 
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gendered nature of anti-immigrationist demands, the participation of women in the anti-
immigration movement, and their variable results. 
Chapter five examines the means by which large-scale, popular anti-immigrationist 
sentiments were contained. Control of popular opinion bolstered by the support of select MPs 
and a great deal of local government required careful planning, including the collection of data 
on public opinion and the circulation of elite-approved messaging. This included both public and 
party-specific opinion polls, as well as internal party strategies to ensure that official policies 
were absorbed by members at the constituency level. This chapter will then examine the reasons 
why anti-immigrationism was controlled, including America’s struggle to come to terms with 
race and racial difference, the challenges posed by Cold War ethno-nationalist movements, and 
the emergence of the National Front as the group most strongly associated with anti-
immigrationism, despite their use of violent and illegal tactics. Elite rejection of anti-
immigrationism as it was popularly articulated had a great deal to do with controlling their 
image, and it was this desire to maintain the appearance of tolerance while implementing 
exclusive legislation that accounts for the anti-immigrationist paradox.59  
                                                          
59 A note on the sources: in cases of correspondence between private citizens and members of political parties, or 
employees of those parties or the state, I have suppressed or altered the names of private citizens who wrote 
exclusively in this private capacity, and not as representatives of any political organization. 
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Chapter 1. Who Do We Think We Are? Defining Anti-Immigrationism 
 
In 1980, a Conservative Party Study Group under the chairmanship of Edward Gardner 
undertook a study of British nationality law.1 They titled the findings of their study “Who Do We 
Think We Are?” In doing so, the members of the study group drew attention to the deeply 
contested nature of both British identity, and the legislation that underpinned it, in the postwar 
period. The study group was chiefly concerned with the question of admission to the British 
nation: who, legally speaking, was entitled to be British? Who had the right to make claims 
against both the British nation and the state? These questions preoccupied not only members of 
political study groups, but also a wide range of individuals across British society. Many of those 
individuals concluded that British identity ought not to be granted to any and all comers; rather, 
to be British was to be a member of an exclusive group, and new entrants were not to be 
encouraged. Anti-immigrationism has been among the most persistent trends in British history, 
and has attracted the attention of historians of the second half of the twentieth century in 
particular. To date, historians have focused chiefly upon elite politicians, and upon organizations 
of the far right. This methodological thrust thus overlooks the substantial corpus of individuals 
who were neither powerful decision-makers, nor associated with extremist political 
organizations, but who supported restrictions on immigration and other related legislative and 
policy measures.  
This chapter will provide an overview of the anti-immigrationist movement, outlining its 
geographic locations, its general aims, and making some suggestions about its demographic 
                                                          
1 “Who Do We Think We Are? An inquiry into British Nationality Law by a Conservative Study Group under the 
chairmanship of Edward Gardner, QC MP” CPC No. 650 (London: Conservative Political Centre, March 1980) p. 5, 




nature. While the most frequent stereotype of an anti-immigrationist is a young, possibly 
unemployed, working-class male, such individuals did not comprise the whole of the anti-
immigrationist movement. As Camilla Schofield has argued, middle-class individuals, and no 
shortage of women, were the leading supporters of anti-immigrationist campaigns.2 Middle-class 
people made up the organizational core of a number of key groups within this movement, as well 
as the unaffiliated mass to whom these groups appealed, because they had access to resources 
and experience that working-class individuals often lacked. Many of these middle-class people 
were ultimately more successful in political endeavours than working-class people, in no small 
part because political elites took their views more seriously. The anti-immigrationist movement, 
which at its greatest strength appealed to ideals of British respectability, moral conservatism, and 
notions of authentic democratic citizenship rooted in a strictly Anglo-Saxon view of British 
history, found its greatest successes when framed as a middle-class, Middle England enterprise. 
Members of the working class may have been anti-immigrationism’s foot soldiers, but many of 
its commanders were much more closely tied to the nation’s power brokers. 
I 
Anti-immigrationism was, by definition, contingent upon the existence of immigration itself. As 
noted in the introduction, Britain had been a nation of immigrants for hundreds of years before 
the twentieth century. What was distinct about postwar immigration, however, was the countries 
from which it originated. The process of decolonization that followed the end of the Second 
World War produced both new independent nation-states, and a new international political 
                                                          
2 Camilla Schofield, Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




entity, the British Commonwealth.3 The Commonwealth did not fulfill precisely the same 
function as the British Empire, but it played important symbolic and legal roles. The 
Commonwealth, in common parlance, was divided into the “Old Commonwealth,” the largely 
white dominions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and the “New Commonwealth,” the 
remainder of the empire which had not achieved dominion status, and which had a 
predominantly non-white population. Previous waves of immigration had arrived in the United 
Kingdom chiefly from elsewhere in Europe, from Ireland and Eastern Europe especially.4 During 
the postwar period, immigrants came largely from the nations of the New Commonwealth. From 
the late 1940s through the 1950s, these migrants largely originated from the West Indies; by the 
1960s, the majority of new arrivals hailed from the Indian subcontinent.5 
The phenomenon of New Commonwealth migration was in large part a consequence of 
the 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA). Introduced in response to the 1946 Canadian 
Citizenship Act, which made residents of that country citizens of Canada first, and of the British 
Empire second, the 1948 BNA formalized a category of citizenship for all residents of the United 
Kingdom and its empire. This citizenship did not distinguish between residents of the empire and 
the UK: all were equally entitled to live, work, and otherwise participate in the society of the 
United Kingdom.6 The Act was largely a formalization of pre-war ad hoc policy: effectively 
open-door, and non-discriminatory against any residents of the British Empire. The BNA was, in 
                                                          
3 See the essays in Stuart Ward, ed., British Culture and the End of Empire (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2001). 
 
4 Colin Holmes, John Bull’s Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Education, 1988), 20-6. Many of those arriving from Eastern Europe were also Jewish.  
 
5 Ibid., 224. 
 
6 Stephen Brooke, “The Conservative Party, Immigration and National Identity, 1948-1968,” in The Conservatives 
and British Society, 1880-1990, eds. Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 1996), 151. 
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many ways, a last tribute to, or celebration of, what would soon rapidly disappear: a notion of the 
empire as a fundamental, constitutive element of the greatness of the United Kingdom. The 
official egalitarianism of the BNA represented, perhaps, a kind of benevolent paternalism. It is 
probably fair to say that its writers did not anticipate the extent to which this new category of 
citizenship would shape British society for the remainder of the century. 
Migration from non-white colonies to the UK had occurred in small numbers prior to the 
Second World War and the end of empire. These migrants were largely either colonial elites, 
young men sent to Britain to be trained to lead their counties of origin, or itinerant workers such 
as seamen.7 While a substantial proportion of seamen did permanently settle in the United 
Kingdom, their numbers were so small as to be negligible compared to the population of the UK 
as a whole. The presence of these “dark strangers” aroused anxieties nonetheless, and racial 
tensions were evident in port towns such as Liverpool and Cardiff. Disturbances in Cardiff 
precipitated one of the earliest restrictions on migration on explicitly racial grounds: the 
Coloured Alien Seamen Order of 1925.8 Following the First World War, the Colonial Office 
undertook a project of repatriation of alien seamen, focused particularly on men of Chinese and 
West African origin.9 During the Second World War young men from British colonies, and 
particularly those from the West Indies were often stationed on British soil as members of the 
                                                          
7 See John Belchem, Before the Windrush: Race relations in 20th-century Liverpool (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2014); Bill Schwarz, West Indian Intellectuals in Britain (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2003); Susan Pennybacker, From Scottsboro to Munich: Race and Political Culture in 1930s Britain 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009). 
 
8 Earlier restrictive acts had chiefly targeted Eastern European Jews by excluding “paupers” from entry to the 
country. The first such restrictive act was the Aliens Act of 1905, followed by the Alien Restriction Acts of 1914 
and 1919. See Holmes, John Bull, 95, 110-3. 
 




armed forces.10 The presence of young black men in American battalions from 1942 onwards 
introduced new complications to the British view on race relations: American forces typically 
operated Jim Crow restrictions on their troops even while stationed in the UK, in contrast to the 
practice of official integration in British camps, and society more generally. The clash between 
the two styles of race relations created a problematic situation for British officials who wished to 
placate their American allies, but also to avoid offending non-white colonial residents working in 
the UK.11  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, however, organs of the British state began 
actively recruiting labour from British colonies, particularly those in the Caribbean (referred to 
by contemporaries as the West Indies). London Transport and the new National Health Service 
were eager to attract young men and women to work as bus drivers and conductors, and as nurses 
and medical orderlies, in order to fill the rapid expansion of jobs required to support these 
services. Indeed, the success of the nascent welfare state was contingent upon the rapid 
recruitment of vast numbers of qualified employees under the aegis of the sitting Labour 
government.12 The arrival of (officially) 492 West Indians in London on 22 June 1948 aboard the 
Empire Windrush has become fixed in historical memory as a watershed moment in the course of 
British race relations.13 The disparity between the future imagined by this first wave of West 
                                                          
10 Young men of West Indian origin were particularly common in RAF ground crews. Approximately 10,000 men 
and a handful of women from the Caribbean, chiefly Jamaica, were stationed in the UK during this period. Cited in 
Sonya O. Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain 1939-1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 245. 
 
11 Rose, Which People’s War, 251-2. 
 
12 On West Indian recruitment see Holmes, John Bull, 220-1. 
 
13 Tony Kushner, The Battle of Britishness: Migrant Journeys, 1685 to the Present (Manchester: Manchester 




Indian migrants and the reality of the discrimination and hostility many of them faced has 
become the focus of both academic and literary studies.14 Nonetheless, attracted by the promise 
of high-paying employment, with the prospect of further advancement than was likely to be 
possible in their home countries, migrants from the West Indies, and increasingly South Asia, 
continued to relocate to the United Kingdom without legal barrier. Efforts were made to restrict 
this migration as early as 1955, when Cyril Osborne, then MP for Louth in Lincolnshire, 
attempted to introduce a private members’ bill to that effect. It failed due to lack of support, but 
rumblings of opposition to immigration in parliament carried on, particularly among the 
Conservative backbench, until 1961. Disturbances in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958 fueled 
this latent discontent.15  
The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, introduced in the House of Commons in 1961 
by the Conservative government under Harold Macmillan, sought specifically to restrict the 
entry of migrants from the New Commonwealth. It did so by the introduction of a voucher 
system, to which individuals holding Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies status 
(CUKC, i.e. citizenship held by those whose passports were not directly issued by the 
government of the United Kingdom) were subject. Prospective migrants from the New 
Commonwealth holding CUKC citizenship now had to apply for admission to the country under 
one of three categories based on their training and employment prospects: A: skilled migrants 
who had a specific offer of employment; B: skilled migrants who did not have an offer of 
                                                          
14 The experience of living in the UK as a migrant or child of migrants from the New Commonwealth has proved to 
be the source of not only a substantial body of historiography, but also a growing body of so-called diaspora 
literature, including the novels of Zadie Smith, Monica Ali, and Andrea Levy, several of which have been produced 
as popular television miniseries by the BBC and ITV and rebroadcast on the American PBS program “Masterpiece.” 
 





employment, but who were trained in a specific field in which there was a labour shortage, or C: 
those who fell into neither category A nor B. In actual practice, very few were ever admitted on 
category C vouchers, so the vast majority of migrants entering the UK after 1962 were either 
skilled workers or dependants thereof.16 Amendments to the act in 1965 further reduced the 
number of employment vouchers available to a maximum of 5,500 a year, and further tightened 
administrative controls.17 
The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was introduced with even more haste.18 In 
1967, Jomo Kenyatta had introduced a policy of Africanisation in newly independent Kenya. 
This put Kenya’s thousands of residents of South Asian heritage at risk of losing their 
employment and assets. The largely middle-class Kenyan Asians were motivated in significant 
numbers to take advantage of an offer made by the United Kingdom at Kenyan independence in 
1963: rather than taking up Kenyan citizenship, residents of the colony had the option of 
maintaining direct citizenship in the United Kingdom (rather than the CUKC citizenship that 
rendered individuals subject to the provisions of the 1962 Act), making them United Kingdom 
Passport Holders, or UKPHs. This citizenship entitled them to work and settle in the United 
Kingdom, and from late 1967 to early 1968 several thousand did exactly this. Public reaction 
was swift, and overwhelmingly negative. The “flood” of Kenyan Asians entering the country, 
particularly as the British economy seemed to be on the verge of a downward spiral, was widely 
considered unwelcome. Legislators, led by James Callaghan in the Home Office, hastily 
                                                          
16 Holmes, John Bull, 232. 
 
17 Holmes, A Tolerant Country, 54 offers an overview of the process of increasing restriction from 1961 to 1965. 
 
18 Randall Hansen provides an overview of this episode and the specific provisions of the 1968 CIA in “The Kenyan 





introduced a piece of legislation that limited the entry of Commonwealth migrants, even those 
possessing a United Kingdom passport, to those who could claim a “substantial connection” to 
the United Kingdom.19 In practice, this meant that unless a direct family member had been born 
in the United Kingdom – and thus, was almost certainly white – Kenyan individuals holding 
United Kingdom citizenship would not be admitted to the country. On the eve of the 
implementation of the Act, chaos ruled the airports both in Nairobi and in London. Thousands 
were said to be queuing to board flights to London; lineups at customs went on for hours.20 1968 
emerged as the key turning point at which the numbers of immigrants, including those in 
possession of British passports, entering the country were drastically, and dramatically, reduced.  
The 1971 Immigration Act altered the terms of the preceding two acts by introducing 
temporary work permits in lieu of employment vouchers, and again tightened the administrative 
processes surrounding immigration.21 The 1971 Act formalized the category of “substantial 
connection” by introducing the concept of “patriality,” which was officially recognized as being 
demonstrated by a parent, grandparent, or husband born in the UK.22 Patrials remained exempt 
from the provisions of the 1971 Act. However, a near-repeat of the 1968 Kenyan Asians crisis 
occurred in 1972, when Idi Amin threatened to expel Asians living in Uganda. The proscriptions 
                                                          
19 While this terminology was not used in the act itself, it was frequently invoked by Conservative commentators 
and policymakers. See for example Report, “The Control of Immigration,” 1973 ACP (73) 78, p. 3, ACP 3/20 Race 
Relations and Immigration Policy Group, 1975-77, CPA. 
 
20 See coverage in all major national newspapers, including the Times and Guardian, for February 1968 including, 
for example, Times, 16 February 1968, 5. 
 
21 “Immigration. A bill to amend and replace the present immigration laws, to make certain related changes in the 
citizenship law and enable help to be given to those wishing to return abroad, and for purposes connected 
therewith.” Session: 1970/71, No. 117, Vol. III.1, 20th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers 
 
22 Having a wife who was born in the UK generally considered insufficient to demonstrate patriality because the 
“natural abode of a married couple was deemed to be the home country of the husband. This issue came to 
controversial light through the 1970s, and will be addressed at greater length in chapter four. See also memo from 




of the 1968 Act still applied, but despite great opposition the government allowed the settlement 
of some 27,000 Ugandan Asians in the UK through the Uganda Resettlement Board.23 Many of 
the objections raised against this move were related to the framing of Ugandan Asians as 
refugees. Critics in the United Kingdom argued that the evident affluence of many within this 
group disqualified them from being identified as refugees.24 Government officials maintained, 
however, that the provisions of the 1968 and 1971 Acts rendered a number of individuals abroad 
who held UK citizenship, but had no claims to patriality, effectively stateless, and that the fact of 
statelessness was sufficient to classify an individual as a valid refugee claimant.  
In 1980 Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government began debating a new British 
Nationality Bill, with discussions extending into 1981. As a consequence of the fact that much of 
the so-called immigration legislation for the postwar period was actually about citizenship, the 
1981 BNA, ostensibly a citizenship bill, actually had a great deal to do with immigration. It 
proposed to introduce three new categories to replace CUKC: British citizenship; British 
Dependent Territories Citizenship; and British Overseas Citizenship.25 British citizenship was 
awarded to those CUKCs who would have been able to meet the requirements of patriality as 
defined in the 1971 Act. British Dependent Territories Citizenship went to those who had close 
ties with one of the remaining colonial or dependent territories (such as the Falkland Islands), 
and British Overseas Citizens were all those who had previously held CUKC status, but who did 
                                                          
23 Sir Charles Cunningham, “The work of the Uganda Resettlement Board,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 2, no. 3 (1973): 261-7. 
 
24 See for example the letters in D 709 2/2/1/10 File of constituency correspondence: ‘Ugandan Asians’. Feb 1972-
Nov 1973, University of Liverpool Special Collections. 
 
25 The specifics of the bill’s provisions were debated as early as the mid-1970s. An explanation of why the various 
types of citizenship were proposed is included in “Towards a New Citizenship: A Report on British Nationality by a 
Committee of the Society of Conservative Lawyers” C.P.C. No. 566 (London: Conservative Political Centre, May 




not fall into either of the first two categories.26 The effect of the 1981 BNA was to definitively 
prevent those who could not claim patriality from assuming residence in the UK, thus 
definitively preventing any further occurrences of either of the African Asian crises, and 
prohibiting the entry of any but a minute handful of colonial-born individuals from settling there. 
Increasingly restrictive immigration legislation was not universally supported, either in 
Parliament or by the general public, and so a series of Race Relations Acts were introduced in an 
effort to bolster good relationships between the white population and minority groups. In 1965, 
the Labour government under Harold Wilson introduced the first Race Relations Act. The act 
was designed to counter the routine discrimination that non-white minority groups frequently 
faced. The act prohibited overt discrimination in places of “public resort”; in the disposal of 
tenancies, or public housing allocation; and the “incitement to racial hatred.”27 However, it made 
no reference to discrimination in organizational membership, the allocation of private properties 
to let, or employment, and most problematically contained no mechanism for prosecuting 
violators of the act. It was largely a symbolic gesture, although it did lay the groundwork for 
subsequent race relations legislation.28 The act also established the Race Relations Board, which 
along with its successor, the Commission for Racial Equality, was one of the most prominent 
sources of race relations policy and theory for the second half of the twentieth century. 
                                                          
26 “British Nationality Bill. A bill to make fresh provision about citizenship and nationality, and to amend the 
Immigration Act 1971 as regards the right of abode in the United Kingdom.” Session: 1980/81, Bill 20, 20th 
Century House of Commons Sessional Papers. 
 
27 The official title of the bill was “Race relations. A bill to prohibit discrimination on racial grounds in places of 
public resort; to prevent the enforcement or imposition on racial grounds of restrictions on the transfer of tenancies; 
to penalise incitement to racial hatred; and to amend section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936.” Session: 1964/5, No. 
125 Vol. IV.1, 20th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers. 
 
28 Votes by Peter Griffiths, who will be examined in chapter two, and Harold Gurden at the committee stage 
prevented a move by other MPs to strengthen the provisions of the act. Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: 
Race, Politics and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (Chicago: University of Chicago 




Conciliation Committees were set up under the auspices of the 1965 RRA in April of 1967. 
These committees, designed to be the first port of call for complaints of violations of the RRA, 
were first established in Greater London, the North West, the West and East Midlands, and 
Yorkshire. The Committees were to each consist of six to eight members “prominent in various 
walks of life.”29 While this was an effort to address concerns about the means by which the 
principles of the RRA could be enforced, it still lacked the comprehensiveness of service and 
legal strength which many critics argued were necessary. In response to left-wing outcry against 
the limitations of the new Commonwealth Immigrants Act, legislators introduced a new Race 
Relations Bill in May 1968. The 1968 Race Relations Act filled many of the gaps left by the 
1965 Act, including the prohibition of discrimination in jobs and housing, and in the provision of 
public services.30 It also created the Community Relations Commission in response to 
complaints about the lack of avenues for enforcement in the 1965 Act, with the aim of generating 
“harmonious community relations” between ethnic groups.31 The CRC was a national expansion 
of the less formal and more unevenly distributed Conciliation Committees, but still struggled to 
meet the level of dissatisfaction about implementation. The 1976 Race Relations Act went a step 
further than the 1968 Act, prohibiting discrimination in education and public functions, as well 
                                                          
29 Paper by J. McDougall, (Sr.) “Race Relations and the Law in Britain” ACP (67)37 Secret Copy No. 25, Circulated 
by CRD, 28 June 1967, CRD 3/16/2 Immigration Policy Group Correspondence 1965-1967, CPA. 
 
30 The preamble to the initial version of the Bill stated that “The purpose of this Bill is to replace sections 1 to 4 of 
the Race Relations Act 1965 by a comprehensive measure which will make it unlawful to discriminate in the 
provision of goods, facilities or services, in employment, in membership of organisations of employers or workers, 
and in the disposal of housing accommodation or other land or to publish discriminatory advertisements; will 
expand and strengthen the machinery for conciliation where discrimination is alleged to have taken place; and will 
make fresh provision to facilitate enforcement, where conciliation fails, and to extend the remedies available in the 
courts.”  “Race relations. A bill to make fresh provision with respect to discrimination on racial grounds, and to 
make provision with respect to relations between people of different racial origins.” Session: 1967-68, No. 128, Vol. 
III. 663, 20th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers. 
 




as introducing the Commission for Racial Equality, which served to review and enforce the 
legislation on an ongoing basis.32 In the CRE, race relations legislation finally had a large-
enough, and sufficiently funded, organization that it was possible to enforce some of the 
legislative provisions, and the CRE undertook a number of investigations beginning in the late 
1970s into reported violations of the act by both individuals and groups.33 Those who were found 
to be in violation of the Act were prosecuted and/or subject to a rehabilitative educational 
program to address the areas in which the individual’s actions, or group policies, transgressed 
legal boundaries.  
In many respects the Race Relations Acts were successors to the 1936 Public Order Act 
introduced after Oswald Mosley’s fascist supporters rioted in Olympia in 1934. Their 
introduction reflected a two-pronged strategy on the part of successive governments: limit the 
number of entering immigrants, and assimilate or integrate those who were already resident. 
They were designed to prohibit the most overt and public manifestations of racist sympathies, 
notably hate speech, but initially they were largely toothless with respect to the more veiled and 
insidious forms of discrimination. It was not until the introduction of the 1976 Act that it became 
illegal for private clubs, including, notably, working-men’s clubs and the clubs associated with 
various political parties, to prohibit membership and/or entry by non-white individuals. It was 
widely rumoured in 1961 that the Sandwell Youth Club in Smethwick operated a colour bar, but 
                                                          
32 “Race relations. A bill to make fresh provision with respect to discrimination on racial grounds and relations 
between people of different racial groups; and to make in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 amendments for bringing 
provisions in that act relating to its administration and enforcement into conformity with the corresponding 
provisions in this act.” Session: 1975-76, No. 68, Vol. VI.363, 20th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers. 
 
33 The records of the CRE’s investigations into potential violators of the Act remain one of the great untapped 
sources for immigration and race relations history, in part because large swathes remain closed under the 30 years 




the local membership were unapologetic.34 By the time private clubs came to be indicted and 
investigated for violation of this code, it was the early 1980s. These investigations often turned 
up tacit codes of understanding, word-of-mouth prohibition passed from doorman to doorman, 
but very rarely reflected in written club rules.35 These discriminatory practices could only be 
revealed by long-term, in depth research by investigatory bodies, which were not mobilized until 
the 1976 Act. 
Given the numerous pieces of immigration and race relations legislation introduced since 
1981, it would be misleading to suggest that either area of policy was wholly resolved by these 
earlier pieces of legislation. There was, however, a series of significant changes resulting from, 
and reflected by, the course of the legislation outlined above. Most importantly, there was 
something of a conceptual transition in the course of this period from the notion of an 
“immigrant problem” to questions of “race relations.” In part, this shift was the result of 
demographic change: by the late 1970s and early 1980s, a substantial proportion of the minority 
population of the country had been born in the UK. These young people, educated in the British 
system and unburdened by the lack of familiarity experienced by their parents with the central 
institutions of British society, and fluent in the language of the country, were popularly 
acknowledged to have ambitions exceeding those of the previous generation. By the time the 
1981 BNA took effect, scarcely any “new” immigrants were arriving from the New 
Commonwealth; such new entries as existed were largely dependents of those already resident in 
the UK. That discrimination was still deemed to be a major social problem, despite the dramatic 
curtailing of immigration, indicated that there was still a great need for legislation on race 
                                                          
34 Smethwick Telephone, 14 July 1961, 7. 
 
35 See for example Commission for Racial Equality, “The Woodhouse Recreation Club & Social Institute, Leeds. 
Report of a Formal Investigation,” April 1980, Leeds Central Library. 
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relations, and indeed research and activism in this area continued apace into the late 1980s and 
1990s.36 While some might legitimately question the extent to which New Labour’s claims to 
have achieved a multicultural society in the late 1990s were in fact true, it remains that after 
1981, immigration, defined as the arrival of populations from former British colonies, and who 
were by and large not white, ceased to be the focus of major political and legislative 
campaigns.37 As such, the language and proposals of those who had espoused an anti-immigrant 
platform prior to 1981 were forced, if they had any remaining objections, to reframe their 
platforms and campaigns.  
II 
 
Of course, one of the key objections raised against immigration was not so much that immigrants 
were immigrants, but rather that they were not British. Indeed, a Conservative Study Group 
objected to the system of citizenship existing prior to the 1981 BNA on the grounds that there 
was an “absence of any separate identity of their own for citizens of this country. The law does 
not recognize any single, separate citizenship for ‘citizens of the UK’…We are all in the eyes of 
the law ‘citizens of the UK and Colonies’, a title that is as out of date as the British Nationality 
Act of 1948 that created it.”38  Tony Kushner has argued that “the evolving and contested nature 
of Britishness can be explored by analysing which groups have been allowed entry to, and which 
                                                          
36 The “Rock Against Racism” campaign, as well as the formal investigation into the Metropolitan Police as a home 
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have been excluded from, the nation’s borders.”39 A number of studies have gone to some pains 
to outline the ideas of British national identity that prevailed in the postwar period.40 These ideas 
were fundamentally exclusive, and in both intent and effect limited the number of people who 
could lay claim to membership in the British polity, both socially and legally. In order to be 
genuinely British, one must be able to claim possession of a certain specified list of attributes. 
Postwar ideas of Britishness had roots in republican, civic humanist, and idealist traditions, 
creating a context in which citizenship functioned as a “multidimensional framework that 
provides the basis upon which people can make claims on the political community concerning 
juridical rights and duties, political and ethical practices, and criteria of membership.”41 
Membership in the British polity was not simply a thin legal category, but entailed the 
assumption of civic responsibilities in exchange for social and political privileges, notably the 
services of the new universal welfare state.42 Part of the civic responsibilities required to assume 
this rule was the performance and endorsement of a particular set of cultural convictions, and a 
specific manner of behaviour typically referred to as “respectable.” 
A memory of the Second World War that emphasized experiences of service and 
sacrifice was central to many people’s conception of belonging to the British nation. Indeed, 
Kushner argues that “[t]he memory of the Second World War and more generally the Nazi era is 
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generally regarded as the most central element in constructing national identity in modern 
Britain.”43 Both Alice Ritscherle and Camilla Schofield have argued that this conception of 
Britishness was widespread during the postwar period, and particularly influential in anti-
immigrationist circles.44 Membership in the British nation was contingent upon having “done 
one’s bit,” having suffered the privation and tragedy for which a peaceful and comparatively 
prosperous postwar existence was a reward. As one disgruntled voter wrote to Nicholas True at 
the Conservative Research Department in 1980, “I hate to heard [sic] people murmur a lot of 
“guff” about, this being what we fought World War II for. As one who saw more than his fair 
share of the fighting (and was wounded before my eighteenth birthday) I can only say that I 
didn’t fire even one shot in order to make this once Great Country into a “Wogs Paradise”, or to 
watch the British People cunning [sic] subverted and betrayed by ‘do-gooders’.” The letter-
writer appended a note to his signature: “Formerly 2nd. Bn. Scots Guards – Willie Whitelaw was 
in the 3rd. Bn.”45  The invocation both of the writer’s personal sacrifice and of his shared service 
with a government minister serves to highlight an understanding of the Second World War as a 
crucible experienced by the British as a nation which bore ideological weight well into the 
second half of the twentieth century.  
The notion of service was essential to an ideal of Britishness, but one’s record of service 
could be overlooked if one did not meet another of the essential criteria for Britishness: race.46 
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As Wendy Webster notes, the concept of a “people’s empire” in which all residents of the British 
Empire were united in service during the Second World War dissipated rapidly after the end of 
conflict.47 Men from the West Indies who served in the Royal Air Force were not seen as 
deserving of the same respect as their white counterparts. Nor were the rank and file who served 
in the Asian and African theatres regarded as having experienced the same degree of sacrifice. 
Women and those unfit to serve who had been resident in colonial holdings through the period of 
the war had not experienced the trauma of the Blitz, or the stress of rationing. Their domestic 
skills had not been pushed to the breaking point by the pressures of the war, and so they could 
not possibly deserve to participate in the brave new postwar world in the same way that those 
who had genuinely suffered did.  
The fact that black and Asian men were also killed in massive numbers, or the fact that 
rationing and shortages also affected colonial regions, simply were not viewed as valid claims 
against the British nation.48 It remained the case that the wartime contributions of white men and 
women from the Dominions were regarded much more highly than those from the rest of the 
empire. Fundamentally, many in Britain did not feel that their nation could possibly include 
those who were not white. Previously, the British had been resistant to grant membership to all 
number of ethnic groups who were seen as Other in some way, including the Irish and Eastern 
European Jews.49 But from the late 1950s through to the 1980s (and beyond) non-white groups 
were widely seen as alien to the British polity. Few Britons wished to openly admit that race was 
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their criteria for exclusion. It was, these individuals claimed, actually a question of similar 
cultural values, and of the possibility for assimilation. White people from Canada and Australia 
just had more in common with the average Briton, particularly in terms of language, religion, and 
values. A Hindu from India who spoke no English, who wore unfamiliar clothes and ate strange 
food: there was simply no way such a person could properly adapt to life in the United Kingdom, 
and a great many in the UK did not feel inclined to go out of their way to adapt themselves to 
suit the lives of others. It is this line of thinking that Kushner identifies in twenty-first century 
Conservative proclamations on national identity, and which “can be partly traced to a longer 
Conservative tradition reaching back to at least the post-war era but taking specific shape since 
Enoch Powell’s major speeches from the late 1960s. From that time on the ‘New 
Right’…dominated discussions about Englishness through to the 1990s, employing a discourse 
that highlighted ‘culture’ rather than ‘race’ in defining national identity.”50 Many, if not most, 
Britons were careful to circumvent allegations of racism by a reliance on this exclusive 
conception of British identity framed in cultural terms.51 In doing so, elements of a worldview 
rooted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have persevered, as well as proving 
adaptable to a range of racial and ethnic groups deemed undesirable for membership in the 
British nation. 
Anti-immigrationists did not only rely upon a culturally exclusive definition of 
Britishness to make their arguments. They also generated a quantitative argument: that the 
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British state and economy could only afford to support a select group of individuals. Rules must 
therefore be set out to mitigate the size of the population that could place a burden upon 
infrastructure and resources. Many erstwhile neo-Malthusians argued that Britain at the mid-
century was already an overcrowded island, and that any increase of population would have 
disastrous results for British society.52 The fringes of Britishness must be strictly policed, then, in 
order to prevent such an increase, and the availability of a culturally exclusive definition of 
Britishness was a handy way of setting up such boundaries. This argument was particularly 
popular in the early days of postwar anti-immigrationism; the 1950s were a period of relative 
economic prosperity and high birth rates, and so the prospect of running out of land and space 
was more pressing than running out of money. However, until the late 1950s many of the 
countries of the New Commonwealth were still members of the British Empire, and so those who 
advocated an “open-door” immigration policy were keen to emphasize Britain’s continued 
responsibility to imperial and post-imperial holdings. Those who supported restrictions on 
immigration disagreed: committed to the notion that Britain simply could not bear the pressure of 
the additional population, and worrying about the growing presence of black faces and its impact 
upon the “cultural integrity” of the British nation, they proferred alternatives to immigration. 
Members of the Conservative Research Department suggested that perhaps Britain could 
increase its funding for international development projects: surely if Jamaica had improved 
manufacturing facilities, the jobs created and boost to the economy would be sufficiently 
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appealing to deter residents from relocating across the Atlantic (after all, they argued, surely they 
would rather stay at home, with their own people?).53 
While critics expressed concern about the burden placed on the British land mass by a 
booming population, contemporary political developments produced and reflected a dramatic 
increase in the quality of British life. Successive Conservative governments from 1951 to 1964 
had campaigned on a platform of improvements to the British economy and standard of living 
that followed in the footsteps of wartime deprivation. Harold Macmillan’s pronouncement in 
1957 that people in Britain “have never had it so good” underlined the apparent prosperity that 
Britons were then enjoying.54 Indeed, Macmillan was committed to an expansionist economic 
policy “not simply for electoral advantage but for its own sake.”55 The improvement of British 
economic fortunes was a priority, and for a moment in the late 1950s the four measures of 
postwar economic success – “full employment, stable prices, a favourable balance of payments 
and rising productivity”56 – were achieved by Macmillan’s government. As Lawrence Black has 
argued, the success of the right in appealing to what appeared to be popular support for rising 
affluence was not inevitable, but it is certainly the case that the right was far more successful 
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than the left in achieving material progress, if not necessarily social progress as the left would 
define it.57 In any case, at the beginning of our period life for Britons seemed to be characterized 
by a trajectory of material improvement; improvement that, anti-immigrationists argued, made 
Britain all the more attractive to prospective migrants. 
The perception that immigrants were motivated by craven desires bolstered the economic 
argument against immigration. Anti-immigrationists claimed that a popularly circulated vision of 
Britain as the land of milk and honey was misleading in the utmost degree, and was spurring 
acquisitive migrants to take up jobs that no self-respecting Briton would accept. In 1965, a 
Middlesex-based Conservative supporter argued that by the 1960s Britain’s reliance upon cheap 
migrant labour was so strong that it had effectively stunted innovation in mechanization; his 
argument was echoed at the 1969 Conservative Party Conference.58 If it were not for the open 
door to immigrants who would conduct menial jobs for pennies, British firms would have 
invested in technological innovations that would have advanced British industry as a whole, and 
would have improved the nation’s competitiveness in a global economy.59 In a period of 
economic downturn, such arguments were, while perhaps not appealing to all in their specifics, 
part of a broader sense that a declining British economy ought to be matched by a declining 
inflow of immigration. The devaluation of the pound in 1967 prompted widespread trepidation 
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among a working population old enough to remember the economic troubles of the 1930s. The 
“I’m Backing Britain” campaign of early 1968, in which employees worked longer hours without 
extra pay, was a grassroots effort to improve Britain’s balance of payments and improve the 
value of the pound begun by five secretaries in Surbiton, and which quickly attracted the support 
of then-Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Supported by large segments of the press, “Back Britain” 
logos typically consisted of a Union Jack logo accompanied by the phrase.60 Such a blatantly 
patriotic movement appealed to the wartime ethos of all British citizens “doing their bit” for the 
nation at large; it is perhaps unsurprising that nativist tendencies with respect to immigration 
emerged at new heights around the same period. The ongoing, and increasing, economic 
struggles of the country at large provided an argumentative arsenal for Britons who felt 
compelled to batten down the hatches, and to preserve what little, as they saw it, Britain had left. 
The idea of the nation was at the forefront of anti-immigrationist narratives. The manifestation of 
anti-immigrationism, however, was rather more local. 
III 
 
While aspects of the anti-immigrationist movement could fairly be described as national, anti-
immigrationist individuals were not evenly distributed across the whole of the United Kingdom. 
Indeed, very few anti-immigrationist groups made any headway in either Wales or Scotland 
during the postwar period. The most active anti-immigrationist groups were concentrated in 
areas of high immigrant settlement.61 Anti-immigrationists found their most fertile campaigning 
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ground in the West Midlands. Birmingham and its suburbs acted as an organizational centre, 
since a high proportion of elected representatives from that area espoused or endorsed anti-
immigrationist platforms. Both Peter Griffiths and Enoch Powell held constituencies in the 
Midlands, and a range of local councillors who supported anti-immigrationist policies also 
represented Midlands seats. West Yorkshire, and in particular the urban centres of Bradford and, 
to a lesser degree, Leeds also proved to be key sites of anti-immigrationist organization and 
sentiment. Anti-immigrationist disturbances took place in the Burley Road region of Leeds in 
1969, while an ardent anti-immigrationist MP represented the Haltemprice Division of Hull, later 
part of East Yorkshire, for much of this period.62  
Immigrants also settled in Lancashire and the North-West, but while Liverpool and 
Manchester did experience significant racial tensions through this period, notably culminating in 
the disturbances in Toxteth and Moss Side in 1981, anti-immigrationist campaigning did not take 
quite the same form as it did elsewhere in the UK. John Belchem has argued persuasively that 
Liverpool must be treated as a separate case in terms of twentieth-century race relations due to 
the fact that the minority population in Liverpool was largely born in the UK, and that 
comparatively few newcomers settled in that region of Lancashire.63 As a consequence of this 
demographic pattern very little in the way of funding or programming found its way to Liverpool 
during this period, since the “problem” of immigration was seen as that of new migrants, rather 
than long-established minority populations. Liverpool’s minority population had been 
concentrated in one area, Liverpool 8, for several decades by the 1950s, and so the resentment 
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about immigrants’ impact on housing that characterized anti-immigrationist movements across 
the rest of the country did not occur there in the same way. Given Liverpool’s long and fraught 
history with race relations, however, and particularly the coexistence of some of the most ardent 
defenders and critics of slavery in the city some two hundred years previously, it is perhaps not 
surprising that while Liverpool was the site for some of the earliest innovations in race relations 
institutions, one of its MPs was also among the most prominent and vocal anti-immigrationists 
through the 1950s and 1960s, Norman Pannell.  
A great number of new immigrants also settled in Greater London, but again, they did not 
settle across the area evenly. Immigrants lived chiefly in the less prosperous areas, largely to the 
south and east, and so too did anti-immigrationists. The London boroughs of Lambeth and Ealing 
(the latter located to the west of London, near Heathrow Airport, and remarkable for its greater 
prosperity among areas of immigrant settlement) became home to particularly large numbers of 
immigrants, and boasted a number of groups and representatives who were at the forefront of the 
anti-immigrationist movement. London also served, of course, as the epicentre for some of the 
most prominent race-related disturbances of this period: Notting Hill in 1958, and Brixton in 
1981. 
A group of relatively well-to-do activists who worked nationally as figureheads for, or 
leaders of, anti-immigrationist groups did not always match this geographical pattern. Lady Jane 
Birdwood served as the head of a number of anti-immigrationist and far-right groups after the 
death of her husband in 1962. Indeed, one 1974 newspaper article argued that the political scene 
in that period, and in particularly that of the right, was characterized by “the use of such 
apparently puritanical prudes as Lady Birdwood whose name pops up all over the place on the 
slightly less lunatic Right,” claiming that Lady Birdwood and her colleagues created “political 
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alliances which are based upon racial prejudice, fear of freedom and a paranoia that creates its 
own conspiracy theory, justifying its own aggression.”64 Her home at Philbeach Gardens in West 
London served as the headquarters for half a dozen organizations over the years, most of which 
had tacit (or not-so-tacit) racism as one of their planks. Similarly, some of the most ideologically 
or philosophically-motivated groups, as opposed to those whose platforms emphasized material 
objections stemming from living conditions in areas of immigrant concentration, tended not to be 
located in these immigrant areas. The Racial Preservation Society, headquartered in Sussex, 
emphasized a philosophy of social Darwinism and biological racism. Correspondents with the 
Conservative Party whose chief objection to immigration was that they violated an ideal British 
future, and who drew most clearly and directly on eugenicist ways of thinking, tended to be 
middle-class or upper middle-class, were often men, frequently ex-military officers, and were 
generally located in rural or semi-rural areas far from the manufacturing centres that attracted 
immigrants, as was the case with John Kirkpatrick mentioned above. 
IV 
 
Anti-immigrationists banded together, sometimes in dedicated groups, but also within the 
confines of established organizations. As the “party of control,” the Conservative Party was the 
most prominent of these. The official Conservative Party line through this period was that 
immigration must be strictly limited, and reduced as much as possible, while taking into account 
certain types of moral or ethical obligations, such as the right of dependents to join their parents 
already settled in the UK, and the need to recognize, or at least appear to do so, the settlement 
claims of those who were granted UK citizenship upon the independence of their countries, such 
                                                          




as the Kenyan and Ugandan Asians.65 All political parties have ranges, or wings of support for 
their various platforms. Anti-immigrationist sentiment was more than evident within the rank-
and-file of the party, as will be outlined throughout this study. While the party hierarchy, and 
particularly those in the Cabinet and Number 10, did not explicitly endorse much of the more 
extreme proposals of the grassroots anti-immigrationist, there were more than a few high-profile 
and powerful individuals who did. The next chapter will detail how the relationship between 
grassroots anti-immigrationism and political representatives operated, but it is important at this 
point to note that anti-immigrationism was evident at all ranks of the party organization. 
There were concentrations of anti-immigrationists in certain subgroups within, or 
affiliated to, the Conservative Party writ large. Both the Young Conservatives and Conservative 
Women’s Associations demonstrated a particular interest in immigration. Certain local 
associations of both groups tended to fall on the anti-immigrationist end of the spectrum, 
although there was significant variation within the broader umbrella organization. 
Unsurprisingly, those involved in either the YCs or Women’s Associations who lived in areas of 
high immigrant population were much more likely to endorse an anti-immigrationist platform. It 
is significant that both these organizations enjoyed a significant degree of independence from the 
main party, and being largely left to their own devices, were free to invite anti-immigrationist 
speakers to meetings and area conferences, as well as developing their own discussion groups, 
letters, and petitions, which might, or might not, then be forwarded to Conservative Central 
Office.66 The attitude of Central Office officials towards these groups was often that their 
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activities were largely recreational: one of the key functions of the women’s groups was to 
organize parties and events which did serve a fundraising purpose, but which were 
fundamentally social occasions. That members of these groups were not taken as seriously as the 
members of Conservative local associations proper was much to the benefit of anti-
immigrationist forces.  
Conservative members need not be young or women to hold anti-immigrationist 
convictions, however. The Monday Club was founded in 1961 as a breakaway policy group 
attached to the Conservative Party, named to commemorate “Black Monday,” 3 February 1961, 
the date of Harold Macmillan’s “wind of change” speech celebrating the growth of African 
nationalism.67 Members met (for dinner, on Mondays) to discuss how to better direct the 
Conservative Party towards the achievement of a future that was in line with a “genuine” 
conservative past. The group published two circulars: the Monday World, beginning in 1967 and, 
from 1972, the Monday News. At its height in 1971, the group “had the largest membership of 
any conservative group, with 10,000 members, 55 different groups in universities and colleges, 
35 Members of Parliament and 35 Peers.”68 The group foregrounded an individualist, and often 
libertarian approach to policy-making, emphasizing equality of opportunity rather than equality 
of results. Membership in the European Economic Community was supported, as better 
facilitating genuine free trade between member nations, which policy could then better be 
expanded to the rest of the world. Government restrictions on business, and the series of social 
policies regulating such issues as abortion and divorce that were introduced by Roy Jenkins in 
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the late 1960s, were derided as unnecessary government intervention in the private lives of 
citizens, despite their categorization as “permissive” policies. The two areas in which the 
Monday Club did not advance a libertarian worldview were immigration and abortion.69 On the 
question of immigration, the Club was convinced that very strict limitations ought to be placed 
on entry to the country by non-white migrants in particular, and many within the Club advocated 
for a widespread policy of repatriation. These views were largely referred to as being in the “true 
spirit” of Disraelian conservatism. As most British political groups do, the Monday Club relied 
upon history to explain themselves and the necessary path for the nation’s future. Rather counter-
intuitively, the group’s publications referred frequently to a Whiggish narrative of history in 
which Conservative politicians, rather than actual Whigs, had led the country through a 
progressive series of reforms that had advanced the individual as an unencumbered participant in 
society. The Monday Club prized those individuals who spoke their mind in support of their 
principles, regardless of the erstwhile popularity of their views. In praise of MP Duncan Sandys, 
who we will meet again in chapter two, a contributor to the Monday World wrote that “[h]e says 
what he feels, and is violently opposed to market research as a means of formulating policy...In 
spite of having this disregard for the majority view, Mr. Sandys seems to have acquired the 
knack of being in tune with it, among the rank and file of the Conservative Party in particular, 
but not only inside the party,”70 noting that Sandys received a “spontaneous” ovation at the most 
recent party conference. 
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The Monday Club was adamant, particularly in later years, that members of the group 
could not hold membership in any political party except for the Conservatives. This policy was 
meant to counter the perception (and probable reality) that the Club was gradually being 
infiltrated by members of the National Front. The club did, however, encourage coordination 
between the group and like-minded individuals and organizations abroad, particularly in the 
United States. They frequently published contributions by academics living in the US which 
advanced platforms that came to be associated with the American New Right. The Monday Club 
members turned to America as a model for their own political future. Indeed, many of the 
economic policies outlined in Club manifestos were adopted by Thatcher in her successive 
governments, and some of the Club’s members came to hold great power within her government, 
notably Angus Maude.71 Their stance on immigration was, despite the consequences of the 1981 
British Nationality Act in drastically curtailing the extent of non-white migration to the UK, not 
endorsed by Thatcher. We will return to the fate of these prominent anti-immigrationists in the 
conclusion, but it is important to note that their stance on immigration remained out of step not 
only with their own, otherwise libertarian, ideological convictions, but with the extent to which 
their policies were adopted and endorsed by the government in later years.  
While the Monday Club remains the most prominent of Conservative associations 
affiliated with anti-immigration, it was certainly not the only Conservative policy group to dwell 
upon immigration. The Conservative think-tank PEST (Pressure for Economic and Social 
Toryism) also actively supported limitations on immigration, although they were much less 
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fervent than their counterparts in the Monday Club.72 The more-liberal-still Bow Group also 
supported control, but little of the rest of the immigration control platform put forward by the 
right of the party.73 
The record of the Labour Party on immigration for this period is more ambivalent. 
Initially strongly opposed to control of immigration, partly on moral grounds, Labour did not 
support the introduction of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. By 1968, however, the 
party had altered their position dramatically, and supported the introduction of the 1968 CIA. 
Indeed, the extension of the 1962 CIA in 1964 and 1965 was supported by the sitting Labour 
government, despite their refusal to support the 1963 extension while in opposition. The party 
continued to support increasingly restrictive legislation through the 1970s, albeit with a less 
enthusiastic attitude than the Conservatives, and with dissent from a number of its members. The 
Labour Party’s stance on immigration was complicated by its close relationship with the Trades 
Union Congress, and the fact that many individuals held membership in both groups. The TUC 
frequently received petitions from shop-floor workers opposing the employment of immigrants, 
and the records of their conference meeting indicate a sharp divide in the attitude of the more 
prevalently anti-immigrationist rank-and-file, and a staunchly pro-immigration union 
leadership.74 To a certain extent this divide prevailed with the Labour Party as well, but was 
tempered by the presence of a strong cadre of liberal opinion within the party rank-and-file. 
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Often young, educated and middle-class, these Labour party members were frequently also 
opponents of the Vietnam War and supporters of the American civil rights movement. Party 
members’ convictions about racial equality and international cooperation framed their views on 
immigration to the United Kingdom.75 
The only political party that was consistently opposed to placing restrictions on 
immigration throughout these decades was the Liberal Party. The Liberals were very much a 
third party for this period, however, and while they added their support to groups advocating for 
immigrants’ rights, and made repeated statements in both houses opposing both restrictive 
legislation and raising concerns about the national discourse on the topic, their powers were 
limited by their numbers and their lack of either the office of government or the official 
opposition. Furthermore, the Liberals did little to appeal to those who were likely to be drawn to 
anti-immigrationist groups: the Liberals frequently argued that the success of anti-
immigrationism was based upon anti-immigrationist politicians who used the topic to exploit the 
ignorance of working-class individuals, gaining their support by exploiting their inability to think 
rationally and tendency to react emotionally.76 There is little evidence to suggest that this 
paternalistic rhetoric was an effective persuasive or campaign strategy, or that any working-class 
individuals who had expressed anti-immigrationist views were motivated to shift their political 
support to the “enlightened” Liberals on the basis of these claims. 
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It is impossible to discuss anti-immigrationism without acknowledging the groups of the 
extremist far right. These organizations have typically served as the face of anti-immigrationism, 
in part because their actions have been so spectacular, and because they represented connections 
both to a fascist past which most contemporaries remembered all too vividly, and to a fascist 
resurgence that occurred across Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. However, while it is probably 
fair to say that the vast majority of far-right extremists were anti-immigrationist, not all anti-
immigrationists were members, or even supporters, of far-right organizations. These groups 
attracted far more press than their numbers justified, again because of the dramatic nature of their 
activities, which were often violent and criminal. It is worth noting, however, that the ultimate 
stamp of approval for a member of the National Front was to win a seat in a local election. Anti-
fascist campaigners in Leeds noted that “[i]n the middle to late seventies the National Front was 
keen to keep up a respectable image. Known thugs were often refused membership, and denials 
were always forthcoming when the press raised the question of links between the Front and 
racial or political violence.”77 Those who became local councillors could, members felt, 
legitimately claim that the people had spoken, and they had chosen the far-right as their 
representative. Crucially, the democratic process was not always an obstacle to be circumvented, 
but often the best, most reliable route to legitimacy and acceptance by those outside one’s direct 
circle of supporters. In order to gain influence, one needed to be elected.  
This desire for political legitimacy was, in fact, one factor that served to contain the 
expansion of the far right. Not only is it notoriously difficult for representatives of small parties 
to be elected in a first-past-the-post electoral system, but often those members of the National 
Front in particular who did manage to be elected proved themselves to be exceptionally bad 
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politicians. Many of those who stood as candidates in West Yorkshire local elections were found 
to have committed fraud on their nomination forms, either including signatures from people who 
were no longer residents of the area, or obtaining signatures under false pretences (in one case, 
by telling signatories the nomination form was a petition to increase funding for playground 
facilities).78 Incapable of attending council meetings, frequently in trouble with the law and 
generally incompetent in their political office, members of the far right were hampered both by a 
severe lack of experience in the realm of electoral politics, and by the absence of a coherent 
political platform that could feasibly be implemented at the local level. The National Front, 
British National Party, and related groups were much better at rioting, hurling verbal abuse, and 
generally causing mayhem than they were at participating in the political process, and they 
found, to their dismay, that fewer people than expected were willing to follow them down an 
extra-parliamentary, and often illegal, path. So while the members of far-right groups such as 
these may have caused the greatest harm to individuals in their use of targeted violence against 
visible minorities and members of left-leaning political groups, their impact upon mainstream 
political culture and policy was dramatically circumscribed in comparison to other anti-
immigrationist organizations. Their chief successes in mainstream politics occurred at the end of 
our period, in the late 1970s, and coincided with a major shift in the way the public and political 
elites viewed anti-immigrationist campaigns. Because of their ongoing associations with 
violence and illegal activity, the increased visibility of National Front organizing in these years 
functioned not to legitimize the Front, but rather to delegitimize anti-immigrationism more 
generally.79 
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Notably, the oldest group in the UK to have claimed admiration for fascism, Oswald 
Mosley’s Union Movement, wanted nothing whatsoever to do with these young upstarts. 
Whenever an individual wrote to Mosley with a view to joining the Union Movement they were 
informed in no uncertain terms that membership in the Union Movement precluded membership 
in any other organization. When one enthusiastic member who had been entrusted with 
coordinating Union operations in the North East as he attended university (the vast majority of 
new Union Movement members were young men, who often had some form of practical 
training) was revealed to be operating simultaneously as an organizer for the National Front, 
membership in which he had vowed to renounce, he was summarily ejected from the party.80 The 
Union Movement was, by this period, a mere shadow of its former self, and largely survived on 
the force of Mosley’s personal profile. It remained staunchly anti-immigrationist, and supported 
forced repatriation (Enoch Powell was deemed to be too moderate in his 1968 proposals), but 
curbed the evidence of anti-Semitism that had characterized the interwar British Union of 
Fascists, and indeed dropped “fascism” as an organizing ideology.81 It maintained close links 
with international organizations, including the Social Credit Movement in Canada, and was 
supportive of the nascent European Union, which it proposed should be part of an international 
union comprising Britain, Europe, the white Dominions and southern Africa, so as to counter the 
rising power of America and Russia.82 The Union Movement also persisted in attempting to 
appeal to members of the discontented middle class, a demographic with which it had had 
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perhaps underappreciated levels of success in the interwar period. However, the postwar Union 
never regained its prewar strength.83  
The far right was also plagued by in-fighting through this period. The National Front, 
formed in 1967, temporarily eliminated a certain degree of dissatisfaction, as various affiliated 
groups including the British National Party, initially led by Andrew Fountaine and John Bean, 
the Racial Preservation Society, and the Greater Britain Movement under John Tyndall and 
Martin Webster were dissolved in order to allow members to join the NF. These individuals 
maintained an ongoing fixation with electoral success. However, frequent conflicts between 
various leadership factions meant that prominent figures, including ex-Mosleyite A.K. 
Chesterton, who had formerly led the League of Empire Loyalists, and his successor as 
Chairman, John O’Brien, left the group within the first five years of its existence. Other 
leadership figures, including Fountaine and Tyndall, also departed to set up rival organizations.84 
Ongoing internal squabbles resulted in the loss of the brief surge of support the NF enjoyed in 
the mid- to late 1970s, and many of the splinter groups faded away into irrelevance. Despite 
these internal troubles, there were very often close links between the NF and other groups which 
enjoyed a greater degree of respectability and success, both electorally and otherwise. In 1973, a 
member of the Circle for Democratic Studies in Croydon argued that “today’s battleground 
against racism is in the schools, tenants associations and in all political parties in areas of high 
immigration, for it is here that the National Front and other extremist groups are looking for 
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disgruntled people to join them.”85 Those promoting single-issue anti-immigrationist platforms 
emerged as some of the most enthusiastic affiliates of the extremists. 
Among the most notorious, and least-researched, single-issue parties of this period were a 
group of interlocking, overlapping organizations dedicated to curtailing New Commonwealth 
immigration. Immigration Control Associations (ICAs) began to emerge, “spontaneously” 
according to contemporaries,86 around 1962, and combined to form a national umbrella 
organization in 1968.87 By the early 1970s, the national Immigration Control Association was 
“influential far beyond its size.”88 Under the leadership of Joy Page and Mary Howarth it was a 
central player in the Anti-Immigration Standing Committee formed in June 1973. Howarth was a 
former member of the National Front and Racial Preservation Society, and the ICA was 
instrumental in forging links between anti-immigrationist groups, welcoming members of the 
National Front, British Movement, the National Democratic Party, and the Monday Club to 
attend and speak at their rallies.89 The ICA was also closely linked to the British Campaign to 
Stop Immigration (BCSI), formerly the Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration (YCSI) led by 
Jim Merrick, which had absorbed the remnants of the Racial Preservation Society (RPS) led by 
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Robin Beauclaire and the Hancock family in Sussex after the dissolution of the group in the 
1960s. Links between the ICA leadership and the Monday Club were particularly strong, 
although hampered by in-fighting within the Monday Club. Joy Page was a close associate of 
both Leonard Lambert, who was expelled from the national body of the Club, but continued to 
serve on the executive of the Provincial Branch, as well as John Radcliffe, who was closely 
associated with George Kennedy Young. Young resigned from the Club after failing to unseat 
president Jonathan Guinness (son of Diana Mitford, the second wife of Oswald Mosley, from her 
first marriage to Brian, Baron Guinness) in a factional dispute in 1973.90 Young was one of the 
most prominent members of the Monday Club’s Immigration Committee, and had close links to 
the political establishment following his stint as director of the Secret Intelligence Service in 
charge of Middle East operations during the Suez Crisis. Young was also closely linked to Beryl 
Carthew, a former member of the Monday Club and leading Powellite.91 Carthew also co-
sponsored the production of Young’s controversial film “England, whose England?” which was 
condemned by the Sun as “a nauseating piece of racial propaganda.”92  
While the ICA was meant to be a national umbrella organization, certain regional 
associations which also referred to themselves as Immigration Control Associations were, 
perhaps, more successful than the national ICA. Based on its prevalence in archival collections, 
it seems likely that “Immigration: The Incredible Folly” by John Sanders was among the most 
widely circulated documents produced by the Birmingham Immigration Control Association 
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(BICA).93 Published in 1965, Sanders’ pamphlet argues that immigration has resulted in massive 
overpopulation within the United Kingdom, and projects that continued immigration, combined 
with the natural rate of increase within immigrant populations would have catastrophic results. 
He notes by way of example the Wolverhampton Medical Officer of Health’s estimate that the 
rate of increase among immigrant populations was “eight times our own,” “our” referring to 
white Britons.94 BICA enjoyed the support of a number of local councillors and MPs in the 
Birmingham area, and ran a significant number of both letter-writing and petition campaigns, as 
well as staging demonstrations within the region.95 BICA was possibly the most successful of all 
the single-issue anti-immigrationist groups, as reflected both by the prominence of its members 
and activities, and by the evident spread of its campaign materials.  
Related to BICA was the also-local Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration. The YCSI, 
later known as the British Campaign to Stop Immigration, was founded in 1970 by Jim Merrick, 
and was eventually affiliated with the remnants of the Racial Preservation Society. One analyst 
has suggested that at its peak the YCSI boasted as many as 35,000 members.96 Merrick, a dyer 
working in Staincliffe, outside Dewsbury, was elected as a Conservative councillor for the Little 
Horton Ward in 1968. In later years he was forced to relinquish membership in the Conservative 
Party, less because of his extremism than because of his obstructionist behaviour and general 
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irritation caused to the rest of the council, and he became a member of the National Front for a 
time (although he had been distributing their materials even while serving as a Conservative 
Party member). Despite this tempestuous relationship, he was re-adopted as an official 
Conservative candidate in local elections during the 1970 campaign, although he ultimately lost 
his seat. Merrick met with great popularity by emphasizing local concerns, such as a ban on Sikh 
men wearing turbans while employed as bus drivers, and objecting to Bradford University’s 
decision to prohibit a speech by Enoch Powell. He became known among his supporters as “the 
Bradford man’s Enoch Powell.”97 Indeed, the first aim of the YCSI was “to offer active and 
moral support to Enoch Powell.”98 In July 1971 BCSI candidates polled 15% of the popular vote 
in local elections.99 By 1975 Merrick himself was able to attract 28% of the vote in his campaign 
for local office, earning only 250 votes fewer than the Labour candidate. A spot on the BBC 
granted by the Community Programmes Unit in 1976 and featuring appearances by Ronald Bell 
of the Monday Club, Jane Birdwood, and a young National Front activist gave the BCSI its 
greatest appearance of respectability, and marked the height of its popular appeal.100 This 
popularity declined, however, through the late 70s as local opposition, and particularly increased 
organization within the black community in Bradford, chipped away at Merrick’s appeal.101 
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Residents’ associations constituted the most local and informal level of anti-
immigrationist organization. These were frequently rather ad hoc groups, occasionally convened 
for more general purposes to deal with neighbourhood issues, but a number of the associations 
that emerged in areas of high immigrant concentration during the postwar period were explicitly 
and particularly concerned with the impact of immigration upon their community. Perhaps the 
most notorious was the Southall Residents’ Association, formed in 1963.102 Activists on the left 
argued that the SRA was a front for members of the National Front, formed largely by 
disaffected former Conservative and Labour councillors who returned to the council under the 
banner of the SRA. Certainly the SRA held a number of well-attended meetings in 1961-2 and 
gained substantial public support. Residents’ associations often proved fertile recruiting ground 
for the single-issue anti-immigration groups: residents of various housing estates and streets in 
Smethwick started to agitate for restrictions on the settlement of immigrants in their 
neighbourhoods during the early 1960s. Not coincidentally, local politician Donald Finney 
referred to many of these campaigns in his justification for the establishment of the Smethwick 
branch of the Birmingham Immigration Control Association in March of 1961.103  
Given the prevalence of anti-immigrationism at the level of local politics, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that some anti-immigrationist activists also targeted trades unions in their 
organizing efforts. A joint effort by the National Front and the Action Party formed TRUAIM 
(Trade Unionists Against Immigration) specifically to influence workers in industries that might 
draw upon immigrant labour.104 After a brief stint under Colin Jordan’s catastrophic leadership 
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the group folded, but their effort was certainly not the only evidence of anti-immigrationist 
sentiment within the labour movement. Union leadership, and particularly the executives of the 
TUC and TGWU were opposed to anti-immigrationism, but there is evidence of shop-floor 
activism, particularly within the unions of the Midlands manufacturing sector.105  
While the focus of anti-immigrationist organizing was typically local, groups not only 
coordinated with other associations within the UK, but also with those around the world. The 
undeniably eugenicist aims of the Racial Preservation Society were underscored by close links 
between the organization and various bodies in America. Many of the publications of the RPS 
were in fact reprints of circulars and newsletters produced by groups like the Methodist Laymen 
out of North Hollywood.106 The RPS also published pamphlets advocating a pseudo-scientific 
justification for racial cleansing and segregation supported by “evidence” written by UNC 
Professor Emeritus Wesley C. George, and former Columbia professor of psychology Henry E. 
Garrett.107 Increased links between overseas associations was one of the hallmarks of postwar 
political organizing, and the anti-immigrationist movement was no different. Correspondents 
with the Union Movement could be found all over the world. One young man affiliated with the 
Social Credit movement in Montreal agitated for a collaboration with the Union Movement on 
the publication of a periodical. Another unlikely correspondent was a young man from Ceylon 
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who desired Oswald Mosley as a penpal.108 The Conservative Party routinely sent fact-finding 
missions to countries that offered models for a range of race relations policies: visits to New 
York and the Netherlands were conducted by Christopher Chataway and Sir John Vaughan-
Morgan of the Conservative Immigration Policy Group in 1965.109 As noted above, the Monday 
Club was galvanized by the emergence of the American New Right, and routinely featured 
articles on its fortunes in the club’s periodicals. While connections with international groups was 
a characteristic of political organizations across the spectrum in this period, it is also the case that 
international examples held a particular rhetorical value in anti-immigrationist circles. America, 
in particular, featured as a spectre of fell things to come if immigration were not strictly, and 
immediately limited. While fewer references than one might expect can be found to South 
African apartheid, one of the most prominent anti-immigrationists of the period, MP Peter 
Griffiths, was a staunch and public advocate of the system.110 British anti-immigrationists may 
have been nativist in their tendencies, but they were purposefully outward-looking both in the 
strategies they adopted for organizing, and in their justifications for reducing immigration to 
their own shores.  
It is important to note that formal membership in single-issue anti-immigrationist groups, 
and in organizations of the far right, was not large. However, this is not to say that they were 
without influence. One critic observed of the anti-immigrationist groups that “[t]he physical 
strength of these bodies only amounts to a few thousand and most of these hold dual membership 
of other ultra-Right groups. They seem to be particularly financially strong and this has led to 
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their ability to make films and print hundreds of thousands of leaflets.”111 While active 
membership in these groups may have been limited, their influence spread by means of 
aggressive and widespread activism and publicity. Certainly many politicians and senior party 
officials were aware of these organizations’ existence. While some campaigns and individuals 
were dismissed, others were deemed outright dangerous and monitored closely, particularly if 
they involved close association with a mainstream party.112 
It is clear that many members of these organizations, especially those with links to the 
major political parties, were middle to upper-middle class individuals. For such individuals, anti-
immigrationism was but one part of a larger view of an ideal world, which might include 
changes to trade restrictions, government spending, or military intervention. Supporters of this 
worldview identified control of immigration as a valid and feasible solution to a number of social 
ills. Limiting immigration would, they believed, be the first step in achieving a particular kind of 
conservative utopia, one in which nostalgia and uniformity prevailed.  
VI 
 
While anti-immigrationists were generally in agreement on certain key principles, their proposals 
and campaigns were as diverse as their organizational and geographical bases. A broad survey of 
anti-immigrationist correspondence and literature provides a sense of the range of policies and 
perspectives advanced by different groups and individuals, while underscoring certain prevalent 
themes. As outlined above, immigration to the UK from the New Commonwealth was 
increasingly limited after 1962, and virtually eliminated in the 1981 BNA. Anti-immigrationists, 
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generally speaking, supported this series of legislation to limit the entry of New Commonwealth 
immigrants, although many lamented that such legislation had not been introduced earlier, and 
frequently argued that further restrictions were still necessary. The most fundamental aspect of 
anti-immigrationist thinking was opposition to the influx of new immigrants, with an emphasis 
on non-white immigrants. Within this general aim, however, anti-immigrationist individuals and 
organizations advocated for a range of solutions to the “immigrant problem.”  
The most popular, and indeed generally acceptable, line within anti-immigrationist circles 
was the strict limitation of individuals entering the United Kingdom, particularly for the purposes 
of settlement. This was the most successful aspect of anti-immigrationist agitation, as 
increasingly strict controls were placed upon migration into the UK across the latter half of the 
twentieth century resulting in the virtual prohibition of entry by non-white individuals. As will 
be explored in greater depth in chapter three, anti-immigrationists also objected strongly to the 
expenditure of public funds on immigrant populations. Many anti-immigrationist groups offered 
proposals to introduce strict limitations upon the extent to which immigrants could avail 
themselves of welfare services. Thus, the Southall Residents’ Association mentioned above was 
keen to limit the number of immigrants accessing public education, as well as housing, and was 
vociferous enough in its objections to attract the attention of then-Minister of Education Edward 
Boyle.113 While these proposals typically took the form of restricting immigrant access to 
particular services and funding, one Monday Club member advocated for the forced sterilization 
of all coloured immigrants who had more than three children.114 Less extreme supporters, such as 
members of the Young Conservatives, advocated for welfare programmes that would privilege 
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immigrants who were strongly assimilationist, who adopted British culture and customs quickly 
and without complaint.115 Assimilationist philosophies were extremely widespread through most 
of this period and often met with support from the government and associated bodies. Indeed, 
much of the literature produced by the Department of Health and Social Services reflected this 
trend, as did recommendations from Bradford City Council.116 Those anti-immigrationists who 
argued that the best solution for dealing with immigrants who were already in the country was to 
rapidly re-educate them to suit British standards of life were also among the most successful of 
their cohort.  
Others within the anti-immigrationist movement were not so keen to have immigrants 
stay on in Britain, even if some of them were inclined to adapt to British life. Repatriation, a 
synonym for deportation, emerged as a deeply contentious policy within the anti-immigrationist 
movement. Supporters of repatriation argued that the best solution to the immigrant problem was 
to remove immigrants from the country altogether.117 The best way to do this, they argued, was 
for the government to provide the money for immigrants to return to their country of “origin,” 
wherever that may be.118 There were two variants on this policy: voluntary and forced. 
Supporters of voluntary repatriation argued that immigrants should be encouraged to take 
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advantage of repatriation schemes, and that more money should be devoted to this purpose, but 
that ultimately the decision to return “home” was the immigrants’ themselves. Those who 
supported forced repatriation argued that such a policy would be insufficient: immigrant 
populations not suited to residence in the United Kingdom must be identified by the state, and 
removed without consultation with the individuals themselves. 
Forced repatriation was not widely popular, proposed seriously only by a minority within 
a limited number of organizations, including the Monday Club, as well as Enoch Powell, but 
voluntary repatriation was much more commonly supported. Forced repatriation had in fact been 
government policy in the first half of the twentieth century, as “alien” populations were deported 
from Liverpool in the aftermath of both the First and Second World Wars, although the Colonial 
Office received significant pushback against their attempts to extend these deportations from 
Chinese nationals to seamen from West Africa.119 Some members of the Conservative Party 
began publicly endorsing programs of voluntary repatriation during campaigns in the mid-1960s, 
with Sir Alec Douglas-Home stating his support for such a program at a public meeting in 
Hampstead in 1965.120 At the time of Douglas-Home’s statement, repatriation only occurred 
when the National Assistance Board found that an entire family of immigrants living on national 
assistance were a greater charge on public funds than would be the cost of paying for their return 
journey.121 After 1974, the government funded a voluntary repatriation scheme run on their 
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behalf by International Social Service, a global non-partisan non-profit organization.122 The 
scheme was not widely publicized, as government officials feared that greater publicity would 
cause unrest within immigrant communities who might feel they were being forced out of the 
country. It was, however, frequently mentioned in press releases and official comments when 
anti-immigrationist critics raised proposals for repatriation. Demands for repatriation were 
possibly the most stressful aspect of the immigration debate for government officials, in no small 
part because of the strength of popular feeling on the topic and qualms about the public reception 
of any information released by the government. In 1975 former Prime Minister Edward Heath 
wrote that he was “nervous” about requesting research on the topic of repatriation from the 
Conservative think tank the Bow Group, which was one of the more left-leaning of the groups 
affiliated with the Conservative Party. Instead, he requested that staffer Chris Patten personally 
set about collecting the materials necessary to produce “the definition of the factors that will 
need to be taken into account when, in due course, we revise the public money available to help 
an immigrant family repatriate. We need to steer a course so as to encourage those who would 
like to go home without alienating British people.”123 By December of 1975, the Conservative 
Research Department advised that “[t]he conditions under which repatriation could be enforced 
might include loss of job or housing, or becoming an undue burden on social services. Such 
repatriation would remove those immigrants who provide the major focus for public discontent, 
but the political costs of such a programme, in both domestic and international fora, would 
probably be high.”124 They concluded that both the financial and political cost of a forced 
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repatriation would be too high to bear, and that the most feasible programme would be some 
variant of the existing programme of voluntary repatriation. They suggested, alternatively, that 
the funds currently being used to run the repatriation programme might be diverted to 
immigration administration, since “[f]unds spent on combating illegal immigration and marriage 
frauds could have a far greater impact on the immigration problem than extending or even 
maintaining the present repatriation scheme.”125  
The government line on this matter was in contrast to the views expressed by some less 
empowered anti-immigrationists. Elizabeth Chumleigh Jones wrote to the Conservative Party in 
September 1975, arguing that “[t]he thing [immigration] is a time bomb that must be defused - & 
quickly - & the only way to do it is really large scale repatriation.”126 Chumleigh Jones enclosed 
two circulars, including one from the Standing Committee on Immigration under Lady Jane 
Birdwood, in the hopes that their contents would mean that “at last immigration will be 
realistically & soberly discussed at the Conference,” at a convenient time and with proper media 
coverage.127 The range of opinions within the Conservative Party and its affiliates is revealing. 
The Monday Club strongly endorsed repatriation as a necessary, and desirable solution to 
immigration. Not all members supported compulsory repatriation, but the majority believed that 
the existing programmes of voluntary repatriation needed to be expanded and better promoted. 
Some members proposed the creation of a separate Ministry of Repatriation, a move initially put 
forward by Enoch Powell. Others suggested that an expanded repatriation programme should be 
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funded out of the Overseas Aid budget.128 It is clear that while the party hierarchy may have 
rejected requests for compulsory repatriation outright, most vociferously of all when the National 
Front began gaining public notoriety in the late 1970s, a substantial proportion of both members 
and supporters of the Conservative Party were strongly in favour of reducing the immigrant 
population already resident in the United Kingdom.  
A relatively strong basis of support for the introduction of deportation for criminal 
offenders did emerge across the 1960s and 1970s. Publicly supported by Peter Thorneycroft in 
1965, advocates argued that immigrants who committed crimes on British soil renounced their 
right to live and work there, and should be removed to their country of origin as “undesirable.”129 
In part this support was based on the notion that only certain types of individuals were 
qualitatively desirable as prospective “Britons,” but it also appealed to those who argued that 
immigration cost Britain too much money, in this case expenditure on law enforcement, the legal 
system, and potentially the penal system. As concerns grew across the same period about the 
number of immigrants entering the country illegally, support also emerged for expansion of 
deportation provisions for illegal immigrants. Until 1968, anyone who entered the country 
illegally and evaded detection for more than 24 hours could not be deported. This provision was 
altered in the 1971 Immigration Act, which allowed for the immediate deportation of anyone 
found to have entered the country illegally, as well as those who had overstayed the length of 
their admitted entry, or otherwise violated the conditions of their admittance.130 These provisions 
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for removal focused, obviously, on those who wished to leave the UK, and those who had 
committed some legal infraction. They did not address those who were perceived as undesirable 
for less quantifiable reasons. In 1965 the Conservative Research Department noted, with distress, 
the Home Secretary’s inability to take action to deport a “Malcolm X from Jamaica.”131 
Proposals arose frequently within the Conservative Research Department for new deportation 
schemes to rid the country of anyone whose activities or public speech was deemed to upset the 
existing balance of British society. Such schemes were meant to target such people who seemed 
likely to lead American-style civil rights campaigns. These proposals failed to become 
legislation, but remained popular enough to indicate that for many anti-immigrationists, free 




The convictions of anti-immigrationists are best described as fundamentally conservative. Their 
aim was not to create a new future Britain, but to return to an (imagined) ideal of British life 
which excluded any newcomers. According to the arguments of anti-immigrationists, the fact 
that the Second World War had wreaked havoc and destruction on the physical environment was 
not justification for notable changes to the social environment. Demographic change was neither 
desirable nor neutral in its effect; rather, it destroyed the pre-war status quo in which it was 
assumed that decent hardworking men and women had enjoyed the warmth and safety of their 
own homes, and the trust and support of their neighbours. If the postwar period was to witness 
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any changes, they must be exclusively to the benefit of those who had suffered through the 
crucible of the war. The creation of the welfare state was a reward for services rendered, and the 
scale of changes wrought by the introduction of national minimums across many facets of daily 
life in Britain was not justification for the extension of these benefits to any group of people not 
previously identified as part of the British social fabric. 
The essential conservatism of the anti-immigrationist movement was a key element in its 
claims to respectability. As we will explore in the next chapter, anti-immigrationists relied 
chiefly upon strategies of political agitation that fell well within the range of accepted political 
and social activities. Extra-parliamentary and particularly illegal activities were discouraged and 
often deplored by a substantial proportion of anti-immigrationists. They viewed their anti-
immigrationist activism as a reflection of their investment in the status quo, in the sanctity of the 
British state and society, and as a fundamental, essential part of the exercise of their own rights 
of citizenship. The nature of their actions, and the content of this view of citizenship, is the 
subject of chapter two. 
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Chapter 2. The Possibility of a Leader: Building the Anti-Immigrationist Movement 
 
 
Anti-immigrationism operated by implementing a series of networks through which members of 
the political elite, particularly elected representatives, were linked to grassroots members of the 
electorate in a reciprocal connection. This structure allowed for the dissemination of anti-
immigrationism knowledge and arguments from both the bottom up and the top down. Neither of 
these groups would have survived without the other: politicians were able to articulate 
controversial opinions on the grounds that they were genuine democratic representatives voicing 
the will of the people, and members of the electorate saw their views given both influence and 
respectability by virtue of their pronunciation by members of the political establishment. Anti-
immigrationism was premised upon this symbiotic relationship, which allowed the movement to 
frame itself as a coalition of active citizens behaving as genuine democrats and patriots. 
One of the most frequently launched criticisms of anti-immigrationists was that they 
demonstrated excessive emotion and insufficient political acumen. The notion that anyone who 
supported anti-immigrationist policies or arguments was not competent to assess or comment 
upon the issue was designed to discount anti-immigrationist arguments wholesale, and to 
diminish and demean those who articulated them. In response to these criticisms, the bulk of the 
anti-immigrationist movement aimed to depict themselves not as emotional, un-intellectual 
incompetents, but as fully-fledged, capable political actors. They claimed an identity for 
themselves as adept political activists advocating for the genuine interests of the nation. Their 
opponents, by contrast, were framed to implicitly represent only sectional or self-interests. Anti-
immigrationists, then, relied upon existing political structures and organizational tactics not only 
as a proven means of getting things done, but also to demonstrate that they operated within the 
realm of “acceptable” political behaviours. If they adopted those techniques used by “legitimate” 
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political campaigns, and relied upon the establishment itself (the political party system and 
parliamentary politics), then they could not dismissed as misunderstanding the appropriate 
operation of British political campaigning. 
It was of course also true that many of the mechanisms anti-immigrationists supported as 
a means of addressing the immigration “problem” could only be implemented by organs of the 
state. It was not possible to set up a non-governmental organization to restrict the entry of 
immigrants: only agents appointed by the central government could take on that role. Increased 
funding for areas with high immigrant populations could come from private sources, but given 
the desire of many anti-immigrationists to have this money targeted towards public services such 
as health care, it was only sensible that it come from the state. Finally, the most extreme of anti-
immigrationist demands, repatriation, particularly of the forced variety, could only be undertaken 
in a systematic way by those with both the intelligence about immigration, and the manpower 
and resources to place immigrants on transport – again, only the state seemed to meet all these 
criteria. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the ways in which anti-immigrationism 
functioned as a movement. First, it will assess the extent to which anti-immigrationism falls 
within the rubric of “social movements” of the twentieth century. It will then outline the ways in 
which anti-immigrationists figured themselves as active citizens fulfilling the requirements of 
genuine democracy, followed by an overview of the techniques and tactics employed by anti-
immigrationist campaigners. Finally, a series of snapshots of some powerfully-positioned 
members of the anti-immigrationist movement will address the structure of the movement, and 
the characteristics that both strengthened and weakened it in order to present some specific 




British anti-immigrationism did not occur in a vacuum. It bore relationships both to historical 
precursors and to contemporary groups. These relationships were not coincidental: anti-
immigrationism was able to function because its supporters could draw upon a set of established 
practices which had been proven to be effective in the hands of other groups. These references to 
an established body of political acumen and competence were sometimes self-conscious, 
sometimes not. But almost everything that anti-immigrationists did can be placed within a 
tradition of activism and organizing, and the fact that these activities had a historical tradition 
independent of anti-immigrationism made them legitimate political tactics, and in turn extended 
that veil of legitimacy to anti-immigrationism itself. Such groups include the moral reform 
movements of the nineteenth century detailed in the introduction, as well as contemporary 
conservative movements elsewhere in the world, notably those groups operating in America that 
formed the basis for the New Right.1 
Among the most salient interpretive points to be made by comparison to these nineteenth- 
and mid-twentieth-century movements is that they are unquestionably framed as “movements”; 
there is no debate over whether this is appropriate terminology. Undoubtedly, they predate the 
upsurge of what historical sociologists and other theorists have come to refer to as “social 
movements,” a phenomenon which has been identified particularly with the groups that came 
crashing to the political fore in the 1960s and 1970s. The literature on social movements was 
initially characterized by strictly theoretical conceptions, particularly by contemporary scholars. 
Only more recently has it become common for historical approaches to be used in assessing such 
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groups. Frank Parkin’s Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament is often cited as the first example of a scholarly attempt to come to terms 
with the phenomenon of social movements. In the course of his sociological analysis of 
contemporary activists and their families Parkin writes that “whereas working class radicalism 
could be said to be geared largely to reforms of an economic or material kind, the radicalism of 
the middle class is directed mainly to social reforms which are basically moral in content.”2 
The first challenge in assessing whether or not a particular phenomenon ought to be 
classed as a “social movement,” scholars stress, is establishing a working definition of the term 
itself. Parkin did not use the term “social movement,” but rather “mass movement,” which he 
defined as having  
‘followings’ or ‘supporters’ rather than members, and their characteristic mode of 
operation is not through committees or formal procedures, but through the mobilization 
of supporters in public demonstrations or similar techniques which by-pass the 
orthodoxies of the political process and democratic machinery. Sometimes a political 
party is the inspirational force behind a mass movement, but not necessarily or even 
typically so.3  
 
He cites as examples the International Workers of the World (IWW), the Chartists, the Radical 
Right in America and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament itself.4 
Subsequent generations of academics have moved well beyond this set of comparisons. 
Sociologists interested in social movements have moved towards an emphasis on the affective 
lives of participants in social movements, while historians have taken a slightly different tack.5 In 
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his 1997 study, Paul Byrne writes that “by stressing the importance of personal change, as well 
as looking to the state for action, [members of social movements] have argued that ‘politics’ is 
not something that just takes place in Westminster, Whitehall or the Town Hall, but in people’s 
everyday lives in their homes and workplaces,” and that “one of the distinctive features of social 
movements is their nebulous nature.”6 In a 2001 overview of the British example, Adam Lent 
defines post-war social movements as “grassroots mobilisations which were initiated outside of 
the established structures and values of the existing polity.”7 Indeed, Lent adopts a positively 
patronizing attitude towards even those groups which were operating in the 1950s, arguing that 
“while these bodies were dining with MPs and arguing about whether to hold the odd 
demonstration, a whole new radical political world was being created under their noses by the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Committee of 100, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign 
and the student left. They were not to know that this world was soon to colonise their own 
political concerns.”8 He does condescend to admit that these groups “all possessed a core of 
incredibly hard-working campaigners whose persistence in the face of press misrepresentation 
and the glacier-like pace of the British parliamentary system was seemingly inexhaustible.”9 He 
further argues that these groups were aided by the Labour majority governments of the time: 
none of the groups he assesses either sought or received Conservative Party support.10 
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As is evident, much of the literature on British social movements to date has focused 
upon groups affiliated with the left wing of the political spectrum. Some more recent work has 
begun to push back against the impression that the social and political organizing of the 1960s 
and 1970s did not include groups affiliated with the right, even if scholars have not wholly 
embraced the label of “social movement” for these right-leaning groups.11 In part, the tendency 
to emphasize those groups affiliated with the political left seems to be a self-congratulatory move 
by some academics who see their work as perpetuating the “great” achievements of activists 
working in the 1960s and 1970s. In and of itself this is not an inherently problematic state of 
affairs, as the personal commitment to such a set of values is just as much reflected in studies of 
Conservative leaders written by those who very much lament that said Conservative leader is no 
longer alive.12 However, the fact that each group has established a fairly strict set of 
historiographical and methodological tools means that there are historiographical lacunae on 
both sides, and that interpretive frames that could reveal much about the state of politics in the 
twentieth century are not applied for reasons to do with the authors’ personal politics. 
Given the fact that both historical and theoretical sociological literature overwhelmingly 
defines social movements as those which do not have affiliation with the political establishment, 
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I will refer to anti-immigrationism as simply a “movement” rather than a “social movement.” 
However, this tendency among scholars to emphasize solely those movements affiliated with the 
left and to completely discount those which worked to lobby or work in concert with established 
political parties and institutions strikes me as overly restrictive, and I believe there are important 
connections between anti-immigrationism and other groups which meet the established definition 
for social movements. Perhaps most significantly, a definition that excludes groups working with 
the organs of parliamentary politics means that almost no groups affiliated with the right wing of 
the political spectrum will be defined as social movements, further entrenching a view of 
postwar activism as entirely the purview of the left. Furthermore, even those groups which 
worked exclusively outside the boundaries of traditional politics still saw parliament as a locus of 
power and worked either to undermine or to influence its representatives, and so it does not make 
sense to view even the most ardent anti-establishment of groups as utterly divorced from 
parliamentary politics. A definition of right-wing affiliated groups as simply “reactionary” does 
not do justice to the creative efforts that were required to establish and maintain the appeal of 
such organizations, and the lengths to which they went in order to appeal to a broader 
constituency – much as did left-wing activists. 
II  
 
The consequence of this indifferent attitude towards right-leaning movements is an academic 
tendency to discount the extent to which those with views not deemed “progressive” can be 
framed as representative within a democracy, and the extent to which individuals with such 
views can be defined as active citizens. The anti-immigrationist movement provides a useful 
example on this score, since anti-immigrationists, whatever their opponents may have said, 
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viewed themselves very much as active citizens perpetuating the goals of a genuine, participatory 
democracy.  
The question of what constituted genuine citizenship has been hotly contested across 
hundreds of years.13 Sonya Rose defines citizenship as “a membership category, defining who 
does and does not belong to a particular (national) community. In this sense, citizenship is a 
synonym for nationality, but it is one that is formally linked to the notion of rights that accrue to 
members, and to the obligations they owe to the state in return. Rules of membership and the 
specification of rights and duties constitute the juridical aspects of citizenship.”14 Rose asserts 
that during the Second World War, a long-standing process came to fruition whereby “[b]eing a 
‘good citizen’ then had to do with actively expressing a commitment to the nation by voluntarily 
fulfilling obligations and willingly contributing to the welfare of the community.”15 Rose 
identifies the roots of this notion in the traditions of classical republicanism and British 
idealism.16 This wartime notion of community participation, of “doing one’s bit” for the country 
as both a responsibility and a marker of membership, is the one most strikingly reflected in the 
language of anti-immigrationists. Rose emphasizes that “active citizenship” in this period was 
demonstrated by participation in civil society and/or public affairs.17 Anti-immigrationists saw 
their participation in the anti-immigrationist movement, their petitioning of members of 
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parliament, their creation of pressure groups and political organizations, as part of this tradition, 
and as part of their own performance of active citizenship. 
As “good citizens,” anti-immigrationists also engaged in the “public identification and 
denigration of particular ‘internal others’ who were depicted as failing to be good citizens or 
were seen as ‘unBritish’ because they were selfish and self-interested underscored the 
significance of the ethics of self-sacrifice to good citizenship and Britishness.”18  In the view of 
anti-immigrationists those who failed the self-sacrifice and public interest tests included, 
naturally, immigrants themselves; race relations experts who were seen as perpetuating racial 
tensions in order to keep themselves in a job; and political elites who were reluctant to speak out 
on immigration for fear that it might similarly cost them their career. It was this last group, 
political elites, whose inaction and silence on immigration was particularly galling to anti-
immigrationists. Anti-immigrationists presumed that the function of democracy was to represent 
the will of the people by means of elected representation; as such, elected representatives were 
obliged to reflect the convictions of those they were chosen to represent, and indeed, in some 
cases, to defend. 
The question of how political representation ought to work was central to anti-
immigrationist objections. Anti-immigrationists commonly felt that at the root of politicians’ 
failure to act on immigration was a misunderstanding, wilful or otherwise, of what a political 
representative’s job actually was. In the view of anti-immigrationists, politicians who refused to 
address immigration failed to genuinely represent the views of their constituents. Indeed, 
politicians might also fail this test if they neglected to address immigration in precisely the way 
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anti-immigrationists desired. Politicians who refused to directly reflect their constituents’ 
position, for whatever reason, were framed as at best paternalistic in a way that was 
incommensurate with political culture in an era of mass democracy. At worst, they were 
purposefully dismissive of constituents’ views on the grounds of their illegitimacy: an 
illegitimacy rooted in a fairly condescending view of everyday citizens’ capacity to reason about 
complex political issues. As Amy Whipple argues, anti-immigrationists can be figured within the 
body of individuals who, through the sixties and seventies, felt that the UK was being governed 
by “an oppressive liberal elite at the expense of an ignored majority of conservative ‘ordinary 
people.’”19 
Merlyn Rees put his finger on the issue when he spoke on behalf of the Leeds 
Association at the 1976 Labour Party Conference, giving  
a word of advice to those who look with little understanding at the working class, who 
sometimes abstain at elections and who normally vote Labour. Many people who are 
afraid of racial issues and who are misled on immigration are not racialists. In our fight 
against racialism, do not confuse these people with racialists. They need reassurance. 
They do not want to be spoken to as if they are wayward fools or spoken to from on high 
from a stance of moral superiority by people who live outside their areas.20  
 
The problem with this attitude was not simply that an attitude of “moral superiority” was 
offensive to these individuals, or that they were likely to be unappreciative of being treated like 
“wayward fools,” but that they were treated as such by “people who live outside their areas.” 
Because of the tendency of postwar immigrants to settle in a handful of conurbations a large 
proportion of Britons, and a substantial majority of MPs if they lived in their own 
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constituencies,21 had little or no daily interaction with immigration or first-hand knowledge of 
the challenges faced by these areas. The apparent disconnect between political representatives 
and the facts of life as experienced by their constituents was at the root of many anti-
immigrationist concerns about the capacity of politicians to genuinely represent their 
constituents. 
MPs received pressure not only from constituents but also from elected officials working 
at the local level. The difference between the kind of representation constituents were likely to 
get from their local politicians and central government MPs was marked. Local councillors were 
far more likely to live in the area they were elected to represent, and the more limited purview of 
their responsibilities meant that they had the time to pursue issues that attracted the attention of 
local residents. Local councillors also often held paid positions within the community, and this 
additional connection to local networks meant that they would often advocate on behalf of 
occupational groups, many of which were in areas of high immigration affected by influxes of 
labour. 
For example, Audrey Firth of Bradford did not self-identify as anti-immigrationist, but 
much of the work undertaken by the Bradford City Council during her period in office both as 
chairman of the Health Committee and as mayor was related to managing the effects of 
immigration in a distinctly assimilationist vein. One of her prominent immigration-related 
endeavours was a set of policies to combat the explosion of tuberculosis occurring within the 
Pakistani population in Bradford who in the early 1960s were chiefly employed in the city’s 
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wool-combs.22 One of the solutions proposed by the council was the purchase of large Victorian 
homes that might be converted to single-room residences, addressing both the problem of 
overcrowding and poor living conditions to which the incidence of TB was attributed, and 
breaking up the all-male households that were also the focus of various objections.23 A number 
of concerned locals lamented this council expenditure on immigrants, which they invariably felt 
would serve only to attract more migrants to the region, exacerbating the issue further. In any 
case, they felt that the funds ought to be distributed away from immigrants, not towards them.24  
Canny politicians took advantage of this popular image of anti-immigrationism as the 
great unsung cause of the common man. As we will see in section four of this chapter, anti-
immigrationist politicians were able to represent themselves as “men of the people” in a way that 
critics of anti-immigrationism could not. While these perceptions did not always accord with 
reality (as Kathleen Paul has argued, senior politicians were in fact quite concerned with limiting 
immigration at an early date), they had power nonetheless, and the power of perceptions to shape 
political behaviour ought not to be underestimated.25 
One of the most frequent lamentations at Conservative Party conferences, and in 
correspondence from constituents, was that the party membership, and electorate at large, had 
been misled by the Conservative Party hierarchy. The repeated failure to cease “all large-scale 
immigration” going forward was demonstrated with examples of the thousands, or tens of 
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thousands, admitted under secondary categories, typically as dependents of primary migrants.26 
The Conservative Party had betrayed its supporters, to say nothing of the country at large. They 
had promised an end to the onslaught of immigrants; instead, thousands more had entered the 
country, and there seemed to be no end in sight. Broken electoral promises are certainly no 
novelty in any democracy, but anti-immigrationists took this one especially to heart. First, it 
indicated that the party was apparently incapable of implementing the most straightforward of 
policies to address the “problem” of immigration: stopping the entry of new immigrants. Second, 
it further indicated an apparent reluctance or lack of political will to implement the strategies that 
were not just, from the perspective of anti-immigrationists, pandering to sectoral interests, but 
were essential to the nation’s survival as a whole. As a result, any politician who would and did 
speak out in favour of an anti-immigrationist platform was rewarded with an almost evangelical 
support. 
The notion of “speaking out” was a critical one for many anti-immigrationists, and was 
fundamentally implicated in their view of what it meant to be an active citizen. According to this 
view, all members of British society were entitled to air their views, and the role of government 
ought only to be to guarantee that those views would not be suppressed. In a 1966 letter to MP 
Patrick Wall, the chairman of the Society for the Preservation of All Races objected to the 
proposed extension of the 1965 Race Relations Act on the grounds of “the avowed intention of 
certain elements in Parliament to restrict freedom of speech on the race issue.”27 Freedom of 
speech and the infringement of other liberties were among the most common objections to race 
                                                          
26 Annual General Conference Report, 91st Conservative Conference Blackpool 10-13 October 1973, p. 37 NUA 
2/1/78, CPA. 
 
27 Letter from Dr. D.R.M. Brown to Wall, 11 December 1966, U DPW/17/22 Immigration – 1966, Patrick Wall 




relations legislation, which was perceived to curtail the freedom of individuals to express what 
they saw as legitimate political views. Margaret Brown Evans also wrote to Patrick Wall that she 
was convinced the 1966 election would see immigration raised as a major issue because the 
priorities of the electorate were not reflected in the perceived reluctance of both Conservatives 
and Labour politicians to speak out on the immigration issue.28 She declared “it is about time the 
Conservative Party had the courage to speak openly on the subject,” and lamented that if 
immigration was to continue “then in the not too distant future we will have an entirely Labour 
government – because very few, if any, of the immigrants vote Conservative.”29 In a familiar 
refrain, Brown Evans claimed that the issue was one of economics, not colour, as it was “the 
British taxpayers who has [sic] to pay for the increased medical services needed, special 
education facilities, and housing (immigrants are now becoming more eligible for Council 
housing than our own people, by virtue of their prolific breeding).”30  
Many anti-immigrationists saw themselves as defending their own right and that of others 
to make statements and take action without government interference. There is a strong libertarian 
flavour to a great deal of the literature surrounding the anti-immigrationist movement, 
particularly that produced by the Monday Club on non-immigration issues. This libertarian 
commitment had an inherent contradiction, however. The way in which anti-immigrationists felt 
that their rights should be respected by politicians involved treating the rights of other 
individuals with contempt, chiefly by preventing the admission of certain categories of 
individuals seeking to enter the UK for the purposes of settlement, and certainly in the proposals 
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that people might be forcibly removed from their established settlements in the UK and sent back 
“home.” That anti-immigrationists were blind to this contradiction is evidence of the extent to 
which, in their view, immigrants did not function as rights-bearing individuals. For the reasons 
outlined in chapter one, immigrants were entitled to neither the rights nor the freedoms of British 
citizenship, nor were they capable of carrying out the responsibilities of citizens, as demonstrated 
by the activism and involvement of the anti-immigrationists themselves. When politicians failed 
to support anti-immigrationists, they failed to defend the rights of constituents in favour of 
people who were not, in the anti-immigrationists’ view, entitled to those rights. 
In addition to her principled basis for ending immigration Margaret Brown Evans also 
appealed to Wall’s preservation instincts as a politician. This was a canny move, and while it was 
not often seen in anti-immigrationist appeals it surely accounts for some politicians’ willingness 
to address the concerns of anti-immigrationists, even at the risk of offending their own superiors. 
In a 1964 letter to the Conservative Party D.B. Barrow appealed to the same instincts: 
I am a ship’s steward. Until recently I thought MLF meant middle east land forces [sic]; 
and I doubt if I shall ever understand the balance of payments problem; but I understand 
the meaning of Smethwick – and if you don’t you’ll lost [sic] the next election too. Ask 
Sir. A.P. Herbert. He seems to be the only member of the upper court who’s in touch with 
working class opinion. There’s no need to reply to this, as I shall be gone before you can 
– unless a black man has already got my job.31 
 
In Barrow’s view, politicians had lost sight of the value of constituents’ knowledge: caught up in 
abstract political concepts and the intricacies of theory (“the balance of payments problem”), 
politicians had failed to recognize the depth and intensity of ordinary people’s objections to 
immigration. Appeals to the preservationist instinct and mentions of electoral success were, 
                                                          
31 Letter from D.B. Barrow to Conservative Party, 23 November 1964, CRD/L/2/3/7/2 Charles Bellairs Letter Book 
Aug-Dec 1964, CPA. It is not clear who or what Barrow was referring to as “MLF,” but the tone of his letter implies 




however, always couched in the language of civic duty. If politicians were to properly do their 
jobs, they must address the concerns of the individuals who they were elected to represent; the 
price of not doing so was, or ought to be, the loss of said job. This was the crux of the anti-
immigrationist view of politics. Members of the British public ought to be listened to because 
they were on the ground living with the reality of politicians’ legislative actions, and because the 
whole point of politicians was to reflect the views of the electorate. Any politician who failed to 
acknowledge the effect that their policies actually had upon the people living in their 
constituencies ought to be drummed out of office for failing to understand the concept of 
democracy. 
III  
The tactics adopted by anti-immigrationists were a combination of long-standing traditions of 
political engagement, and those borrowed from contemporary movements stressing a new style 
of activism. Among the most common tactics was the composition of letters. The British have 
long been a nation of letter-writers; in particular, the writers of letters to both newspapers and 
political representatives. The former served to publicize anti-immigrationist views, and to 
provide a public forum for anti-immigrationists and their critics to declare for their sides; the 
latter served as a means of communicating views of either constituents or concerned individuals 
to those in positions which enabled them to take action on those concerns. For the most part, 
constituents would write to MPs and local officials (including councillors, mayors, and 
aldermen) who represented the areas in which they lived regardless of whether or not that 
individual had publicly supported anti-immigrationism. In some cases, individuals who felt that 
their own representative was unsupportive would write to other officials who they assumed 
would be more sympathetic, or who held a position of greater power, such as a cabinet minister. 
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Amongst the party faithful, letters were often directed not only to individuals’ MPs, but 
also to officials within the party hierarchy itself. Sometimes this would take the form of writing 
to the party leader or Prime Minister; other writers would direct their inquiries simply to “the 
Conservative Party.” While letters to MPs and councillors often emphasized the responsibility of 
elected representatives to accurately reflect the views of those whom they had been selected to 
represent, letters to political parties argued that the party ought to represent the views of its 
membership: individuals who paid dues and often participated to a high level in the life of the 
party.32 A similar logic operated in both arguments: those at the top, either of party or 
government, ought to take into account the ideas of those who by the design of the institution in 
which they participated formed a supportive base. Ideas ought to be reflected at the top, not 
imposed upon the bottom. 
Letters were also sent, at times, in desperation. In 1973 one couple wrote to Oswald 
Mosley, looking for assistance to help them find a house. They wrote:  
We are living in a furnish[sic] flat and are paying £11 per week, we both have good jobs 
and I (the wife) save most of my earnings, but the prices of house [sic] have gone up so 
much we don’t see how we can ever own a house. We are on the Hillingdon Council List 
but have been told we don’t stand a chance. We both feel very depressed as the future 
dose [sic] not hold much for us. We agree with your circular, but what can be done, can 
you give us any advice.33  
 
While letters and petitions often contained complaints, these complaints were also frequently 
accompanied by pleas for aid. The principle of representative government suggested, at least to 
these writers, that words were not enough: the state and officials ought to act on behalf of 
affected citizens, not merely to issue statements reflective of their shared views. 
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Sonya Rose observes that “[p]eople who write letters to the editors of newspapers 
certainly are not representative of the mass of newspaper readers. Letter writers are probably 
more engaged than the ordinary reader, and/or they are likely to have had the time to devote to 
writing.”34 While this is almost certainly true, anti-immigrationist letter-writers often felt that it 
was their duty to write on immigration issues precisely because they had the time and energy to 
do so. They assumed that they represented a much larger body of people who were prevented 
from speaking out for various reasons, and that as such it was the responsibility of them, the free-
time cohort, to do what needed to be done to save them all.35 Lawrence Black writes of the 
contemporary National Viewers and Listeners Association that “[i]t encouraged (short, polite) 
letter writing, an activity that reinforced the middle-class biases in the membership, besides 
legitimizing and empowering housewives and giving them the ‘gumph’ (as one put it of her 
newly acquired protesting ‘know-how’) to express themselves.”36 Letter-writing served much the 
same function in anti-immigrationist circles: as an activity that could be accomplished by any 
literate individual with access to pen, paper, and post office, and which was relatively less time-
consuming than other political tactics.  
The great tradition of pamphleting was also adopted by anti-immigrationists with gusto. 
Pamphlets were typically produced by organizations rather than individuals, and particularly by 
those single-issue groups like the Birmingham Immigration Control Association, as well as the 
National Front. Pamphlets were generally designed to be informational, providing statistics and 
brief accounts of the impact immigration was ostensibly having upon British communities. Few 
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were long-form argumentative essays, although this was not unheard of (BICA’s most widely 
circulated pamphlet was one such essay).37 The Sussex-based Racial Preservation Society relied 
heavily upon pamphlets originally circulated by American institutions and reprinted in the UK 
under their own name.38 Indeed, virtually no evidence exists of any other activities undertaken by 
the RPS, so it may be presumed that the circulation of pamphlets was their chief, or at least most 
prominent, activity and means of communicating with the general public. In large part, these 
pamphlets were reprinted in Edinburgh by Raymond Bamford, and were the original product of 
both American eugenicist organizations and of some academics based mainly at universities in 
the American South.39  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s all the major political parties continued to rely upon 
pamphlets as a means both of campaigning and of maintaining contact with supporters. The 
Conservatives published a great deal of short-form material on immigration, much of which 
highlighted the steps the party had taken to limit immigration since 1962 against the will of the 
Labour party.40 The Liberals, having adopted a public relations strategy that consisted chiefly of 
informing anti-immigrationists of their false consciousness and lemming-like following of 
certain politicians, saw their responsibility primarily as the circulation of “accurate” information 
about immigration which took place largely in the form of pamphlets.41 In their bid to counter 
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anti-immigrationism, the Labour Party tended to reproduce large segments of anti-immigrationist 
public statements, such as excerpts of speeches given by Enoch Powell, and then to dedicate the 
remainder of the pamphlet to the deconstruction of the speech.42 Of course, this strategy had the 
effect of circulating the content of anti-immigrationist statements even further than they would 
have reached without the aid of the Labour party. 
Circulars and periodicals were a common mechanism for circulating journalistic-style 
reports on the state of various locales where immigration was high as well as arguments about 
what ought to be done to address associated issues. Little information is available about the 
circulation numbers for these periodicals: some, such as those produced by the National Front, 
were often sold by individuals in public areas, and members of local associations would take 
such a competitive attitude towards their sales tactics that it seems likely that reported sales 
numbers may have been exaggerated.43 Certainly these periodicals circulated widely enough that 
a number of copies found their way into the collections of left-leaning organizations, including 
the Working Class Movement, the personal papers of leading immigrant supporters such as 
Maureen Baker and Eric Heffer, and the Labour Party itself. The Labour Party and National 
Front seem to have run a series of infiltrations of each other’s groups by young working-class 
men, and so a number of the National Front documents in the Labour Party archives are likely 
the collection of one such individual who had a subscription as part of his membership.44 The 
Monday Club had a more formal approach to their periodicals, and nearly-complete runs of both 
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the Monday News and the Monday World are extant in the Conservative Party Archive. 
Subscriptions were taken as a matter of course with membership in the organization, although 
the two periodicals appealed to different constituencies, the Monday World being more 
“intellectual,” closer to a right-wing version of the New Statesman with long-form essays and 
occasional poems, while the Monday News was a circular reporting more closely on the minutiae 
of club news and events.45 
Reflecting a tactic strongly associated with nineteenth-century organizations and used 
with some enthusiasm into the twentieth century, many groups also relied upon petitions. The 
Monday Club were committed to petitions as a means of promoting their “Halt Immigration 
Now” campaign in June 1973.46 In a flier presumably enclosed in a copy of the monthly Monday 
News Paul Harris, secretary for the campaign, provided an action plan for those wishing to 
participate in the campaign. The goal, he said, was to obtain at least a million signatures, and 
National Members of the Monday Club were tasked with obtaining 500 signatures each. These 
members were encouraged to carry copies of petition pages on their person at all times: one to be 
filled out by themselves, others to distribute to like-minded individuals wishing to participate. 
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They were also urged to “brief people on the facts and the urgency of the problem,” and to 
organize showings of the film “England, Whose England?” wherever possible.47 The members 
were further encouraged to write personally to their MPs; to Robert Carr, the Home Secretary; to 
Prime Minister Edward Heath; and to the editors of their favourite papers. Petitions were also 
circulated among the members of various unions,48 and even more informally within 
neighbourhoods.49 Petitions were also frequently utilized by formalized neighbourhood 
associations, including the Southall Residents’ Association, and the residents of various 
neighbourhoods in Smethwick.50 
The Birmingham Immigration Control Association engaged in a more novel campaign 
designed for mass participation when they created postcards that were meant to be mailed in to 
individuals’ MPs. On one side was printed “Uncontrolled Immigration. I/We the undersigned are 
of the opinion that the Government should take immediate steps to regulate immigration into this 
country from all countries. Signed...Address...” On the reverse it read “To....M.P. House of 
Commons, Westminster, S.W.1.”51 Individuals were meant to fill in their name and address and 
that of their MP, and drop the card in the mail. This sort of campaign, similar to those still used 
in the twenty-first century by organizations like Amnesty International, appealed to participants 
because of the minimal effort involved: no creativity or ingenuity was needed to craft a letter if 
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the content was already written, and the amount of time involved in signing one’s name is, 
presumably, negligible. From the perspective of organizers, postcard campaigns could be much 
more effective than petitions, which typically involved roughly the same level of involvement 
from participants. A petition would generally be presented to only one individual in the first 
instance, leading to tough choices about who to target their activism towards, whereas individual 
cards could be sent to as many MPs as participants were willing to contact, in addition to which 
the format – a large stack of cards received separately, and probably processed individually by 
MPs’ staff – created an impression of individual concern which could sometimes be missing 
from a petition which might have hundreds or thousands of signatures on it, but which in 
physical form amounted to only a few sheets of A4 paper.  
A similar postcard was made available by BICA for the purposes of fundraising. It read: 
“To The Secretary, The Birmingham Immigration Control Committee. Mr. A.H. Jones, 102, 
Regent Road, Handsworth, Birmingham, 21. I wish to join you in demanding legislation which 
will effectively protect the the [sic] people of Great Britain from the evil effects of uncontrolled 
unlimited immigration. Name...Address...Occupation...Date...I enclose...and am prepared to 
contribute...per month to the Campaign Fund. Signature...”52 While the recipient of these cards 
would by definition agree with these sentiments, it is noteworthy that they would go to the 
trouble of printing such cards. The cards suggest an understanding of the extent to which such 
pre-written mailers were likely to produce a higher rate of response than a simple entreaty for 
support which would require supporters to take the initiative in locating a blank card and filling it 
out themselves. While this seems a trite distinction, campaigning in this period reflected an 
increased awareness of the fact that individuals were ever-more assaulted with information, and 




that their participation was contingent upon the amount of effort required. Any move towards 
minimizing that effort was a worthwhile investment on the part of the organization. 
At the opposite end of the activist spectrum, those who were both deeply involved in the 
anti-immigrationist movement and who fancied themselves either intellectual or artistic (or both) 
engaged in the production of monographs and of films. G.K. Young’s film mentioned above fell 
into this category, but he was far from alone as a Monday Club-affiliated auteur of anti-
immigrationism. Eton and Oxford-educated Tom Stacey, made a Fellow of the Royal Society of 
Literature in 1977, had served as a foreign correspondent for Picture Post, the Daily Express, the 
Montreal Star, the Sunday Times, and the Evening Standard. As a regular contributor to Monday 
Club publications he established himself as an expert in conservatism generally, and immigration 
and foreign relations specifically, as well as a sympathetic collaborator for other young 
Conservatives seeking to explain their views in a longer format. Stacey had stood as Tory 
candidate for North Hammersmith in 1964 and in Dover in 1966 and 1970 while maintaining his 
career as a journalist. In 1965 he published a series of articles entitled “The Dark Million” in the 
Sunday Times outlining what he saw as the wholesale destruction of working-class areas by the 
arrival of West Indian migrants.53 Stacey was also regarded as something of an expert on the ex-
colonial developing world. In 1965 he was in correspondence with the Conservative Research 
Department, urging the creation of a Conservative-run “fully-fledged permanent committee of a 
dozen roving members who would keep in touch with events and personalities in the ‘emergent 
world.’ This committee would report periodically on outstanding topics and would be 
                                                          




permanently available to comment on any topic referred to them.”54 Stacey had also submitted a 
motion to the 1962 party conference, though it was not debated. On behalf of the North 
Hammersmith Conservative Association, Stacey had moved “That this Conference, while 
recognising the justice and wisdom in bringing Kenya to independence under an African 
Government, urges Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that European farmers are given an 
effective guarantee that they will not suffer severe loss as a result of the fundamental 
constitutional changes which were not foreseen by Her Majesty’s Government when it was 
officially encouraging white settlers in Kenya.”55 From 1969 to 1973 he directed Tom Stacey 
Ltd., a publishing house subsumed by Stacey International in 1974.56 Stacey’s edited collection 
of Enoch Powell’s speeches, entitled Immigration and Enoch Powell, was printed in 1970, and 
was the most widely circulated of Stacey’s publications under Tom Stacey Ltd. Other members 
of the Monday Club lauded Stacey’s mission with the publishing house, arguing that he and a 
handful of other individuals were serving as the vanguard for a new brand of conservatism.57 As 
is frequently the case with British politicians, many sitting or recently retired politicians also 
wrote books as a platform for the anti-immigrationist views. Lord Elton, an interwar historian 
who chose not to write under his given name of Godfrey Elton (not to be confused with the more 
prominent Tudor historian Geoffrey Elton) published The Unarmed Invasion with London-based 
                                                          
54 Letter from Douglas to Heath, Fraser, Udal, 4 February 1965, CRD 3/24/9(2) James Douglas Policy Group letter 
books 1965 Feb-March, CPA. Stacey would have written to Douglas in Douglas’ capacity overseeing the operations 
of the Policy Groups, including the Immigration Policy Group. 
 
55 Annual Conference Handout, 81st Annual Conference The Pier Pavilion Llandudno 10-13 October 1962, p. 35, 
NUA 2/2/27, CPA. 
 
56 Stacey is still alive and continues to publish; details of his publishing firm can be found on their website, 
http://www.stacey-international.co.uk [accessed 5 January 2016], and other aspects of his life and work at his 
personal website, http://tomstacey.com [accessed 5 January 2016]. 
 




publisher Geoffrey Bles, while the notorious Smethwick MP Peter Griffiths produced A Question 
of Colour?, published by Leslie Frewin. These two publications were likely the most widely 
circulated anti-immigrationist tracts for contemporaries, and both can be found in research 
libraries worldwide.58  
Physical protests, notably marches, were rare in anti-immigrationist circles, although they 
did occur. The largest was the march through Westminster in support of Enoch Powell after his 
“Rivers of Blood” speech in 1968 attended by striking dockworkers and meat-cutters, among 
others. The Monday Club led a rally in Trafalgar Square in May of 1970.59 With the rise of the 
National Front through the late 1970s these kinds of public demonstrations became more and 
more closely associated with a violent far-right, and so became less popular. Nonetheless, 
marches could attract a great deal of media coverage, so as long as they were conducted in a 
peaceful manner they were not wholly rejected as an effective campaign tactic. 
Many anti-immigrationists found working directly through the political system to be a far 
more preferable option to marching through the streets. Annual party conferences were among 
the few opportunities the party faithful had to directly engage with the party hierarchy. Motions 
would be moved by an individual, often a backbench MP or president of a constituency 
association, and speakers both advocating for and opposing the motion could be drawn from 
anywhere on the floor. The party hierarchy, or government as the case was, would then respond 
through a closing speech either by the party leader or, more often, the cabinet or shadow cabinet 
minister responsible for the portfolio in which the issue fell.60 At Labour party conferences 
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immigration as a topic of conference debate was typically restrained to statements urging the 
government to end racial discrimination in the early part of this period, although when 
immigration was raised as a topic of debate, as at the 1965 and 1976 party conferences, it was in 
response to heightened demand from the party membership for a debate on the subject.61 In the 
parliamentary report section of the 1964 Labour party conference report an account of the party’s 
rejection of the 1963 renewal of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act conceded that “[t]he 
problem of assimilation of Commonwealth immigrants was characterised mainly by housing and 
education. Over-crowding was an evil whatever the cause, and local authorities needed greater 
powers to remedy and prevent it,” and that “[t]he Labour Party felt that financial help should be 
given to local authorities and voluntary efforts to ensure the integration of immigrants in local 
committees.”62  
Apart from the opposition to immigration control, these proposals were not markedly 
different from those perspectives articulated by more moderate Conservatives at their own 
conferences. One such view was outlined by Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler at the 1965 
conference, which stated “That this Conference, recognising that firm restrictions on new 
entrants are now necessary to prevent exacerbation of the overcrowding problem in areas of 
immigrant concentration, urges that this must be coupled with positive and wide ranging 
measures for the integration of existing immigrants in the fields of housing, education, 
employment and the social services, backed up by the generous resources of the central 
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Government,” and which passed by an overwhelming majority.63 It is evident that the 
Conservative Party wished to avoid the domination of the conference agenda by immigration; as 
a result, resolutions that addressed immigration tended only to be selected for debate every other 
year.64 According to the party handbooks, however, which provide a record of all the resolutions 
submitted to the party for consideration as part of the debate, hundreds of resolutions on the topic 
were submitted from the 1950s through the early 1980s. The motions debated at the conference, 
then, are not necessarily representative of the issues that the party membership wished to debate, 
but rather the issues that the party hierarchy felt were deserving of exposure to increasingly high 
levels of media scrutiny. Among those hundreds which were submitted the most moderate 
argued for a form of leniency by embracing those immigrants already settled in Britain. Some 
specifically rejected proposals for repatriation, emphasizing integration as the only ethical 
solution to the problem.65  
Others emphasized the desirability of particular kinds of immigration, such as Major 
A.N. Lane, who moved on behalf of the South Dorset Conservative Unionist Association “That 
this Conference whilst realising the Commonwealth implications involved, considers that the 
uncontrolled flow of coloured immigrants into this country is certain to lead to most regrettable 
developments in the future. The Government are, therefore, urged to control immigration but to 
encourage students, trainees and others seeking higher education, scientific and technical 
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training,”66 while Mr. J.F.G. Major, B.Sc. of the South Nottingham Conservative Association 
moved “That this Conference, whilst recognising the contribution made to our industrial needs 
by many immigrants, views with alarm the unrestricted entry of Commonwealth citizens to this 
country and requests Her Majesty’s Government to ensure admission only of individuals of good 
health and character and with the means to establish themselves on arrival.”67 Even those who 
endorsed the continuation of immigration often did so conditionally, either requiring immigrants 
to have guaranteed employment in the UK before their arrival, or to pass a medical exam, or 
both. Still others recognized the possible challenges that an adversarial immigration and race 
relations policy might pose, such as David Harman of the Wednesbury Conservative and 
Unionist Association, who moved that “This Conference requests that, bearing in mind the 
number of British born children of immigrant parents who will soon be leaving school, urgent 
consideration should be given by the next Conservative Government to the problem of bringing 
about true integration in adult life.”68 
Many, many more were far more hostile in their view of immigration. Among these more 
dramatic proposals was one forwarded by Mrs B. Carthew on behalf of the Kingston and Malden 
Conservative Association, which read: “That this Conference calls for a halt to immigration to 
this country for permanent settlement, save in exceptional circumstances. It also calls for the 
setting up of a service which will be responsible for the voluntary repatriation of immigrants 
with powers to make suitable grants for re-settlement in their country of origin in addition to 
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assisted passages.”69 Mr K.G. Warren’s motion on behalf of the Enfield East Conservative 
Association “That this Conference considers the manifest strength of public opinion against 
continuing immigration necessitates a complete reappraisal of Conservative policy on this 
issue”70 was also rejected for discussion. 
Mirroring their senior counterparts, a youth parliament held in Wimbledon in 1968 voted 
by 21 votes to 15 in support of a Conservative motion that “Unlimited immigration is against the 
national interest,” and which also “suggested a strict quota of immigrants to preserve the 
principle of a fully integrated society.” In a sharp departure from real-life parliamentary politics, 
the motion received the support of Young Liberal Martin Adams, who argued that “the 
Government were losing control of the situation in the country at the moment, and he agreed 
immigration should be limited.”71 Representing the Young Socialists, Roger Crossley “said the 
country was split into bosses and workers and the bosses decided what was the national 
interest…He suggested cutting spending on less essential things and using it to boost the 
economies of under-developed countries who would then trade with Britain.” The Young 
Conservative representative argued that “[u]nlimited immigration is going to strain our resources 
beyond breaking point,” further arguing that the motion was not racialist because it referred to 
immigrants from anywhere, including Europe.72 
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Local councils also proved occasionally to be volatile sites of disagreement over 
immigration policy. In Wandsworth local Labour councillors claimed that the recent election of 
two National Front councillors demonstrated the extent to which Tory councillors often 
sympathized with the NF, arguing that “the Tory Party can be infiltrated by extremists; that a 
bright blue rosette can be a respectable cover for a red, white and black armband.”73 Indeed, the 
resolutions introduced in local councils in a desperate move to take the initiative when they felt 
the national government was turning a blind eye to their travails were among the most dramatic 
of tactics adopted by anti-immigrationists. Many of these resolutions were toothless since there 
was no mechanism for their enforcement, as was the case with a letter signed by fourteen 
councillors in Lambeth in 1968 to restrict any further immigration into the borough.74 The move 
was made without the knowledge of the council’s Tory leader, who was outraged that such steps 
would be taken without his knowledge, especially as they violated established party policy. 
Similar motions were introduced in Birmingham and Bradford, and the Lambeth council was 
purposefully following their lead. The statement opened:  
We would like to indicate our full support for Birmingham, Bradford and other councils 
who have called for no further immigration into the areas under their control. There can 
be no doubt that the massive immigration into certain areas of this country during the past 
15 years has caused, and will continue to cause, increasing burdens and problems to the 
local authorities within those areas. Inadequate legislation and lack of foresight at 
national government level, both in the past and today, have placed an intolerable burden 
and dangerous problem, both of which are certain to escalate in certain areas of this 
country. Lambeth has a high proportion of immigrants and we, the undersigned, call for a 
complete ban on all further immigration into this borough, which has a major problem in 
housing, education and welfare services.75 
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The statement went on to note the lack of support for such measures from the national 
government, stating that “Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Ennals have stated that you cannot build a wall 
around specific towns, cities or boroughs. We agree, the solution lies with the Government to 
call a complete ban on all further immigration into this country – no permit holders and above 
all, on relatives or dependents, who now make up the vast majority of the present immigrants.”76 
Evidently, the councillors felt that control of immigration did not and ought not fall within their 
remit, but in the face of apparent inaction on the part of the central government they felt they had 
no choice but to make their concerns explicit.  
The attempted circumvention of one level of government by another was unusual, but not 
unheard of: in the early twentieth century, restrictive national welfare policies had prompted 
local governments, technically no longer responsible for the maintenance of unemployed 
workers, to work outside their official remit to fill the gaps left by national legislation.77 The 
Lambeth councillors had no capacity to actually enact the measures for which they called, but the 
fact that they chose to comment so publicly and critically upon matters for which the national 
government was solely responsible reflects the general trend within anti-immigrationist circles to 
demand that national policies mirror those which were most popular in localities heavily affected 
by immigration. The chief criticism levelled against the councillors who were signatories to the 
Lambeth letter was that they were chiefly newly-elected young people with no previous 
experience as elected representatives.78 Referred to by the editor of the local paper as 
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“Conservative ‘rebels,’”79 they nonetheless attracted support from those constituents who felt 
that their views opposing immigration were not sufficiently represented at any level. In fact, the 
Lambeth Council reflected many of the same divisions evident at the national level: a handful of 
less-powerful, sometimes young, representatives went out of their way to declare their support 
for anti-immigrationism, against the grain of more established or less eccentric politicians. When 
the party and parliament accused these individuals of breaking rank with the established dialogue 
on immigration, they replied that they were simply acting as genuine representatives of the 
public will. The Lambeth Conservatives later split over a debate on the motion “Immigration in 
to the United Kingdom will cease forthwith”: supporters argued that immigration placed an 
unbearable burden upon services and could not be sustained. Opponents, led by Sir George 
Young, objected on the grounds that this policy would exclude Australians from entry into the 
country.80 
Anti-immigrationists also engaged in the conduct of electoral politics itself as a tactic to 
advance their views. Anti-immigrationist groups would either endorse candidates standing for 
election in areas where anti-immigrationism ran high, or submit their own candidates. E.J. 
(Jeffrey) Hamm, private secretary to Oswald Mosley in the postwar period, himself ran as a 
Union candidate in Handsworth, in the northwest of Birmingham. His campaign focused 
particularly on appealing to disaffected Tories who were frustrated by the lack of grassroots 
representation for their issues, notably the social problems stemming from the spike of 
immigration to Handsworth.81 Hamm positioned himself as the solution not only to immigration, 
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but to a failure of democracy and politics more generally. As such he appealed to the concepts of 
active citizenship and genuine democracy outlined above, while also relying on an eminently 
respectable method, that of contesting for public office, as a means of doing so. While the 
National Front continued to contest seats as a means of demonstrating their commitment to the 
existing political system, Oswald Mosley’s Union Movement conversely removed itself from 
electoral contests beginning in 1968, as Mosley wanted “to urge that the gathering crisis 
necessitated the ending of party strife and the union of the whole nation in a government of true 
national unity. Union Movement subscribes to that view and therefore no longer contests 
elections which perpetuate party strife.”82 Despite Mosley’s acquired distaste for the rough-and-
tumble world of electoral politics, the mainstream political stage remained a potent venue for 
anti-immigrationist activity. The scope and limitations of this strategy are reflected in the careers 
of a handful of British politicians, to whom we now turn. 
IV  
While the anti-immigrationist movement was premised in no small part upon large-scale 
grassroots participation, it equally relied upon the involvement of elected officials. This section 
will assess the tactics and legacies of four men who might serve as case studies for the range of 
elected officials involved in this movement. It is clear from the tactics adopted by anti-
immigrationists that the democratic system of parliamentary politics in Britain was the chief and 
most desirable mechanism for achieving their goals. The strategies of political expression non-
elected anti-immigrationists adopted were designed to appeal to those who held political power. 
This strategy assumed that electoral politics based on representation of the electorate, rather than 
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a paternalistic method of governance, was both the best way to achieve their goals, and also that 
this was in fact the mechanism by which politics in Britain worked. As the people who had voted 
for their political representatives they were entitled to representation by those individuals: the job 
of the politician was to reflect the perspectives and desires of the electorate. As the anti-
immigrationist movement progressed it became clear that not all politicians were willing to 
advocate on its behalf, no matter how representative anti-immigrationists may be of their 
communities. Those who rejected the appeals of anti-immigrationists were derided as out of 
touch, ivory-tower types who had no real view of the British people and their desires, and who 
instead served the interests of a distant and hostile elite.  
The hostility of this elite made those members of the political class who did represent the 
anti-immigrationists’ views that much more adored. The careers of four men, all of whom served 
as Conservative Members of Parliament through the 1960s, serve collectively to exemplify some 
of the ways in which officials could and did appeal to the democratic ideals of anti-
immigrationists, as well as the limitations of those ideals when implemented by individuals of 
varied background. Furthermore, they highlight the ways in which the possession of political 
power complicates the anti-immigrationist message. Elected officials did not only serve the 
imperatives of their constituents, but also of their party and the nation. An overview of these 
men’s careers serves to highlight the extent to which an anti-immigrationist identity might be 
foisted upon a representative, rather than embraced, but also the ways in which an anti-
immigrationist ethos could be utilized to serve the representative’s own political goals. 
Furthermore, a closer examination of these individuals emphasizes the significances of networks 
and organizational links to the anti-immigrationist movement as a whole. Anti-immigrationists 
were not a unified mass of disenfranchised individuals seeking to influence a universally hostile 
120 
 
political establishment; rather, individuals from that establishment could serve as intermediaries 
between those who did not hold political power, and those who held a great deal of it. If the anti-
immigrationists detailed above were committed to articulating and advancing their views through 
democratic processes and by influencing those in positions of power, these were some of the men 
who had access to avenues through which that power was enacted. 
Enoch Powell 
 
Popular perception of anti-immigrationism has been largely characterized by, and 
perhaps conflated with, Powellism. It is important to note that anti-immigrationism neither began 
nor ended with Enoch Powell. He was certainly not the first politician to state an anti-
immigrationist argument, and he was hardly its only defender during the period in which he is 
often framed as its staunchest representative. Powellism, I would argue, also comprises a number 
of views on other subjects which would not necessarily have been adhered to by the bulk of anti-
immigrationists.83 It is perhaps fair to say that all Powellists were anti-immigrationist, but not all 
anti-immigrationists were Powellists. Nonetheless, it is true that the high tides of the anti-
immigrationist movement, the moments at which it attracted the greatest degree of public notice 
and popular discussion, were very much associated with Powell. His April 1968 “Rivers of 
Blood” speech remains the most powerful and popularly remembered example of anti-
immigrationism, so much so that it was used (albeit in a fictionalized form) as a device to 
represent the whole of popular racism during the 1960s in an episode of the television crime 
drama George Gently. The speech prompted an outpouring of letters, articles, and subsequently 
research enterprises on the topic of immigration, both from its supporters and opponents, such as 
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had not been seen since at least the Second World War, if not in the whole of the twentieth 
century.  
Powell delivered the speech to a closed audience at a Conservative Association meeting 
in Birmingham; the media, however, was notified about the topic of the speech in advance, and 
as a result press coverage was much greater than might ordinarily have been expected of a 
private speech. Powell detailed an apocalyptic future in which an increasing non-white 
population resulted in the utter collapse of British society, citing a constituent who claimed that 
“in 15 or 20 years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man.” Powell 
emphasized the necessity for a state-supported programme of repatriation, and of strict 
limitations on all Commonwealth immigration. He drew attention to the impact of immigration 
on the services of the welfare state, and closed, notably, with a reference to “[t]hat tragic and 
intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which 
there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by 
our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come.” He lamented, “[a]s I look 
ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with 
much blood.’”84 
Party leader Edward Heath immediately removed Powell from his position on the 
Shadow Cabinet, and Powell was roundly criticized by many of the most prominent 
Conservative MPs, including Edward Boyle and Quintin Hogg. But in the aftermath of the 
speech, anti-immigrationists aired their joy so publicly it was as though the floodgates had 
opened; indeed, within days Whitehall itself was filled with a thousand London dockers 
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marching to protest Powell’s firing. Finally, a prominent Conservative politician, a member of 
the Shadow Cabinet, was speaking that which so many people had been thinking. One of the 
most common statements in the correspondence of his supporters was that Powell spoke on 
behalf of the great unheard masses: “Mr. Sandys and Mr. Powell are speaking for 95 per cent of 
us. Mistaken policies should and must be reversed. We don’t mind the few but not millions.”85 A 
large proportion of the letters written by members of the public in support of Enoch Powell are 
unavailable. Held by the Conservative Party in their archive, access to these files is routinely 
denied. Those letters which were sent to Powell outside the aegis of the party, however, can be 
found in his personal papers, and number in the thousands.86 Some letter-writers took an 
alternate tack and sent their congratulations to Powell via an intermediary. Such was the case 
with many of Patrick Wall’s constituents. Knowing that Wall, an executive of the Monday Club 
through this period, was a strong supporter of anti-immigrant measures, constituents wrote to 
him asking that their support be made known to Powell.87 Camilla Schofield’s assessment of 
Powell’s letter-writers may be taken as a method of interpreting anti-immigrationist materials in 
general: she writes that they “should not merely be read as irrational or misdirected emotional 
outbursts. Powell and his supporters framed the issue of black immigration within a set of 
coordinates that reveal a great deal about the moral architecture of public and private life at the 
time.”88 
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Gavin Schaffer has argued that the decision to grant Powell significant television airtime 
in the aftermath of the “Rivers of Blood” speech raised concerns that he was being given a 
disproportionately large platform for potentially inflammatory statements. The counterpoint to 
this view, held even by those working within broadcast media, “was a belief that he spoke for 
many people and deserved access to the media on this basis.”89 Broadcasters felt compelled to 
represent both sides of the immigration issue, and in this light “Powell was cast as the reasonable 
voice of an angry multitude,”90 in any case preferable to the more rabid individuals who might 
otherwise be called upon to take his place. Schaffer further notes that “Powell had worked harder 
than anyone to create just this image and was quick to defend his right to a fair hearing.”91 If this 
is a cynical view of Powell’s motives in ascending the public stage on this issue, it is one that can 
be applied to the conduct of Powell’s contemporaries as well. In the postwar era of mass 
communications and an increasingly global media it became ever more important for prospective 
or standing politicians to persuade voters that they were the best people to hold their jobs. 
Indeed, television served as an essential venue for this practice of marketing oneself, as 
evidenced by the range of individuals who took to the nation’s screens to defend their views on 
immigration.92 Powell thus seized upon opportunities to appear as a respectable expert in a 
public venue as a mechanism to advance his views against those of his opponents. While in later 
years Powell may have adopted positions that seemed further and further from the political 
mainstream, he was never without supporters, and he was certainly never unable to persuade 
                                                          










those who would give him a hearing that he knew at least something about what he was talking 
about. Powell’s failing in the eyes of history was not that he was a bad politician, but that he 
used his substantial political acumen in defense of now-indefensible stances. 
As commentators have been noting since journalist Paul Foot wrote his study of 
Powellism in 1969, Powell arrived tardily to the anti-immigrationist game.93 In the early 1960s, 
and even during the Smethwick controversy addressed below during the autumn of 1964, Powell 
remained largely silent on the topic of immigration. Once he decided to change his mind, 
however, he did so dramatically. By 1967 it was noted in the minutes of a Conservative Leader’s 
Consultative Committee meeting that “Mr. Powell, who would not be able to be at the meeting 
on 1st May, thought we should not assume that the present liberality of outlook and the 
disappearance of the racial feeling that had welled up for instance at Smethwick would last for 
ever [sic]…there could easily be a recrudescence of the “Smethwick” attitude, particularly when 
people became aware of the prediction of three million coloured people in Britain by the year 
2000.”94 This prediction, of course, was Powell’s own, and not one supported by either 
government or other organizations’ assessments.95 Even among anti-immigrationists, Powell was 
not universally valorized. Powell encountered opposition from those who had taken an anti-
immigrationist stance many years earlier, including BUF founder Oswald Mosley. Mosley’s aide 
E.J. Hamm wrote in May 1968 that “[o]n immigration, Enoch Powell merely said in rather 
hysterical and abusive language what Mosley has been saying calmly and without abuse for the 
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past nine years.”96 While Powell’s use of language was the subject of criticism from the left as 
well, it was among the aspects most criticized by those on the right, including Peter Griffiths.97 
Despite these criticisms, Schofield highlights the Churchillian nature of much of Powell’s public 
speeches, emphasizing the extent to which Powell drew upon a vocabulary of assault and siege 
common to Second World War rhetoric, and the way in which this appealed to a sense of 
discontent within the British public.98 
Among the more critical assessments by Powell’s contemporaries is an article written by 
Ferdinand Mount, chief leader writer at the Daily Mail and a novelist, as well as former assistant 
to Selwyn Lloyd and a Conservative Research Department employee whose letter book is quoted 
elsewhere. An editor’s note appended to the article, which appeared in Solon: A Right Wing 
Journal, stated that Powell is “quite the oddest leader for anyone on the right to claim as their 
own, much as I admire a few of his qualities. What is indisputable is that he is a focus of right 
wing discussion.”99 Mount wrote that “Mr. Powell sees himself, then, as a man driven on by a 
duty to truth and marked out from other men by his devotion to that duty. His colleagues, 
through fear or blindness desert him; but nothing can deflect him from his chosen path.”100 
Mount’s assessment of Powell was both critical and almost perversely fascinated:  
Mr. Powell in his quintessential mood – a melancholy defeatism combined with 
demagogic flattery. “You are the salt of the earth”, he constantly reassures his hearers, 
whether businessmen, trade unionists or the public at large “everything would be lovely if 
matters were left to you. It is Whitehall which messes it all up”. The Government cannot 
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win; if things go well, Mr. Powell gives the credit to the brain and sinew of the British 
people; if things go badly, it is the fault of the Government or of some ineluctable process 
of history. There is in Mr. Powell’s determinism a strange echo of Marxist historicism.101  
 
For all Mount’s skepticism, Powell’s critique of the political establishment, and endorsement of 
the mass of the British people, was immensely appealing, and created the basis of the outpouring 
of support he received through the late 1960s and 1970s. 
While Powell was an adept politician and certainly capable of tailoring his tactics to 
appeal to the current mood, immigration was but one part of his comprehensive world view, not 
an isolated strategy to attract votes. As his career slipped into its twilight years he left the 
Conservative Party that had proved so reluctant to adopt his perspective, standing instead as MP 
for the Ulster Unionist Party. One of the most prominent and controversial politicians of the 
twentieth century, he has become associated in popular memory most strongly with immigration, 
but it was never the only issue about which he felt strongly. While he was perhaps the most vocal 
and most popular of anti-immigrationist politicians, he was never only, or even foremost, an anti-
immigrationist politician. Powell sits more obviously as a precedent to the emergence of the New 
Right, and as a discontented post-imperialist, than as an anti-immigrationist alone.102 It is 
impossible, then, to assess his rise and fall as reflective solely of the fortunes of anti-
immigrationism as a movement. 
Duncan Sandys 
 
Duncan Sandys, former son-in-law of Winston Churchill, was an established 
parliamentarian by the time postwar anti-immigrationist controversy began to emerge. As 
Secretary of State for the Colonies he negotiated the agreement in which Kenyan Asians were 
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permitted to retain British citizenship after Kenyan independence. Randall Hansen has 
comprehensively outlined Sandys’ role in these events, arguing that the commitment made to 
Kenyan Asians at the moment of independence, that they would be entitled to British citizenship, 
was in fact undermined by the restrictions placed on immigration in the 1962 CIA. Hansen 
concludes that Sandys, in effect, betrayed the pledge made to Kenyan Asians that they would be 
granted the right to settle in the UK.103 Thus, Sandys’ work as Secretary of State laid the 
ideological and legal groundwork for the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act that prevented 
the entry even of United Kingdom passport holders, so long as they had “no substantial 
connection” to the UK. What is perhaps more interesting as a means of assessing his role in the 
broader anti-immigrationist movement are the ways in which he is referred to by constituents in 
letters to the editors of local papers. Sandys was MP for Streatham, South London, from 1950 to 
1974, following a term as MP for Norwood, also in South London, from 1935 to 1945. Streatham 
was one of the areas of Greater London most dramatically affected by the arrival of New 
Commonwealth immigrants. At the peak of the Kenyan Asians crisis, Sandys received upwards 
of a thousand letters of support for his public stance opposing to limit the incoming numbers of 
immigrants. He appeared on the popular BBC public affairs program “Panorama” in February of 
1968 to outline his stance on the issue, and emphasized that his concern with respect to 
immigration was not a response to the sudden arrival of Kenyan Asians, but rather had prompted 
him to write to the Home Secretary as early as 1966.104 Sandys established himself quickly as a 
patrician champion of his constituents, whose concern with immigration was largely related to 
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the impact it had upon the immediate Streatham community. A diverse group of individuals 
found reason to support Sandys, underscoring the extent to which anti-immigrationism not only 
permeated British society, but also the importance of active representation by elected officials to 
anti-immigrationist individuals. 
While the Young Conservatives (YCs) as a body tended to be more moderate on the issue 
of immigration, this was not always true of associations in areas of high immigrant populations. 
The political vice-chairman of the Streatham Young Conservatives Association, William Fuller, 
wrote an article in the association’s newsletter advocating a complete ban on all immigration, as 
well as the deportation of immigrants convicted of criminal offenses, and the introduction of a 
programme to encourage immigrants to return to their countries of origin or to migrate to other 
countries “that would welcome them.”105 Further proposals outlined by Fuller included separate 
educational facilities for immigrant children, mandatory medical examinations for all new 
immigrants, and “compulsory education of immigrants in public health, sanitation, and birth 
control, and deportation of all immigrants who have been continuously unemployed for over two 
months.”106 Fuller’s stance was in stark contrast to certain members of the Conservative 
opposition who had called for moderation on the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Bill, 
including Ian Macleod and John Hunt, whose opposition to strict controls rendered them, in 
Fuller’s view, not “true Conservatives.”107 Fuller was evidently convinced that it was the 
responsibility of these members of parliament to reflect the views of those living in the 
constituencies most affected, including Streatham. He went on to explain that the issue was, 
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indeed, one of “colour,” but that it was a problem to be dealt with by means of “logic and 
reason,” rather than “conscience and moral judgments.”108 The grounds for Fuller’s commitment 
to a “logical” solution rather than a “moral” one was the burden placed by immigrants upon 
welfare state infrastructure, and the projection that in the future Britons would find themselves 
waiting for accommodation in housing and hospital facilities while immigrant families seized 
opportunities that could have been theirs. 
Clive Flynn, a Streatham YC, wrote in the association’s magazine SCAN that seventy 
percent of the electorate supported Sandys’ stance on both immigration and capital punishment. 
Flynn argued: “At present, he is representing not only Streatham but all the constituencies whose 
so-called representatives neglect their constituents in order to uphold their own worthless 
principles. Such people have no right to be in Parliament – they are as yellow as a Chinaman 
with jaundice.”109 Flynn’s argument in support of Sandys’ was much the same as others launched 
by advocates of anti-immigrationism. Sandys was simply doing his job by reflecting the 
viewpoints of constituents – and constituents, according to Flynn, wanted restrictions on 
immigration. Apart from its invocation of an aggressively racialized view of the world, Flynn’s 
loaded simile highlighted that such direct representation of local concerns was the responsibility 
of elected officials even if those concerns might not be seen as popularly accepted. According to 
Flynn, advocating on behalf of constituents even at the risk of political embarrassment was a 
mark of pride and strength, and those representatives who chose not to reflect their constituents’ 
views in the face of political opposition were not just bad at their jobs, but morally weak. 
Claiming an anti-immigrationist view as evidence of strength of character was an important 
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move towards flipping the script used by others to oppose immigration controls. In this view, 
anti-immigrationists were white knights, those daring to speak out on behalf of the downtrodden 
and misunderstood, the unheard and unrepresented. The people who deserved such a defense, 
according to this view, were white Britons suffering at the hands of immigrants, not the 
immigrants themselves. The Streatham YCs mounted a similar defense of Enoch Powell after his 
sacking in April 1968, arguing that his speech “represented the opinion of the majority of the 
people of this country.”110  
Sandys’ stance on immigration was very similar to Powell’s; indeed, in the wake of 
Powell’s dismissal he made reference to a personal association between the two men on the 
issue, stating that “Enoch Powell and I…have for a long time, been advocating two precise 
measures. First, that the entry of all further immigrants including the dependants of those already 
here, should be virtually stopped altogether, and secondly that generous grants should be given to 
any are disposed to return home. The problem is not primarily one of racial prejudice. It is one of 
numbers,” arguing that it was futile to introduce measures to improve race relations as long as 
50,000 immigrants continued to enter the country each year.111 When one Streatham News reader 
wrote a letter to the editor urging Sandys to re-examine his views on immigration in light of the 
riots in Watts in 1965, and in Chicago in early 1968, arguing that “[r]acial harmony will never be 
achieved by educated men playing upon the fears of the ill-educated with dubious statistics and 
oft-repeated, but rarely proven, tales of black misbehaviour towards their white neighbours,” he 
met with a strident rejoinder.112 Douglas Harris wrote in reply that “[t]he American racial 
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problem is the consequence of their own importation. We, however, have generally been tolerant 
of small persecuted minorities and over the centuries a few have and were welcomed – 
assimilated and unnoticed because we ourselves had the room and our own native population 
quite small,”113 concluding that, in the end, this was a short-sighted policy. 
In June 1968 Sandys was forced out of a hall by fifty students at Bradford University 
where he had been invited to speak to the university Conservative association. In response, 
hundreds of students from across the country wrote to voice their disgust at his treatment.114 The 
Streatham News reported that while Sandys was unable to finish his speech inside the lecture 
hall, once he had exited the building he found an open space and continued speaking through a 
hailer he happened to have on hand despite “continual chanting and jostling.”115 In a statement, 
Sandys proclaimed that students had written to him “asking for them to be disassociated from 
this hooliganism. Although many of the writers are opposed to me politically, they made it clear 
they believe in free speech and that I had a right to be heard.”116 The entire incident seemed to 
bolster Sandys’ reputation as a fearless defender of his views in the face of ostensibly unjustified 
and vaguely hysterical opposition. The invocation of free speech also situated him firmly in the 
right as a democratic actor: British society ought not to silence his opinions just because it did 
not agree with them.117 Sandys went on to decry those protestors who had opposed him as “loud-
mouthed foreign agitators” and stated “[i]t would be nice for a change to hear some British 
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students speaking for themselves.”118 Again, Sandys claimed that those who opposed his stance 
on immigration did not speak for the British polity in a genuine way, and that if given the 
opportunity many British people would express the same views as him. Instead, he claimed, 
these views were being overruled by illegitimate actors expressing sectional interests that had 
nothing to do with the well-being of the British people. 
In February of 1969 Sandys introduced a bill to the House of Commons that would 
dramatically reduce the number of immigrants entering the country. The bill, defeated by 247 
votes to 126, was nonetheless supported by a number of prominent Conservatives, including 
party chairman Anthony Barber, former party leader Sir Alec Douglas-Home, then-Chief Whip 
William Whitelaw, and, then serving as Shadow Transport Minister, Margaret Thatcher. The bill 
included controls upon the admission of dependents of those immigrants already residing in 
Britain, as well as proposing to take into consideration problems of service provision and 
infrastructure. Effectively, all Commonwealth immigrants would be placed in the same initial 
situation as aliens, with no right of permanent settlement, or entitlement to bring over 
dependents.119 Sandys’ bill reflected his commitment to advancing his views not only 
rhetorically, but also politically: he did not only pay lip service to the views of anti-
immigrationists, he also took identifiable steps to introduce legislation to address those views. 
Sandys had significant advantages over other anti-immigrationists: he was unequivocally 
a paid-up member of the Establishment, and even the hint of scandal was insufficient to dislodge 
him from his position.120 This power gave Sandys a certain kind of liberty – not to say impunity 
                                                          
118 Streatham News, 21 June 1968, 1. 
 
119 Streatham News, 14 February 1969, 1. 
 
120 As evidenced by Sandys’ involvement with personal and sexual scandals. N. Piers Ludlow, “Duncan Sandys,” 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [online – accessed 5 January 2016]. 
133 
 
– to say what he wanted. However, Sandys never took his anti-immigrationism to the same 
lengths as Powell. His retirement from politics in 1974 may have been a factor in his lack of 
involvement with anti-immigrationism in its later years; certainly, he was not quite as young as 
the other men described here. Apart from a lack of interest in pursuing anti-immigrationism to 
the exclusion of other concerns, Sandys’ power itself was also a distancing factor. While Sandys 
positioned himself rhetorically as a champion of the people, it seems likely that he never 
genuinely saw himself as such. He lived in London, but in Westminster, not Streatham. For 
Sandys, anti-immigrationism was a topic on which he happily agreed with his constituents, but it 
is not at all clear that he would have pursued it had it not suited him and his own aspirations, nor 
was it the case that he only championed anti-immigrationism as a direct representative; rather, it 
seems that anti-immigrationism was a partial continuation of his earlier career in foreign and 
colonial affairs and the principles of international relations, not a latter day fixation with the 
living conditions of South Londoners. Simply put, Sandys was less invested in the anti-
immigrationist cause than other representatives, and thus despite his superior access to the 
avenues of power he proved a more marginal figure to the movement as a whole. 
Peter Griffiths 
Conservative MP Peter Griffiths was elected to represent the constituency of Smethwick, 
near Birmingham, in October 1964. Defeated at that seat in 1966, he taught for a time at 
Portsmouth Polytechnic before returning to politics in an unsuccessful campaign for the 
Portsmouth North seat in February 1974, and winning the seat in Thatcher’s landslide of 1979. 
He held the seat until his retirement from public life in 1997. Griffiths has remained a fixture in 
popular memory as the first individual to run in a national election on an anti-immigrationist 
platform. This characterization is probably not strictly true, since Oswald Mosley continued to 
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contest elections following his “conversion” to interwar fascism and commitment to anti-
Semitism, and politicians through the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were less 
hesitant to express racialized views then some of their more recent counterparts. In any case, 
Griffiths was the first to win a seat on such a platform in the era of television and mass 
communications, and even before his election the conduct of his campaign attracted international 
attention. Smethwick was certainly a magnet for larger-than-life characters, since in addition to 
Mosley, who held the seat in the 1920s as a Labour MP, Christabel Pankhurst had also run for 
the seat on a platform of “advocacy for improved housing.”121 
Much of Griffiths’ success had to do with his relationship to the Smethwick community. 
Smethwick-born and bred, Griffiths was head at a local school, and had served on the council for 
a number of years before his parliamentary campaign. He made much of his long-time residence 
in the area in contrast to the high-flying incumbent, Patrick Gordon Walker. Gordon Walker was 
a favourite of Harold Wilson’s and widely understood to be pegged for the Foreign Office in the 
case of a Labour victory, but he resided most of the time in the luxe Hampstead Garden Suburb, 
and was born in West Sussex and educated at Christ Church, Oxford. The Birmingham Post 
described Gordon Walker as a “pipe-smoking history don turned politician” – not someone likely 
to possess any particular awareness of the potency of immigration as an electoral issue.122 The 
success of anti-immigrationist political campaigning at the national government level was partly 
contingent upon the ability of anti-immigrationists to link their cause to other issues that had 
local traction. In the case of Smethwick, this was the perceived indifference of Patrick Gordon 
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Walker to Smethwick as a community, and his perpetual fixation with national and foreign 
affairs at the expense of constituents’ local concerns. This frustration primed the community to 
respond positively to Peter Griffiths’ self-promotion as a “man of the people.” Regular columns 
in the local paper, the Smethwick Telephone, offered the candidates for all three major parties the 
opportunity to engage with their constituents on a weekly basis. From the beginning of the 1960s 
through to Griffiths’ election in October 1964 these articles engaged ever more frequently with 
the topic of immigration.123 While Griffiths is often credited as bringing immigration to the fore 
in Smethwick politics coverage of other events, such as the creation of the Smethwick branch of 
the Immigration Control Association and threatened rent strikes in 1961, predates Griffiths’ 
campaign for parliament. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Griffiths’ campaign was his association with 
Donald Finney, head of the Smethwick branch of the Birmingham Immigration Control 
Association. Griffiths’ parliamentary campaign reached its controversial height when news broke 
of posters appearing around the Smethwick area which stated “If you want a nigger for a 
neighbour, vote Labour.”124 This facet of Griffiths’ campaign remains, to the present day, the 
most memorable and the most abhorrent element thereof, and resulted in Griffiths being labelled 
by then-Prime Minister Harold Wilson as a “parliamentary leper.”125 Griffiths, however, 
consistently disavowed any knowledge of or involvement with those behind the postering, 
suggesting that those responsible for the posters were in fact members of the Immigration 
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Control Association under the leadership of Finney.126 Finney had founded the Smethwick 
branch of BICA in 1961, and was to remain its leader until he became dissatisfied with other 
members’ apparent reluctance to be sufficiently “extreme” and founded the splinter group the 
English Rights Association.127 Finney had been deeply involved in the controversy surrounding 
the 1961 establishment of the Smethwick BICA, and became increasingly prominent in local 
politics through the 1960s. By 1961 he was also serving as a Conservative member of the local 
council. Throughout his career Finney became increasingly associated with far-right 
organizations, and became more extreme in the expression of his personal views. While he 
remained a member of the local Conservative Party, he frequently expressed distaste for the 
more moderate immigration policies articulated by the national party hierarchy. Indeed, the 
Guardian wrote of Finney and his associates in 1965 that “[t]heir aims are the same as those of 
Sir Oswald Mosley, but they are staunch Conservatives.”128 
It seems likely that Griffiths’ association with Finney was at least partly one of political 
opportunism. Finney and his tactics were not well-liked by the party hierarchy, violating as he 
did the basic tenets of what the Conservative Party deemed “acceptable” political behaviour.129 
The fear among the Conservative hierarchy was very much that Griffiths’ might live up to his 
“parliamentary leper” moniker. One Conservative Research Department staffer wrote of 
Griffiths, in a memo suggesting Griffiths ought not to be permitted to respond directly to a letter 
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from a constituent: “We can keep a certain control of him, but he is rather an opinionated young 
man, and one cannot be quite sure how he will deal with this.”130 
The problem with Griffiths was not so much the content of his views, but the way in 
which he expressed them. The issue was not that he associated with representatives of other 
organizations - this was common enough within Conservative circles – but rather the nature of 
the particular organizations he chose to be affiliated with. There could be no particular objection 
to membership within the Monday Club, and certainly there were other Conservative 
organizations which advocated an anti-immigrationist view. But Griffiths’ relationship with 
members of the far right had violated the restrictions upon intra-associational relations by joining 
forces with a group and individuals who did not always abide by the rules of the political game. 
Those who ventured outside the realm of electoral politics and advocacy to engage in 
intimidation and deceitful tactics did damage to the reputation of mainstream politics, and the 
Conservative Party could not risk losing face over this issue. Correspondence circulated within 
the Conservative Party hierarchy in London suggested that the party saw Griffiths as 
unpredictable, and feared that he might somehow embarrass the party on this issue. In response 
to the deluge of letters on the Smethwick issue received by the Conservative Central Office, one 
staffer argued that “[w]hat our opponents are trying to do is to get us either to repudiate Mr. 
Griffiths or else to come out 100 per cent in his defence. In our view it would be a mistake to do 
either of these things.”131 Griffiths did not inspire a great deal of confidence in national party 
circles, and their ambivalence towards him suggests that there were limits to the national party’s 
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willingness to devote much energy to the kind of candidate who inspired “nigger neighbour” 
postering campaigns. 
Griffiths was defeated in the 1966 General Election by Labour candidate and former 
actor Andrew Faulds by a margin of 4,000 votes (11%), double the margin by which Griffiths 
had defeated Gordon Walker two years earlier and 4% higher than the national swing to 
Labour.132 Faulds’ determinedly pro-immigration stance suggests that it was Griffiths’ appeal to 
local knowledge, and his preferability to Gordon Walker, which were instrumental in his initial 
election.133 This is not to say that immigration was not a significant factor in his election, but 
rather underscores the extent to which Griffiths’ support was contingent upon attaching anti-
immigrationism to notable local issues, and also the significance of maintaining one’s anti-
immigrationist stance in an acceptable way. During his term in office Griffiths had proved 
himself to be an unpredictable politician, and his continued association with Donald Finney, 
despite Finney’s increased association with the far right, indicated that Griffiths might also be 
drawn to more extreme tactics not endorsed by the party hierarchy. While Griffiths had not been 
overtly abandoned by the national party he was also not noticeably supported by it, and there is 
no evidence to suggest that the party felt it worthwhile to dedicate any resources to assisting 
Griffiths in holding his seat. Indeed, Griffiths’ campaigns to influence members of the Labour 
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government on behalf of his constituents had failed dramatically, suggesting that his competence 
as a direct representative was less than voters had hoped for.134 
In 1966 Griffiths published A Question of Colour?, which advocated for an apartheid 
style of race relations policy and served as a retrospective defense of his tenure in office. He 
subsequently departed Smethwick for a teaching job in the history department at Portsmouth 
Polytechnic, and more or less disappeared from public life until his contests for the Portsmouth 
North seat, culminating in his successful campaign in 1979. He held office for another eighteen 
years, yet there is no evidence that he ever spoke publicly on immigration again. It is not clear 
whether this was the result of party instruction or his own reluctance to risk his reputation. His 
name remains synonymous with racism and exclusionary campaign tactics, yet few have given 
serious thought to the extent to which his first term in office indicated the significance of local 
politics for the immigration debate. It is unlikely that Griffiths would ever have been elected as 
MP without his earlier stint as a local councillor and his detailed knowledge of the local area. 
Griffiths adeptly marketed himself as a man of the people of Smethwick. There were strict limits 
to the parochial appeal of his political strategizing, however, and it was in the expansion of that 
appeal to the national stage that he failed. 
Patrick Wall 
Perhaps the least well-known of these individuals is Patrick Wall.135 Born in Cheshire in 
1916, Wall was privately educated in Bath, commissioned by the Royal Marines in 1935, and 
spent the Second World War serving on vessels for the Royal Navy as well as on support craft 
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for the Royal Navy, United States Navy, and Royal Marine Commandos. Wall was decorated for 
his service by both the British and the Americans, and went on to train at both the Royal Naval 
Staff College and Joint Services Staff College. He became a staff instructor at the School of 
Combined Operations in 1946. After retiring as Major in 1950 to focus on politics he continued 
to serve as a reservist and with the Sea Scout and Sea Cadet organizations. He was elected as 
Conservative MP in the Haltemprice Division of Hull (later East Yorkshire) in 1953 and served 
through the redrawing of the constituency to his retirement in 1987. Knighted for his services to 
politics in 1981, Wall served on a seemingly endless number of parliamentary committees and 
was heavily involved in both party and civic affairs. In 1964 he founded the “92 Society” which 
was dedicated to “keeping the Conservatives Conservative,” and which remained in operation 
until 1984. Both a Conservative and a conservative in a general sense, Wall was also an 
observant Roman Catholic and maintained an interest in the associational life of the church.  
His chief parliamentary interests are listed on the catalogue of his papers as “defence, the 
fishing industry, and Commonwealth and foreign affairs,” and he was noted for his wide travel, 
particularly across twenty trips to Africa. His interests, as well as his background, position him 
as closer in type to Enoch Powell than Peter Griffiths. However, his dedication to local 
government (he served as a member of Westminster City Council simultaneously with his office 
as Member of Parliament from 1953 to 1962, as well as Vice President of the Urban District 
Councils Association from 1965 to 1974) is more reminiscent of Griffiths’ early career as a local 
politician in its emphasis on local representation, although the simultaneous holding of both 
offices and Wall’s residence in Westminster suggests that Wall’s representation of Hull was less 
based on a “man of the people” ethos than Griffiths’ representation of Smethwick. This unusual 
linking of interests and involvement with international, national, and local levels of policy 
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engagement makes Wall fairly unique in anti-immigrationist circles, and also helps to explain the 
approaches Wall took to the immigrant “problem.” Unlike the constituencies represented by the 
other three individuals discussed here Hull did not experience immigration on the same scale as 
other cities in Yorkshire and across the UK, in part because it lacked the surfeit of manufacturing 
jobs available elsewhere. 
The way that Patrick Wall comported himself as a politician was crucial. His personal 
papers indicate a deep dedication to research on questions of immigration. He sought out 
publications from across the UK and abroad, and was evidently well-versed in the materials 
produced by race relations organizations such as the Institute of Race Relations, the Survey on 
Race Relations, and the Runnymede Trust.136 His manuscript notes indicate an attempt to work 
through and assimilate these materials in order to sort out their political consequences. If this 
statistic were true, then what would that mean for the community at large? He evidently viewed 
the appropriate method of assessing the impacts of immigration as intensive, almost academic, 
research. It is not clear at what point exactly he became convinced that the appropriate method of 
dealing with immigration was to restrict it dramatically; it is clear, however, that his anti-
immigrationist stance was not based on hearsay or on baseless conviction, but was stoked 
through careful and broad reading of all that was written on the topic at the time. As late as the 
1980s he was invited to a fundraising dinner held by International Christian Relief,137 indicating 
that his by-then long-standing anti-immigrationist stance was not perceived to preclude him from 
endorsing relief strategies rooted in the field of international development. 
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Wall’s readings reflect something of a methodology, and while much of the material he 
consulted was rooted in the social sciences, there are indications that his approach was partly 
historical. He used time lines to organize his materials, and frequently referred to a historical 
development of the “problem,” developing something of an origins story.138 In all his own 
commentaries, particularly those presented to the House of Commons, he presented his materials 
not as an impassioned plea, but in the starkly unimpeachable methods of sociological and 
economic data analysis. His tone and presentation echoed those used by contemporaries at the 
IRR and Runnymede Trust, and were in stark contrast to some of the more dramatic 
presentations given by both Powell and Griffiths. Wall’s education and armed forces background 
are perhaps the best explanation for his choice to approach immigration as a problem best solved 
by thorough reconnaissance and tactical assault. His conclusions were not particularly different 
from either Griffiths or Powell, but were presented in a very matter-of-fact tone, as the inevitable 
consequence of the argumentative path Wall had so clearly outlined. 
It is evident from the correspondence he received, both from his own constituents and 
from those who were simply concerned with immigration as a whole, that he was perceived as a 
thorough and responsive MP, who properly and appropriately performed the duties of his station. 
Wall was even petitioned by the chairman of the Society for the Preservation of All Races 
(which billed itself as “formerly the Racial Preservation Society”) Dr. D.R.M. Brown in 1966 
protesting the proposed extension of the 1965 Race Relations Act, on the grounds that a multi-
racial ideal was not a “valid idea.”139 
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Wall was, in some ways, the embodiment of the anti-immigrationist movement itself: 
focused on government as the means of addressing the problem; operating on multiple scales of 
governance – local, national, international; dedicated to his causes as part of a general 
commitment to democracy. Wall was respectability incarnate, a man who had served his country 
both in battle and in parliament; as such, his views were given weight that his constituents could 
not muster. His status as a deeply involved backbencher put him closer to the people and their 
concerns, allowing him to position himself as the voice of reason against a craven or irreverent 
party elite. It also, however, put him further away from the seat of power in parliament: he was 
ever a private parliamentary secretary, never a minister. Of the men examined here, only Powell 
and Sandys had ever enjoyed access to those responsibilities and privileges. Powell had lost his 
in the wake of an overly forceful expression of his convictions; Sandys was more committed to 
the conduct of politics than to the conduct of representation. 
Wall, then, was positioned to be much the most influential among key anti-immigrationist 
politicians. But in the end, he was not. It is possible this was because as a backbencher, he 
simply did not have the ear of key party leaders, including the prime minister, which would have 
been required to introduce lasting legislative changes on the model he proposed. Wall also 
engaged in a huge number of other issues, and it seems unlikely that he would have been willing 
to dedicate his career to – indeed, to stake his career upon – intervention on this one, deeply 
controversial issue. It is also unclear whether Wall could have demonstrated the kind of charisma 
or arresting personality that led both Powell and Griffiths to the heights of public support.  
These men all bore certain similarities to each other: Powell and Sandys, as part of a 
Conservative establishment that had access to great power; Griffiths and Wall, as invested in the 
representation of a locality, albeit in different ways; Powell and Wall, as committed to a 
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systematic investigation of the symptoms and causes of the so-called “immigrant problem.” And 
yet they are all different men, at least within the range of Conservative Party members, and this 
difference suggests first that anti-immigrationism appealed to a range of actors within 
mainstream party politics. Anti-immigrationism did not emerge from a unified class, or 
educational, or geographic background. Apart from Conservative Party membership, there were 
few institutional links between these four individuals. Despite these differences, they all 
functioned in the same way: to serve as the key point of transmission between a relatively 
disempowered public and an empowered political elite. Their careers, taken collectively, 
highlight some of the major themes of the anti-immigrationist movement – the importance of 
working within a democratic process, the significance of a particular understanding of 




The majority of anti-immigrationists positioned themselves within the spectrum of acceptable 
political activism, not as outsiders relying on unheard-of or extremist methods. The dynamics by 
which anti-immigrationism operated were significant for the similarity they bore to other 
political and social activist groups. Anti-immigrationists were not members of a naïve public 
exploited by scheming politicians; neither were politicians paragons of virtue who were bullied 
into adopting anti-immigrationist views by public badgering. In this symbiotic model, a public 
composed of capable political actors – indeed, active citizens – interpreted and critically assessed 
the platforms offered by a range of democratic representatives, and those candidates which most 
clearly adhered to a direct representation model of democracy were those who won the votes of 
this particular public. Anti-immigrationist individuals were not disempowered or uneducated 
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individuals, and politicians who espoused an anti-immigrationist platform did not do so only or 
exclusively as a manipulative trick to gain power. Rather, support for anti-immigrationist 
politicians was the end product of a rational decision-making process, and the politicians who 
rose on the wave of this support were able to claim the role of true democrats and patriots, as 
well as the voice of the public, all accomplished without violating the accepted methods of 
achieving political power. 
The loose nature of the anti-immigrationist movement worked, at times, to its advantage, 
allowing diverse groups of differing aims to work in concert. But a lack of cohesion, and the 
troubled careers of those who seemed best positioned to act as intermediaries between 
constituents and those possessing great political power, placed limits upon its effectiveness, and 
at times put members of the movement at cross-purposes to each other. Anti-immigrationists 
were persuaded of the necessity of playing by the rules of the political game, but the nature of 
their mission was such that they did not always have the means to win. Nonetheless, the whole of 
their project could be placed within the confines of mainstream political activity, and it was in 
the context of mainstream political debates that anti-immigrationists found the grounds of their 
most successful arguments. 
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Chapter 3. Stories and Statistics: The Circulation of Anti-Immigrationist Knowledge 
 
 
In 1958, Coventry MP Maurice Edelman published an article in the Daily Mail entitled “Should 
we let them come pouring in?”1 The article prompted a great deal of correspondence, both from 
his own constituents and from letter-writers abroad. Correspondents were broadly supportive of 
Edelman’s argument that immigration should be limited as soon as possible, although many had 
further measures they wished politicians would introduce. A number of correspondents also 
viewed Edelman as a receptive audience for their conclusions about the motivations for, and 
objections to, immigration. One writer took the opportunity to lament the blindness of those who 
supported uncontrolled immigration, attaching a letter he had sent to one such proponent. To the 
supporter of immigration he wrote: “Why do you think the Jamaicans are coming here? (i) 
Because they love the English? (ii) Because they like our climate? (iii) Because they like our 
scenery? (iv) Because they like our welfare state?”2 The perception that immigrants placed an 
undue burden upon the organs of the British state and its welfare services in particular was 
widespread, and was perhaps the most powerful anti-immigrationist line of argument. Even those 
who were not opposed to immigration in principle were often persuaded either by experience or 
reports of already-stressed services being stretched to the breaking point by the arrival of 
immigrant populations. I argue that it is essential to avoid dismissing the stories that were 
circulated by anti-immigrationists as the ill-informed, self-interested ramblings of a discontented 
group. The kinds of information anti-immigrationists used, and the means by which it could be 
circulated, reveal important clues about the nature of political and social trust for the postwar 
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period, and for oppositional activist groups generally. Furthermore, the scale of the circulation of 
anti-immigrationist rumours reveals the power of the anti-immigrationist movement, and the 
degree to which it shaped the conversation about immigration even at the highest levels. 
Information about immigrants’ use of welfare services circulated by word-of-mouth and 
by publication in a largely local print media. The anecdotal nature of these reports, as well as the 
methods of circulation, were crucial to the image anti-immigrationists had of themselves as 
authentic democratic citizens outlined in the previous chapter, as well as their identification as 
members of a massive, misunderstood majority. The circulation of this anecdotal knowledge, 
along with statistical information, both influenced and was shaped by the policy-makers and 
academic researchers who controlled the conditions of entry and living for immigrants within the 
UK. Indeed, when decision-makers with access to power and resources came to address the 
question of immigration, it was largely in terms that had been defined most stridently for over a 
decade by those who were opponents of immigration. The rumours begun within anti-
immigration circles shaped research and policy across the field of race relations, as well as 
defining, at least in part, what officials determined was “necessary” information for legislative 
purposes. Government officials, even if they were ostensibly neutral civil servants, were not 
immune to the demands of the public, particularly as articulated through the media. There is 
substantial evidence to suggest that the nature of the information that was compiled on 
immigration, and which was released to the public, was perceptibly influenced by the demands 
of an anti-immigrationist public. Anti-immigrationists positioned themselves as the plain-
speaking, commonsensical alternative to the deliberate obfuscatory efforts of the government and 
race relations agencies. This position not only drew positive support from the general public, it 
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also shaped the conditions under which government and party agencies produced and released 
information about immigration.  
The chief battle between anti-immigrationists and government officials took place over 
the collection and release of statistical data relating to the settlement and use of services by non-
white immigrants. Statistical knowledge functioned as a counterpoint to the anecdotal nature of 
the rumours that remained the most powerful weapon in the anti-immigrationists’ arsenal, but the 
ostensibly objective nature of statistical data was quickly seized upon by anti-immigrationists as 
well. The frequent framing of anti-immigrationists by critics as hysterical, unreasonable, and 
irrational made statistics a useful tool for anti-immigrationists as a means of enforcing their own 
unimpeachability, and countering claims about their inability to clearly and unemotionally assess 
problems. Pointing out errors in the collection of statistical data, and asking questions about the 
means by which it was collected, became a favoured method for anti-immigrationists to highlight 
the supposed bias of the civil service, and to underpin their claims that the many organs of the 
state were not serving as properly representative of citizens’ views. 
Stories about the burden that immigrant populations placed on local infrastructure and 
economies had circulated around “undesirable” immigrant groups since at least the nineteenth 
century. Both Irish and Eastern European Jews were frequently accused of placing undue stress 
on the housing market in London’s East End in the late nineteenth century, and of acting as job-
stealers to boot.3 The narrative of the undeserving immigrant whose unspeakably low standards 
of living undercut the decent British citizen was certainly not new. Indeed, parallel narratives can 
                                                          




be found in other industrialized countries that attracted large migrant populations.4  What is 
different about the stories that surrounded New Commonwealth immigration to the UK in the 
second half of the twentieth century is the extent to which they referred to perhaps the most 
monumental change to occur in postwar British society: the creation of the welfare state. Anti-
immigrationists expressed great unease about the strain placed by new immigrant populations 
upon this nascent group of services. As Camilla Schofield and Alice Ritscherle have argued, 
much of the dialogue surrounding the unjust usage of state services, and admission to the UK, 
was framed in terms of democratic values and national sacrifice.5 As outlined in chapter one, 
many anti-immigrationists invoked the Second World War as a formative event in the shaping of 
the British national character. Immigrants, these individuals suggested, had not “done their bit” 
for Britain’s war effort, and as such did not deserve the benefits that accrued from wartime 
hardship. The most important of these benefits was also one of the most significant products of 
postwar politics: a universal welfare state, the most prominent organ of which was the National 
Health Service. Contemporary concerns about the stability and future of the welfare state shaped 
the content of anti-immigrationist arguments: at another time, anti-immigrationist rhetoric would 
likely have focused on a different set of objections. 
This chapter attempts to outline the mechanics underpinning Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s 
question: “What does knowledge do – the pursuit of it, the having and exposing of it, the 
receiving again of knowledge of what one already knows?”6 For anti-immigrationists, knowledge 
                                                          
4 George J. Borjas, “Welfare Reform and Immigrant Participation in Welfare Programs,” International Migration 
Review 36, no. 4, Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants: Institutions, Markets and Policies (Winter, 2002): 
1093-1123. 
 
5 See discussion in chapter one. 
 
6 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham, NC: Duke University 




was indeed power, and the types of knowledge that they used and the ways in which this 
information was deployed were essential both to framing the successes of the movement, and to 
underpinning their self-image as genuinely democratic citizens speaking on behalf of a 
disempowered, disenfranchised majority. Anti-immigrationists deployed anecdotal and statistical 
information in order to counter the claims by government and community agencies that 
immigration was of net benefit to the nation, and instead to frame immigration, and immigrants, 




In May 1957, a story appeared in John Gordon’s “Current Events” column in the Sunday Express 
on the subject of a young Swiss woman. Ruth Mathys, a 23 year old from Zurich living in 
Britain, had recently been fitted for contact lenses. In Switzerland, these would have come at an 
expense of £40 to £50. Under NHS subsidiziation, they cost only £1. Gordon, tetchily, inquired, 
“after all why should Switzerland have a health service when London is only two hours away, 
the fare is so modest, and the heart of Britain so kind?”7  In subsequent articles Gordon returned 
to the provision of welfare services to individuals who could not claim citizenship, or at least 
genuine membership, in the British polity. 
By June 1957 the Conservative Research Department had received a number of inquiries 
from the public on this matter.  In a letter to a fellow party employee, Research Officer Geoffrey 
Block wrote:  
I may say I understand it comes from an article by Mr. John Gordon, a columnist whose 
verbal habits are known to me of old. I am not saying that the report is untrue, but I 
should not be surprised if a good many relevant factors have been suppressed...The article 
rather maliciously implies that the Swiss girl was a casual short-time visitor. I understand 
                                                          




that in fact she came over here with a labour permit to work for a year. If she is working 
she is paying income tax and National Insurance contributions and therefore contributing 
to the cost of “our National Health Scheme [sic]. Of course if foreigners are doing a 
useful job of work here, e.g. Polish coal miners, and are paying taxes, it would be 
difficult to deny them the National Health Service.8   
 
This was not Mr. Block’s first experience with those who argued that the NHS was being abused 
by undeserving individuals. One constituent had written to the party in April complaining of 
such abuse; Block’s reaction was that “[t]here is a feeling about this among a certain type of our 
supporters but the short answer to them is that there is nothing in it; and if one gives a reasoned 
answer at all one has to tell them so. This is unlikely to pacify [the letter-writer].”9  Indeed, the 
party faithful were undaunted by dismissals of these stories from on high. At the 1957 party 
conference three motions were submitted for consideration that directly addressed the abuse of 
the NHS by non-citizens.10 A further four motions urged control of immigration, one on grounds 
of the strain immigration placed on employment and housing facilities.  No motion was 
addressed at the conference, likely because the 1956 Conference had witnessed a debate on the 
same question: “That this Conference is of the opinion that facilities under our National Health 
Scheme should only be made available to nationals of those countries where similar facilities are 
available to visiting British subjects.” The motion, put forward by two party members from 
Chelsea, was carried by a large majority. Councillor Allan Fearn of Rochdale, speaking in 
support of the resolution, argued “They tend to think that they might as well go to England since 
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the Englishman is a bit of a mug; some of the folks there are a bit too free at giving things out to 
foreigners.”11   
The fact that John Gordon’s report appeared in what was effectively a high-falutin gossip 
column was of no consequence, and the girl’s European citizenship was seen as beside the point. 
Stories of this nature were told widely, and frequently addressed the same themes, and so it was 
assumed that one of them, somewhere, sometime, must be true; in turn, the singular example 
could be expanded to a general truth. Part of the basis for taking the veracity of these stories as 
given was the fact that the people who reported them were often resident in areas of very high 
immigrant settlement. 
A memo written by Geoffrey Block in early 1958 noted that “[r]ecently there has been 
publicity and adverse criticism concerning foreign Commonwealth visitors utilising the British 
social services. Particular reference has been made to allegations of foreign visitors getting free 
treatment under the Health Service and American Servicemen’s wives drawing British Family 
Allowances and cheap milk.”12 Even at this early date, it is clear that concerns about undue 
stresses on the welfare state were already circulating. The targets of those objections would shift: 
young Swiss women and American servicemen’s wives would be replaced with young Pakistani 
women and the wives of Jamaican busmen. This transition is noteworthy: from outsiders 
identifiable as such simply on the basis of not being born in the UK, to those who also qualified 
as outsiders on the basis of race. This transition suggests that the notion of an exclusive 
Britishness was, and perhaps continued to be, robust enough to exclude other white people. 
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However, it seems likely that as the population of New Commonwealth immigrants increased, 
personal encounters with “outsiders” were more likely to be with those from the West Indies or 
South Asia than with a white man from Philadelphia. Indeed, by the late 1970s the transition to 
an explicitly racialized identification of perceived outsiders was more or less complete. A 
constituent writing to his Conservative Association in 1979 emphasized the pervasiveness of 
anti-immigration sentiment, arguing that “[t]he feeling about this subject is very strong, 
especially among the workers they are talking about it all the time. When they see Greeks Turks 
& coloureds many who cannot speak English get on buses – have free passes & getting money 
for children plus social security it gets under their skin, after all these immigrants have not paid 
in for these benefits for years & years as our own people have done.”13  
These correspondents outline a few of the welfare-related concerns that were widespread 
among anti-immigrationists.14 As noted above, the concept that immigrants could draw National 
Insurance payments without ever having paid into the fund was a particular grievance. Though 
routinely denied by officials, since National Insurance payments could not in fact be paid out 
until payments had been made in for a specified period of time, the rumours of benefits fraud 
persisted.15 Benefits fraud was a sore spot in general: older citizens who remembered all too well 
the humiliating days of the means test and widespread poverty begrudged the apparent ease with 
which “scroungers” drew an income supported by these citizens’ own blood, sweat and tears in 
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the form of productive labour and national insurance contributions, without any evidence of 
effort or work ethic on the part of the scrounger.16 Respectability within the working class in 
particular had been defined, at least on the part of male breadwinners, as the ability to 
demonstrate financial independence from the state.17 It was a mark of pride to put food on one’s 
table and a roof over one’s family’s head without government assistance. To rely upon the state 
for these basic resources was popularly regarded as shameful within much of the working class. 
When it came to immigrants, however, this sensitive issue became all the more so. Not only were 
immigrants availing themselves of a resource that conveyed a mark of personal failing, they were 
doing so without having made lifelong contributions to these funds via taxation or insurance 
contributions.18  
Given the transformative nature of the National Health Service, which became operative 
two weeks after the arrival of the Empire Windrush at Tilbury docks, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that Britons would have been defensive of their newfound treasure. Anti-immigrationists 
routinely stated that immigrants placed an undue burden on hospital and medical services in 
general, partly due to their perceived propensity towards disease. Tuberculosis and venereal 
disease were the most frequently cited examples, especially in the first two decades of 
immigration, but the most fervent anti-immigrationists were also prone to blame immigrants for 
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the increase in cases of leprosy.19 Critics also focused on the unavailability of beds in maternity 
wards due to the disproportionate presence of immigrants. Some health officials responded that 
immigrants were more likely to be booked in to deliver in a hospital or other public health centre 
in an era of frequent home births because the conditions of the immigrant women’s homes were 
unsuitable for home delivery.20 An increase in pressure upon paediatric care services was also 
laid at the feet of immigrants, many of whom had young families. 
The education of immigrant children raised additional issues.21 Critics were often 
concerned about the limited knowledge of English that many children possessed upon arrival in 
Britain; and, indeed, many of those who were born in Britain were not necessarily raised in 
English-speaking homes. Thus, teachers claimed to have to divide their classes in two: one group 
of native English speakers, one of those who struggled with the language, forcing them to 
develop two lessons to meet the needs of all their students. Schools whose catchment areas 
contained large populations of immigrants complained of classes comprised almost entirely of 
non-English speakers, many of whom would not necessarily share a native language. The parents 
of English speakers lamented the lost opportunities for their own children if classroom time had 
to be devoted to language teaching rather than other parts of the curriculum. In short, immigrant 
children placed an additional burden on the school system, and most importantly limited 
resources placed the bulk of this burden upon teachers and administrators who dealt with it 
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(whether by choice or necessity) by directing resources away from British-born, native English 
speakers. 
Immigrant children attending state schools, like any others in the UK, were required to 
attend particular schools on the basis of where they lived. Housing presented a massive existing 
problem that was not improved by an increase of population of any kind. Because a large 
proportion of the population still relied upon council housing, the waiting lists for access to such 
housing were the object of great contention. Due to the destruction of large amounts of housing 
stock during the Second World War, particularly in manufacturing areas in the Midlands and in 
the East End of London, and the poor conditions and lack of modern facilities of much of the 
existing stock, the waiting lists in large urban areas could stretch into the thousands, and the rate 
of new construction languished far below the rate of demand.22 In West Yorkshire, workers 
arriving to take up newly created jobs at factories in Bradford and Leeds had nowhere to live but 
ancient back-to-backs, a form of housing that remained emblematic of nineteenth-century slum 
living well into the twentieth century.23 Critics complained that young couples planning to marry 
had to delay their weddings because they were so far down the council housing list that they 
could not hope to receive accommodation by their preferred wedding date and the private 
housing market was prohibitively expensive. The perceived undesirability of immigrants as 
neighbours was such that Lynn Barber notes a tactic employed by notorious London landlord 
Peter Rachman in the 1960s to encourage sitting tenants to relocate: “putting in the Schwartzes,” 
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or renting a neighbouring flat to West Indians, was sufficient to motivate even very established 
tenants to vacate the premises.24 
The additional level of government oversight offered by council housing was markedly 
absent from the private housing market with the result that the most vulnerable, and often the 
most recently arrived, immigrants tended to congregate in private accommodation of extremely 
poor quality at exorbitant rates. Single-family homes would be used to house many more people 
than they were designed to, with entire families cramped into a single room, often with no more 
in the way of facilities than a hot plate and a basin. Kitchen facilities were shared at best, and 
outhouses were relatively common. For this standard of living exploitative landlords would 
charge new immigrants rates unheard of in the mainstream property market. For neighbours of 
overcrowded houses the increased noise and paltry levels of maintenance were a constant source 
of complaint. Indeed, overcrowding came to represent one of the chief housing-based objections 
about immigrants. Not only did overcrowding present serious health risks, it also created a social 
environment that anti-immigrationists deemed damaging to the neighbourhood as a whole. The 
presence of one overcrowded home could, opponents argued, be seen as license for another one 
to emerge on the street. As private landlords turned to the financially lucrative sector of short-
term lets to new immigrants, long-term renters and those seeking a higher quality of residence 
were placed at a disadvantage. 
At the root of the immigration-housing controversy was the fact that immigrants were 
heavily concentrated in what social scientists referred to as “twilight zones.” These areas, 
described by John Rex as comprising the former homes of a merchant class located within a mile 
of the city centre, had fallen into disrepair as single families were unable to maintain such large 
                                                          




homes. However, due to the high calibre of their construction they were not yet condemned as 
slums, and so were taken over by private landlords and converted to multi-family dwellings.25 
Immigrants were drawn to these areas both by their relative accessibility and by the fact that they 
were increasingly the sole province of immigrants. The tendency of immigrants to settle in one 
area was in no small part a result of the increased assistance that could be offered by fellow 
newcomers. As Rex notes, however, long-time residents often resented the transition of what had 
previously been the homes of the most “respectable” members of their city to increasingly 
decrepit, poorly maintained buildings of excessive and irregular tenancies.26 
Critics claimed that the concentration of immigrants in particular areas was a significant 
source of related problems, and some officials suggested that an appropriate response would be 
to rehouse immigrants across more disparate areas. An alternate version of this proposal was to 
encourage immigrants to settle in different cities altogether. The model for this scheme was 
Dutch: immigrants to the Netherlands were required to reside in approved areas so as to prevent 
demographic concentration.27 This plan was received with less enthusiasm in Britain, however. 
Immigrant support groups argued that immigrants often chose particular cities as permanent 
residences because of the proximity of friends and family members from their country of origin, 
or at least a significant population of fellow immigrants who were seen as an essential support 
base for new immigrants just learning to navigate the complexities of life in Britain. To force 
new immigrants to reside perhaps hundreds of miles away from the only people they knew in 
Britain was both unfair and unjust. Resistance also emerged from the residents of these alternate 
                                                          








destinations. In the wake of the 1972 Ugandan Asians crisis, Dr. David Owen, Labour MP for 
Plymouth (Sutton), made a series of public statements encouraging those fleeing Uganda to settle 
in Plymouth. A number of the existing residents of Plymouth were not terribly pleased with this 
proposal. One constituent wrote to protest that employment in the region was already at a low, 
and that her husband, a 22-year veteran of the Royal Navy, was unable to find work in the area 
and had been forced to take employment based in London, which also entailed extensive 
international travel. They hoped, she wrote, that in a few years’ time he would be able to find 
something closer to home, “[t]hat is of course if the Asians havent [sic] already taken up your 
invitation and devoured our piece of England that we love and are proud of.” Surely, she argued, 
Owen could see that it was important to take care of native Britons who were struggling to make 
ends meet “before you put out any welcome mat.”28 Another married woman from Plymouth 
wrote to inform Dr. Owen that “[m]y husband and I object strongly to your public suggestion 
that Asian immigrants should be welcomed to the Plymouth area. A house to house survey in our 
immediate area has produced a petition signed by 50% of the householders calling for a total ban 
on immigration. As a member of the local Labour party and one of your supporters at the last 
election, I suggest you put your constituents [sic] interests before those of private idealism.”29 
The responses of David Owens’ constituents’ highlight the strained relationship between the 
bureaucratic method of dealing with the immigrant problem and the experience of citizens. 
These feelings were hardly limited to the general public. Dr. Owen, along with Jeremy 
Thorpe, engaged in a correspondence with MP Peter Mills about Mills’s public statements 
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opposing the settlement of immigrants in the Southwest of England. Mills, then Minister of State 
for Agriculture, had rejected the government’s policy of endorsing the “dispersal” of Ugandan 
Asians across the whole of the UK, rather than encouraging them to settle exclusively in areas of 
high immigrant population. Mills, like many of Owen’s constituents, rejected the idea of 
encouraging Ugandan Asians to settle in the West Country in particular. Mills justified his 
statements to Owen: “it was because of the very real problems these people face that I believe 
the practical solution is for them to go initially where they have friends wherever this may be: 
Midlands, North, West Country, who can help them on the very real problems they will face 
when they arrive in a strange country.”30 Owen remained unpersuaded, and convinced that Mills 
was violating the spirit of welcome that was meant to invigorate the government policy, he wrote 
to Home Secretary Robert Carr with a request for him to discipline Mill for his failure to support 
the government’s policy. Instead, Carr responded that “those Asian refugees to whom we have 
obligations and who come to this country should be encouraged to settle in areas which have the 
facilities to receive them. Our efforts are directed to ensuring that additional burdens do not fall 
on areas where, for example, housing and school places are already under pressure…This 
consideration excludes some areas which would otherwise have been able to take a share of the 
refugees.”31 Even the Home Secretary in this case felt that encouraging immigrants to settle in 
areas that were struggling economically, and where opposition to their settlement was very high, 
was a political risk that was not worth taking.  
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As suggested by the correspondence above, the substance of anti-immigrationist 
complaints often focused on fears of what may come, not necessarily of what had already 
manifested. They interpreted information about immigrants and their apparent use of welfare 
services to necessarily imply future hardship for anti-immigrationists and their families. Stories 
of personal experience hardship were generally other peoples’. Anti-immigrationists extrapolated 
these tales of woe to their own circumstances, concluding that they should function as cautionary 
accounts of what would befall anti-immigrationists if the authorities did not take action. The 
stories circulated were often best described as rumours. Rumours, Jonathon Glassman has 
argued, “are unattributed narratives about current events that can be defined in part by their 
mythic power – their ability to dramatize and substantiate general truths – and hence by their 
power to compel belief.”32 He further suggests that “[r]umors assume their greatest power among 
people who feel cut off from control of such authoritative discourses or feel that their interests 
are not addressed in them. Among such people rumor often contributes to a rebellious 
subjectivity, a sense that in sharing rumors they are uncovering truths that those in power want 
suppressed.”33 Anti-immigrationists’ self-image as a maligned, misunderstood majority serves to 
explain the power of rumours within their ranks. Stories told by their contemporaries or 
compatriots were endowed with much greater weight and seriousness than official accounts 
precisely because they were initiated and circulated by those deemed worthy of anti-
immigrationists’ trust. Furthermore, these stories suggested, or perhaps confirmed the suspicion, 
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that officials were deliberately attempting to obscure the “truth” of the immigration situation, 
despite anti-immigrationists’ concerted efforts to uncover that same “truth.”  
The most notorious anti-immigrationist rumour of this period was surely Enoch Powell’s 
little old lady. Invoked with great vigour and colour in his “Rivers of Blood” speech on 20 April 
1968, Powell painted a tragic picture of an English everywoman whose neighbourhood had been 
transformed by New Commonwealth immigration, and who not only had lost the comfort of 
familiar surroundings, but was routinely subjected to both verbal and physical harassment, as 
delinquent immigrant children shoved packages of excrement through her letterbox. This woman 
had lost the privacy of her home, the safety of her street, and was prevented from taking steps to 
remedy her situation by the British state itself, which instead saw fit to fund the shenanigans of 
her new neighbours by means of the dole. This most vivid of anecdotes was picked up by many 
media outlets in the aftermath of Powell’s speech, and was received both with horror and a 
degree of suspicion. Enterprising anti-racialist campaigners engaged on a door-to-door research 
campaign, combing the streets of Wolverhampton, the woman’s alleged hometown, trying to 
identify her for follow-up and confirmation. No such woman was found. 
Powell was confronted on the question of the woman’s identity in a letter from Mr. David 
Winnick, Labour MP for Croydon South. Powell responded:  
I never disclose, except at their request, particulars likely to assist in the identification of 
constituents – or indeed other individuals – whose cases I may use to illustrate 
circumstances or problems. I have therefore declined and shall continue to decline to 
comment in any way on the content of page 5 of my Birmingham speech, except to say 
that those who are surprised by its contents or inclined to question its authenticity must 
be little acquainted with what has been, and is, happening in areas such as that which I 
represent.34  
 
                                                          




In an interview with David Frost in January 1969, Powell remained unrepentant. Frost inquired, 
“‘Surely as a duty, it was important for you to thoroughly check your facts.’ Powell reiterated his 
reply: ‘I had no doubt that it was true, for my source was thoroughly reliable.’ Mr. Powell told 
David Frost to read the Milner Holland report on housing in London of five years ago where he 
would find numerous cases of excrement being pushed through doors. ‘You have only to go and 
make inquiries, see the police reports to verify these facts. And these are facts.’”35  
In a report on this interview in the Brixton Advertiser, Powell is framed as a hero and 
Frost as a frankly incompetent, vaguely effeminate cosmopolitan. The paper reported: “[t]he 
Right Hon. Enoch Powell unearthed some of that immigration dust which has been swept under 
the carpet and with frankness and logic destroyed the arguments of his emotive critics with solid 
facts. Mr. Powell, may well be a future Prime Minister of this country. His Friday night 
confrontation with Britain’s youthful Solomon David Frost, dented and damaged that young 
man’s image and – enhanced his own.”36  In the aftermath of the “Rivers of Blood speech” anti-
immigrationists certainly adopted Powell as genuinely representative of their views, someone 
whose lived experience mirrored their own, at least with respect to the strains of immigration, 
and who most importantly took seriously the reports from his constituents of hardship and 
mistreatment. Whether or not the letter itself was genuine (and the letter did exist, though the 
identity of the author remains redacted),37 Powell claimed to have taken the claims it contained 
as legitimate and worthy of his concern, and framed his action as simply that of a democratic 
representative acting upon his constituent’s behalf. 
                                                          








The national tabloid press has taken a great deal of blame for circulating anti-
immigrationist stories. James Hampshire identifies those papers as the primary actors in 
perpetuating rumours of “welfare parasitism,” particularly during the period in which he argues 
these arguments were losing traction in Whitehall as legitimate objections to ongoing 
immigration.38 While public statements from central government agencies on immigration may 
have limited the extent to which the burdens on welfare services were referenced, local 
government agencies were still very much concerned with the relationship between immigration 
and welfare spending. Furthermore, local and provincial papers were crucial in the circulation of 
anti-immigrationist anecdotes. This was in part because their purview matched the scale of many 
anti-immigrationists’ complaints: they were fundamentally concerned with the local, and less 
attentive to the national and international news stories that dominated the national dailies. A 
local press was more likely to report upon local council resolutions, residents’ association 
meetings, and the activities of the local and area branches of the various political parties. 
Detailed accounts of the activities of the Southall Residents’ Association are to be found in the 
pages of the Southall Post and Southall News, while the Streatham News followed the minutiae 
of Duncan Sandys’ public statements on his role in the Kenyan Asians crisis, and the 
Birmingham Post and Birmingham Evening Mail kept close tabs on the councillors who formed 
the backbone of the Birmingham Immigration Control Association. 
Furthermore, the opinion pages of these papers offered a critical platform for anti-
immigrationists to air their views. While national broadsheets like the Times were more likely to 
print the views of vaunted experts and those with international experience, local papers often 
claimed to be committed to printing a “representative” cross-section of letters to the editor. In the 
                                                          




wake of Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech virtually all the papers in the country received 
at least some letters on the subject of immigration. The Birmingham Evening Mail stated 
explicitly that “[i]t is the policy of the Evening Mail to print a representative and balanced 
selection of letters on all issues. The weight of today’s correspondence was at least twenty to one 
in support of Mr. Powell.”39 The Birmingham Post also made an editorial note in the opinion 
section outlining their stance on the issue. The editorial team observed that the letters they had 
received indicated “overwhelming popular support for further restriction of immigration. This we 
have reflected. There is evidence of less, but still very widespread, support for Mr. Powell’s 
speech. It has aroused opposition by its tone and also by its opposition to the Race Relations Bill. 
This too we have reflected – and supported in our leading articles.”40 The accessibility of the 
letters to the editor section in smaller papers, typically a result of the more limited circulation of 
these papers, meant that the opinions page of a local paper was often likely to become a 
battlefield between anti-immigrationists and their opponents. The Smethwick Telephone, which 
became notorious as the original site of Peter Griffiths’ anti-immigrationist views, was in fact 
such a platform as early as 1961, when Donald Finney and the founding members of the 
Smethwick branch of the Birmingham Immigration Control Association traded barbs on alternate 
weeks with John Jackson, a prominent activist and artist from Bearwood and critic of anti-
immigrationism.41 The Telephone was broadly sympathetic to the anti-immigrationist cause, and 
its reporting, as well as its opinions section, reflected this predisposition. The Telephone 
privileged reports of council meetings in which immigration was the primary topic of discussion, 
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following up on council debates with further interviews with local councillors and 
complainants.42 The Telephone functioned, rather self-consciously, as an extension of local 
politics, offering a platform for local candidates and a venue in which citizens could support or 
object to the policies on offer by councillors who, in this period, were largely opposed to 
immigration.43 Its publication of Griffiths’ platform, though picked up by national media in the 
course of the 1964 electoral campaign as an aberration, was in fact part of a long-standing 
tradition of allowing all the candidates of the three major parties to publish a comment in the 
paper on a weekly basis. 
The Brixton Advertiser, perhaps the most eagerly and aggressively anti-immigrationist 
paper of this period, similarly trumpeted their editorial commitment to the cause:  
This newspaper has been castigated many times for its stand over immigration and has 
even been reported to the Director of Public Prosecution for daring to suggest that a race 
problem exists. Now, at last, a politician has dared to voice in stronger words than those 
which we have used some plain unvarnished home truths…Support for Mr. Powell is 
now coming in from wide and unexpected sources. We predict it will become a 
flood…What the Tory Party must next do, as it watches Mr. Powell’s stature grow with 
the man-in-the-street and the down-to-earth middle classes, is to find a clear-cut line on 
immigration un-muddled by liberalism and unafraid of the “do-good” press. The facts are 
inescapable. There are already too many immigrants over here, adding to our housing 
problems and burdening our social services and national assistance.44 
 
The Advertiser is an extreme case, but insofar as the local press saw itself as representative of its 
readers these papers were likely to support the efforts of anti-immigrationists. If they did not go 
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so far as to print an editorial supporting an anti-immigrationist line they would, at least, give 
equal if not extra airing to anti-immigrationist views on their pages. The existence of a 
supportive or at least accessible local press fostered public awareness of anti-immigrationists 
who worked on a local scale. Even those papers which were not explicitly supportive of their 
local anti-immigrationists, as was the case with the Bradford Telegraph & Argus and Merrick’s 
Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration, still granted them a great deal of coverage, and the 
maxim that “all press is good press” tended to ring true for anti-immigrationist organizations that 
were otherwise short on funds for marketing and publicity.  
There are some parallels between the circulation of rumours about immigration and the 
creation of moral panics at other points in British history. The role of the press in publicizing 
rather sensationalized stories of immigrant “floods” is perhaps the most significant.45 Given the 
concentration of New Commonwealth immigrants in a few chiefly urban areas of the country, 
many British citizens would not have had personal experience with the immigrant population. 
The central government proved reticent to speak on immigration, and without contact with local 
government agencies that more explicitly stated their policies many of these people would have 
had to rely on newspapers and television for the vast majority of their information on 
immigration. It is worth noting, however, that while there may have been a panic about 
immigration, there were significant differences from other moral panics. Many of the arguments 
against immigration were of a financial nature, and while there were certainly normative 
overtones in determining the ends to which the nation’s finances should be best put, the existence 
of immigrants was not universally seen as a blight upon the nation’s character in the same way 
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that, for example, white slavery was.46 The people who were at risk from suffering the ill-effects 
of immigration were not young white women, but rather the population as a whole. Victims were 
not vulnerable in any respect except for the government’s inattentiveness to their concerns. 
Furthermore, immigration remained a topic of debate for much longer than, say, the Jack the 
Ripper episode graced the pages of London’s papers. While the arrival of Kenyan Asians in 
1968, and particularly the newspaper coverage of those events, may match the description of a 
typical moral panic more closely, it is not a strict correlation. Notably, the press faced a problem 
in generating a straightforward villain either individually or of a corporate nature in the case of 
immigration. Who was to blame for immigration? There was no bloody-minded serial killer or 
avaricious group of pimps. The difficulty of ascribing an explanatory narrative to the “problem” 




The stories we tell come to inform the studies we conduct. Surveys of immigration were not 
widely conducted until the 1960s; often, these surveys focused not on the impact of immigration 
tout court, but rather on the impact of immigration on the specific areas about which complaints 
were most frequently aired. To some extent this trend can be attributed to the tendency of social 
science to test accepted truths, and to assess the degree to which popular truths can be 
scientifically verified. Nonetheless, the views of both state agencies and academic researchers 
were framed by the dominant discourse about immigration: that immigrants placed an 
unnecessary burden on welfare services. In particular, studies conducted by those individuals 
                                                          





who had total freedom over the subject of their research tended to emphasize questions about the 
impact of immigrants on these services. While these studies were not likely to have been widely 
circulated, the fact that they were conducted without having received any specific mandate to do 
so underscores the interest and concern with these issues even among those who were not 
specifically tasked with addressing the “immigrant question.” 
 Academics’ intervention in the lives of immigrants was nothing new. Through the 
interwar period a growing body of individuals concentrated in Liverpool and based out of the 
Liverpool University Settlement began applying the methods of social work and social science 
research to the “problems” of a multiracial city.47 The welfare of so-called half-caste children, 
the offspring of African seamen and white British women, was of particular concern to the 
researchers, who saw their work as building a base for state and private intervention into the 
lives of non-white individuals and families. Indeed, the publication of a 1930 study about the 
welfare of half-caste children, popularly referred to as the “Fletcher Report,” garnered attention 
and support from a range of philanthropic and other bodies, including the Anti-Slavery Society.48 
This growing interest by social reformers in the lives of immigrants gained power in policy 
circles through the postwar period in concert with an increased focus on the capacities of social 
science to resolve the major problems of British society. 
As Paul Rich argues, 
The growing interest by various voluntary bodies and welfare associations in Britain with 
black immigrants signalled the emergence of a new field of political debate in the post-
war years, that of ‘race relations’…it came to be associated with the question of 
promoting harmonious political relationships in colonies about to gain independence and 
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of ‘absorbing’, ‘assimilating’ or ‘integrating’ black New Commonwealth immigrants into 
British towns and cities. ‘Race relations’, as a subject area both for social science analysis 
as well as political debate, represented a new need for political concepts and analytical 
tools at a time of quite rapid political and social change in the immediate post-war 
years.49  
 
The growing field of “race relations” included the publication of such studies as Rex and 
Moore’s assessment of immigrant populations in Birmingham, cited elsewhere in this chapter. It 
also included the widely circulated publication about racial discrimination based on research 
conducted by Political and Economic Planning (PEP) in 1968.50 Formed in 1931 and serving as 
one of the major sources of left-wing thinking on planning and its consequences through the 
Second World War and postwar period, PEP included an “active democracy” group that was 
founded late in the Second World War under the leadership of Michael Young. As Abigail Beach 
argues, the “task of the ‘active democracy’ group…was to examine the working of democracy in 
postwar Britain and to press for improvements.”51 The mechanisms by which increased citizen 
participation was to be achieved included “[f]ree association for mutual aid and benefit, 
[which]…was regarded as a core component of Britain’s heritage of liberalism and toleration 
and, as such, was praised by those on the left and centre-left of British politics who viewed it as 
part of a radical continuum for social justice and communality, as well as by those on the 
conservative right who cherished it as an affirmation of independence from the state.”52 PEP’s 
open encouragement of associational life reflected a particular conceptualization of citizenship 
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which included “both duties and rights, and formal and informal modes of expression, [and work 
in late 40s and early 50s]…clearly indicated a definition of citizenship that extended beyond the 
elective principle to include spontaneous and informal forms of involvement in community 
life.”53 The proposed ideal for British citizenship as articulated by PEP, then, was similar in form 
to the ideal advocated by members of a range of anti-immigrationist groups, including those in 
chapters one and two. PEP’s public advocacy both of social scientific research as a mechanism 
for understanding and addressing the problems of British society, and of active participation by 
British citizens in a range of political and associational organizations, underscores the extent to 
which anti-immigrationists adopted the conventions of an established range of acceptable, and 
indeed desirable, political and social movements of their era. The link between active citizenship, 
political advocacy, and social science research in particular was one eagerly pursued by anti-
immigrationists.54 
 Such was the appeal and apparent legitimacy of social scientific research that a wide 
range of occasionally unexpected individuals and groups undertook such research, often 
examining the members of their own communities. A study conducted by students at Westhill 
College of Education in Selly Oak in 1969 involved on-site observations of various organizations 
whose work was designed or expanded to address the issue of immigrants’ integration into 
British society.55  Some, such as the St. Johns Ambulance and Scouting groups, were assessed 
for their capacity to offer opportunities for social engagement and advancement to “immigrant” 
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or “coloured” young people within a group that was generally dominated by white children. One 
student selected the West Indian Community Association as the basis for their case study. The 
Welfare Committee of the Association sought to help its members with issues such as childcare, 
information about schooling and truancy, and how to access various bodies of the welfare state to 
whose services members were entitled. The student observed that unlike many tenants’ 
associations in London which had pursued similar aims to some success, geographical spread, 
economic inequality, and general lack of community feeling posed major barriers to the success 
of the Committee’s aims. Notably, the student observed the following: “There is no evidence to 
suggest that immigrant youngsters are proportionately more in need of care and protection than 
white youngsters born in this country.”56 The student went on to observe that a lack of resources 
and differences in community structure between the UK and the West Indies were significant 
barriers against young people accessing any help that they might have needed and to which they 
were entitled, but the fact that the student felt it worth noting above all that immigrant children 
were not a net burden on the welfare state is significant. The nature of the inquiry and the reports 
provided both by the student observers and their academic supervisors suggest that this survey 
was conducted by a group of individuals deeply invested in the success of a multi-racial vision of 
Britain. The aim of their study was to assess and provide guidance to improve the extent to 
which Britain welcomed and supported minority individuals. This inquiry generally was not 
concerned with the economic consequences of immigration, nor indeed with the welfare state, 
but rather with voluntary organizations which had only peripheral and informational 
relationships to the state. So, the fact that the study even addressed the question of the burden 
placed by immigrant children upon the welfare state suggests that the strength of popular 
                                                          




perception about the parasitic nature of immigrants had pervaded even those who critiqued it. 
This perception had such cultural power that even those who rejected its existence had to assess 
the extent to which these rumours were true, even in a study that was not directly motivated by 
this question. 
In a study conducted by a geographer on the fertility of immigrant women in Leeds in the 
early 1970s it is clear that the researcher aimed to test the extent to which anti-immigrationist 
rumour was true, but there is no indication that he was anything less than wholly influenced by 
popular perceptions of immigrants as undeserving, dirty, and uncivilized.57 He notes that “[t]he 
high birth rate of 64.9 for the Pakistani group is being held artificially low by the very low 
number of women in relation to males in this birthplace group! In total the crude birth rates given 
here suggest that the fertility of immigrants and the coloured immigrants in particular, is very 
high,”58 and that “on average women born in the New Commonwealth gave birth at four times 
the rate for the indigenous population,”59 but concludes that “essentially the birth and fertility 
rates for the major New Commonwealth immigrant groups are far from unreasonable and are not 
markedly higher than the rates which could be expected in the actual countries themselves.”60 
That is, such rates, many times higher than the rest of the population, were framed as typical of a 
particular kind of woman, who was a different sort than the “indigenous” British woman. 
A similar study led by J.H. Sparrow in Birmingham in the summer of 1962 was 
conducted because, in light of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, the author “wanted to 
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discover to what extent the problems raised by unrestricted Commonwealth immigration were 
problems of colour and to what extent control of immigration was a sensible or proper way to 
handle the situation.”61 One crucial difference between this and other studies was that Sparrow 
was not a trained social scientist, but simply an interested individual who felt that a study 
conducted along social scientific lines would be a useful and appropriate method of answering 
his own concerns. Sparrow spent four weeks at the Sparkbrook Association (an immigrant 
support group) voluntary office, and in the course of his observations noted similar concerns to 
those outlined above: limited maternity beds, difficulties for immigrant children attending 
school, and so on. Sparrow concluded that “[t]he working of the [1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants] Act will cost £500,000 a year. But the expenditure of this amount of money in 
trying to alleviate the social problems aggravated by mass immigration would have precluded the 
necessity for the Act,” further suggesting that “[i]f the government had to some extent guided 
immigration…and prevented the growth of the ‘ghettoes’, if it had ensured that the financial 
burden of assimilating the immigrants was borne by the country as a whole and not just by the 
over-taxed immigrant areas…I believe that the integration of coloured people in England, 
divorced from the non-racial social problems caused by the immigration, would proceed happily 
without any need for coercive control of immigration.”62 
The questions asked by these disparate individuals were echoed at higher levels of 
political influence and power, including committees struck by various government-affiliated 
bodies. In a study published by the National Institute Economic Review in 1967 entitled 
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“Immigrants and the Social Services,” Mrs. K. Jones argued that on a per capita basis the 
contribution of immigrants to the social services was higher than non-immigrants. This was the 
case because there were few non-contributors within the immigrant community as a result of the 
general youth and employment of immigrants, who were thus more likely to pay in to National 
Insurance than to draw upon it because of illness or age.63 This study was referenced more than 
virtually any other in defense of the immigration status quo, and as a rejection of anti-
immigrationist logic. However, the basis for the study is evidently to refute anti-immigrationist 
rumour: Jones’ entire method was to test the hypothesis provided by anti-immigrationists, 
concluding in support of an antithetical argument.  
Groups which were non-academic but explicitly political also concerned themselves with 
these issues. The West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre Study Group conducted a 
study entitled “Helping the Immigrants” in 1962. The purpose of the report, according to its 
authors, was not “to argue the need for restrictions on immigration; it is concerned only with 
practical problems arising in the areas where immigrants settle in large numbers. The problems 
that have arisen from indiscriminate immigration do not affect all parts of the country…these 
problems are not properly appreciated in parts of the United Kingdom.”64 The report concerned 
itself chiefly with the insufficient housing supply in Birmingham and the surrounding areas, and 
the resulting degradation of living conditions. The report found that additional problems with 
teaching West Indian children who “do not speak standard English at home but a kind of patois 
based on eighteenth-century English” required additional financial support, since the strategy of 
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recruiting West Indian teachers had failed on the same grounds of “speech difficulties.”65 While 
the authors of the report noted that “[o]fficial sources do not support the allegations that the 
immigrant communities constitute any appreciable danger to public health,” they nonetheless 
observed that “differences in standards and customs certainly make them difficult to assimilate 
into the population around them.”66 The report concluded that “[a] considerable effort is called 
for on the part of local authorities, voluntary organisations and the immigrants themselves. Since 
national policy and needs have brought immigrants to this country the cost of their assimilation 
should fairly be a national burden.”67 Despite their claim not to support restricted immigration, it 
is clear that the authors of the report were by no means satisfied with the status quo in cities 
where high numbers of immigrants had settled. 
In November 1968, the Five West Midlands County Boroughs Joint Committee (Dudley, 
Walsall, Warley, West Bromwich, Wolverhampton and the City of Birmingham) Immigrants 
Study Group produced a “Report submitted to Government Departments concerned with aspects 
of Immigration on the effects of Immigration on Local Authority Services.” The purpose of the 
study group was to “examine the problems which exist and concerning which the Local 
Authority has responsibility in the field of immigration, to exchange information thereon and to 
make recommendations as to any general policies which the Five County Boroughs should 
consider” and to “liaise with local voluntary liaison committees and other bodies (including 
those representing immigrants) as necessary, so as to produce the best local condition where 









racial harmony may flourish.”68 To this end, the group consulted with Medical Officers of 
Health, Directors of Education, Chief Public Health Inspectors, Housing Managers, Children’s 
Officers, Chief Welfare Officers, and Borough/City Treasurers. The authors of the report noted 
that “immigrants congregate in the twilight areas of our towns…this means that the demands for 
additional and special service mentioned above become concentrated in these areas. The needs of 
the immigrants within these areas create an immediate and substantial demand for services where 
previously there has been a gradual decline in demand as the indigenous population have grown 
older with the outward movement of younger elements to better areas of the town.”69 While the 
report noted that demographic changes of any kind could necessarily place stress upon existing 
services, and that the increase of manufacturing jobs in the region was the cause of many of these 
changes, they also advocated for an inclusion of “all whose language and/or customs differ from 
those of the indigenous population” in the working definition of “immigrant” that was used to 
calculate both use of services by immigrants and grants obtained from the central government on 
this basis.70 Like the C.P.C. report, the study group found significant evidence of strain being 
placed upon local welfare services, and were at some pains to measure the extent to which this 
strain was the result of increased immigrant populations, even going so far as to cobble together 
statistics on immigrant residents from a bizarre range of sources when no official statistics were 
available.71  
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While both the C.P.C. report and the Five West Midlands County Boroughs Joint 
Committee report were influenced in no small part by a desire to obtain greater funding from the 
central government, the chief thrust of their respective inquiries was along precisely the lines that 
anti-immigrationists had been advocating for years, and not along the lines advocated by 
immigrant support groups.72 There is no better indication of the perceived power of a line of 
argument than if one’s opponents devote a great deal of energy to disproving that argument. That 
so many critics of anti-immigrationism went to great lengths to disprove rumours of the burden 
placed upon welfare services by immigrants suggests that critics were genuinely concerned about 
the influence that those rumours might have upon the general population, or that they had 
determined that a significant proportion of people were already persuaded of the rumours’ 
veracity. As James Hampshire has noted, anti-immigrationist stories about the impact of 
immigrants upon welfare services framed immigrant populations as “parasitic” in their very 
nature.73 Immigrants were not only alien to the body politic, but harmful, draining it of its energy 
and resources. This framing was an essential factor in the anti-immigrationists’ definition of 
citizenship and membership in the British nation. However, while Hampshire argues that these 
rumours never gained hold outside a handful of tabloids, I suggest that they remained sufficiently 
powerful to influence the language of even those who denied their validity. 
Perhaps most crucially, arguments about the insufficiency of welfare services in general 
often did have some basis in areas of high immigrant populations. The West Midlands in 
particular were plagued by one of the largest housing shortages in the country for decades 
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following the Second World War. In the mid- 1960s, the waiting list for housing in Birmingham 
stretched to 30,000 names.74 John Rex, in his 1967 study of race relations in Sparkbrook, widely 
cited by contemporaries, emphasized that the severe housing problem was the context for racial 
tensions in the area. He argued that “[o]ur own study of these problems in no way supported the 
conclusion that the influx of coloured immigrants had, through its sheer numbers, made 
Birmingham’s housing situation worse. What we did observe was a process of discriminative and 
de facto segregation which compelled coloured people to live in certain typical conditions, and 
which of itself exacerbated racial ill-feeling. It was this problem which provided the framework 
of the race relations problem in Birmingham.”75 In areas of high job expansion, particularly the 
major manufacturing centres that were such a draw for new immigrants in this period, 
infrastructure had simply not kept pace with the increased population drawn by the expectation 
of employment.76 
The construction of new housing, hospitals, and schools to match the expansion of 
population in the postwar period, and to replace those facilities damaged during the Second 
World War, lagged dramatically. Furthermore, the bureaucratic process that underpinned the 
decision to expand infrastructure in any given area took so long that by the time a building was 
improved, the demographic profile of the area could have changed so much that the building was 
no longer sufficient to the needs of the region.77 A range of observers argued that in fact 
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problems with access to welfare services predated the arrival of immigrants, and were likely to 
long outstrip the period of immigrants’ large-scale entry to the country.78  
Social scientific research, then, was seen as a legitimate method of knowledge 
production: it was generally accepted that social scientific data was good data, reliable data, and 
that it could be used to explicitly and comprehensively defend and support one’s arguments 
about immigration. By attaching their objections to a set of demonstrable problems, and within 
the context of a widely accepted framework of data collection and argumentation, the anti-
immigrationists’ cause gained both credence and respectability.79 Furthermore, complaints about 
immigration and racial difference became deeply intertwined with debates about pressures on 
housing, unemployment, and shortfalls in education funding. Given the extent to which these 
arguments became inter-connected it was virtually impossible for officials to address them 
separately until the end of this period, when the more or less complete prohibition on non-white 
immigrants demonstrated that prejudice did not disappear even when virtually the whole of the 
non-white population was born in the United Kingdom.  
III 
 
While anecdotal evidence effectively demonstrated the injustices committed against non-
immigrant Britons by immigrant populations, statistics were essential to framing immigration in 
a broader sense as, fundamentally, a problem. Anecdotes emphasized the suffering of white 
Britons by providing context and emotional depth, which foregrounded their humanity. The 
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power of these anecdotes was drawn from their personal nature: my cousin cannot get a house, 
my son is falling behind in school, my neighbour could not get the medical treatment she needed. 
The chief actors in these stories, albeit always cast in the role of victim, were white men and 
women born and raised in Britain who had paid their dues as responsible citizens, and who were 
then repaid not with the bounty of the new welfare state, but with exclusion and hardship. The 
framing of immigrants as part of a statistical dataset had the opposite effect. As individual 
immigrants were reduced and condensed to figures on a page they were stripped of both their 
humanity and their context, which neatly suited the purposes of anti-immigrationists whose 
cause was contingent upon framing immigrants as non-members of the British polity. 
But the methods of social science, and particularly the practice of statistical analysis, was 
just as contested as the more qualitative conclusions drawn on these topics. Adam Tooze has 
argued that “[s]tatistics are not neutral reflections of social and economic reality. They are 
produced by particular social actors in an effort to make sense of the complex and unmanageable 
reality that surrounds them…They should be treated like other cultural artefacts, texts or 
images.”80 Nadja Durbach observes that in the 1830s, “[s]tatistics quickly became a tool of 
public policy, for numbers had the appearance of objectivity and added scientific weight to 
otherwise subjective opinions. The state thus frequently mobilized statistical “facts” to counter 
anti-vaccination rhetoric.”81 However, “[a]nti-vaccinationists, like other Victorian pressure 
groups, attempted to beat the government at its own numbers game, deploying only the data that 
would support their position and inflame their publications’ readership.”82 Like anti-
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vaccinationists, anti-immigrationists were loath to trust the state’s version of immigration 
statistics. Anti-immigrationists’ distrust of official statistics was partly motivated by the 
realization that these statistics were often used to bolster policy initiatives devised at the centre, 
and which did not, anti-immigrationists felt, take proper account of the intricacies of their living 
situation. The best way to fight fire was apparently with fire, so anti-immigrationists developed 
their own version of statistical analysis, one that properly addressed the questions they had about 
the impact of immigration on their communities, from their perspective. 
 Both critics and supporters of immigration made relentless reference to statistical data as 
an essential part of resolving immigration-related issues. As frequently cited in studies through 
the 1960s and 1970s, the recommended proportion of immigrant students at state-run schools 
was accepted to be 30 per cent: educational policy in areas of immigration settlement was 
specifically designed to meet this target, including by the introduction of bussing programs in 
both Ealing and Bradford in the 1960s.83 William B. Hipkin, while standing for election as local 
councillor in the Bradford South Ward in 1966, circulated a ten-point plan for reducing 
immigration and its negative impacts. One of these points suggested that the number of 
immigrants in any given locality should be limited either to a specific number or to one percent 
of the total population of the area.84 The notion that immigrants ought to comprise no more than 
a specific proportion of the population was a common one. The logic behind these proposals was 
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a metric of containment to ensure that British society could not be “diluted” by the presence of 
immigrant populations.85 The latent influence of an Edwardian focus on social engineering, 
highly evident in ongoing eugenicist debates, remained widespread in debates on immigration.86 
While overt reference to eugenicist reasoning was strongly discouraged, policy-makers of all 
kinds accepted the notion that a nation could be built by the accumulation of data, and the 
appropriate application of policies based on this data was both a natural and a desirable solution 
to the issues at hand. 
Statistics served as particularly powerful evidence in the debate over immigration. This 
state of affairs was highlighted in the course of a correspondence between the Conservative 
Research Department and Enoch Powell in the spring of 1970. Internal memos circulated 
between Conservative Research Department (CRD) members, as well as then-party leader 
Edward Heath, encouraged the chief correspondent not to engage with Powell on the question of 
numbers, noting his propensity to use convoluted methods of calculation to produce the results 
he was looking for.87 CRD analyst Patrick Cosgrave noted to Heath that “it remains true that the 
Government’s 35,000 figure was guesswork, like most of their other statistics on the immigration 
and race relation problem, which have given Mr. Powell so much power in the past.”88 Powell 
had of course enjoyed great success with his previously circulated statistics on the future of 
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immigration and the British people. His apocalyptically-tinged predictions that by the year 2000 
five to seven million residents of the British Isles would be non-white was cited frequently both 
by supporters and opponents.89 Indeed, the Labour Party accused Powell of misleading the public 
with “wildly high” estimates, noting in criticism the Institute of Race Relations’ estimate of 3.5 
million for the same period.90  
While Powell’s methods may have been suspect, it is unlikely that he simply fabricated 
the numbers he produced: Powell was no stranger to statistical and mathematical analysis. As 
Powell’s resignation from the Treasury in 1958 following a disagreement over expenditure 
policies demonstrates, ostensibly objective matters of calculation are as subject to political 
motivation as any other policy decision. In the case of immigration statistics, however, both 
statisticians and anti-immigrationists assumed that beneath infinite layers of propagandistic 
posturing, there was a basic truth. How many immigrants were there in Britain? How many more 
might come? How much did these immigrants cost? Virtually all commentators on immigration 
consistently posited that there was a set of “true” statistics on immigration that were 
discoverable, and that it was possible to eliminate all political prejudice in their compilation - if 
only the other side would cease their machinations to the contrary.  
By 1978, the Conservative Political Centre (CPC) had concluded that the lack of statistics 
available in the early days of New Commonwealth immigration had negatively impacted the case 
of the Conservative politicians who had raised the “alarm” on immigration in the late 1950s. Had 
such statistics been available, the CPC implied, the whole issue would have taken on a much 
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smaller role in British political culture, and certainly would not have resulted in such grand and 
grievous repercussions.91 Of course, the Conservatives were as guilty as any other party of using 
both statistical data and debates over its collection to serve their own ends. In a Supply Day 
debate on immigration on 5 July 1976, William Whitelaw made the argument that strict control 
of immigration was an absolute necessity to ensure good race relations. Insisting that “[w]e shall 
succeed (in restoring racial harmony) only if we give to all our people the prospect of an end to 
immigration and a clear sense of finality and certainty in our plans,”92 he proceeded to outline a 
four-step plan to ensure such certainty, the first point of which was to provide improved 
statistics. A CRD brief on the speech noted that “[t]here is widespread mistrust and little 
comprehension of existing statistics on immigration. Ignorance breeds fear, and the Government 
should establish a small independent body to review the present method of compilation, and to 
recommend how the figures can be made as accurate, and as easily understood as possible.”93 
Whitelaw’s note that the perceived unreliability of statistics made them well-suited to 
manipulation got to the crux of the public’s view of official statistics: in making this complaint 
as a member of the Conservative Party, he laid claim to the Conservative’s superior grasp of 
objectively verifiable truth on this topic, and positioned Labour as chronic manipulators of “the 
facts” in order to support their own political aims.  
The problem, of course, was that statistical objectivity was a fantasy, and furthermore 
that no one could agree upon who ought to be included in any such calculation of the immigrant 
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population. As much was noted in a brief circulated by the CRD in 1980, in which CRD analyst 
Nick True argued that statistics on new immigrants should not include the so-called “boat 
people.”94 From the perspective of the Conservative Party, refugees did not “count.” The 
“problem” of these asylum claimants from Hong Kong was temporary, and not indicative of any 
future onslaughts of migration. Furthermore, they fled communism for the bountiful shores of 
capitalism, and thus were more attuned to the brave new world of Thatcherite economics than a 
good many native-born Britons seemed to be. From the perspective of many of those native-born 
Britons, however, the “boat people” were yet another chapter in the fateful narrative that 
included the arrival of the Kenyan and Ugandan Asians.95 The British state seemed to repeatedly 
welcome these “dark strangers” on the grounds of some vague and indiscriminate “historical 
contract” honouring the obligations of a system of imperial governance that had not formally 
operated for decades. For anti-immigrationists, it did not matter where these people came from, 
or how educated they were, or what their view on supply-side economics was; they were not 
British, they were not white, and they were yet another burden placed upon the besieged welfare 
state.  
As the twentieth century trudged on, efforts to quantifiably pin down the immigrant 
population continued apace. The creation of a registry of dependants was part of William 
Whitelaw’s recommendations as Shadow Home Secretary in 1976, and emerged from similar 
impulses as a general drive for improved statistics. Following Whitelaw’s proposals, the purpose 
of the register would be “to define the numbers of those entitled in law to enter Britain from the 
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Indian sub-continent.”96 Nick True noted that this policy proposal, if implemented, would likely 
be found in violation of the new European convention on human rights, but countered that the 
discrimination at hand was “by the question rather than by colour”; that is, that only one section 
of the community would be asked to register its dependents, but that this group would be defined 
by the fact that they had overseas dependants, rather than by the colour of their skin strictly 
speaking.97 
By 1980 Whitelaw, then holding Cabinet office, was facing something of a conundrum 
on the proposal to register dependants. Whitelaw epitomized the views of many political leaders 
when he argued that “[o]nly by offering the prospect of an end to immigration will we succeed in 
allaying persistent fears about levels of immigration and remove from those already settled here 
the label ‘immigrant’. Our ethnic minorities are valued members of our society. They are making 
a great contribution to the life of our country. They are here to stay.”98 Nonetheless Whitelaw 
recoiled from his earlier proposals for a register, arguing that “[t]his is not at present a feasible 
option because of the substantial expense involved. But so important do we regard it to provide 
definite assurances that the rate of immigration is on the decline that we must hold this option in 
reserve to provide definition of numbers if doubts persist.”99 He reiterated the Conservatives’ 
continued opposition to the forcible repatriation schemes advocated by the far right, calling them 
“evil policies.” The real solution, he concluded, was to introduce legislation for a new British 
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Nationality Act, which “will not damage the rights of any one legally settled here but will clarify 
and nationalise the existing tangle of legislation on this subject. These policies are in the interests 
of all our citizens. One cannot wish away anxieties about immigration while remaining 
inactive.”100 The dependents register controversy highlights the extent to which the collection of 
statistical data was seen as a panacea for all things immigration-related even as it raised 
substantial opposition, frequently due to the looming shadow of the role played by similar data 
collection and categorization efforts by the Nazis and other eugenicist parties. For the party of 
control, in particular, defining the limits and scope of control was an essential exercise. 
IV 
 
Anti-immigrationist concern with statistical data was partly contingent upon a similar official 
fixation. The postwar fascination with central planning was applied, albeit somewhat belatedly 
and with more than a few complications, to the question of immigration.101 In the report 
generated by the Five West Midlands County Boroughs Joint Committee Immigrants Study 
Group the authors noted that “[t]here is no readily available information as to the number of 
immigrants in Great Britain, in the West Midlands or within the area of any specified Local 
Authority. Neither is there any clear definition of what is meant by an immigrant and a number 
of specialist agencies and Government Departments have created their own definitions to suit the 
factors which they consider significant in their work.”102 The specifics of who fell into the 
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category of “immigrant” mattered immensely, not least for the impact they had on funding and 
repatriation policy initiatives. Many contemporary commentators, researchers, bureaucrats, and 
campaigners alike did share a particular understanding of the word “immigrant.” A pamphlet 
published by the Bow Group was fairly typical in its use of terminology: “Throughout this 
pamphlet ‘immigrant’ means coloured Commonwealth immigrant unless the context indicates 
otherwise.”103 In many official cases, “immigrant” also included some individuals who were 
born in the UK: several government departments debated at length not whether children born in 
the UK to parents who were born abroad should be categorized as immigrants, but how old they 
would be before they would stop being defined as such.104 Under the auspices of the 1966 Local 
Government Act, which contained provisions for funding directed at areas of high immigrant 
population, researchers defined an immigrant “as someone resident in Britain for less than 10 
years or the child of such a person.”105 What mattered, of course, was that the definition take 
account of all those resident in the UK who were not white. The aim was less to identify people 
who were born abroad, as these debates did not take into account those who were born elsewhere 
in Europe, but rather to determine what proportion of the population resident in the UK could be 
seen as foreign.  
The Commission for Racial Equality published a document in April 1980 entitled “Why 
Keep Ethnic Statistics? Questions and Answers for Employers and Employees.” It argued that 
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“‘Labelling and differentiating’ between people according to their racial or ethnic origins is 
already prevalent in society, and has developed regardless of ethnic records…ethnic record-
keeping should be seen as an essential tool in the attainment of RACIAL EQUALITY, since the 
records would provide reliable data to facilitate the formulation and implementation of policies 
to achieve this desired goal.”106 Like the CRE, government agencies were very attentive to the 
question of statistical data on ethnic minorities by the late 1970s. This was partly the case 
because, as noted in the CRE report, ethnicity-related data was used to calculate funding 
packages for impoverished areas, and also to target spending and the construction of 
infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and housing, largely in response to the objections raised 
through the late 1950s and 1960s outlined above.107 This was, however, a rather late 
development in the process of official collection of data on immigrant groups. 
 Party and state officials most frequently referred to conflict over questions relating to 
statistics as the “numbers debate,” which certainly did no more to humanize the issue than the 
anti-immigrationists’ concern did. Anti-immigrationists’ perception of the opacity of 
immigration statistics was also not entirely unfounded. Prior to the introduction of the 
Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962, there was no programme for the collection of data on 
immigration. Long-haul passenger vessels were required to provide a passenger manifest to the 
Board of Trade, but this data was far from a comprehensive representation of the people entering 
the country. By the early 1960s, a large proportion of migrants to the UK were entering the 
country either by air or via short-haul sea journeys from the European continent. So, if a migrant 
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entered the country by sea on a vessel travelling from Kingston, Jamaica to Portsmouth, then 
their entry to the country would be noted by the Board of Trade. If, however, they flew from 
Jamaica to Heathrow, or took a ship to Calais, and subsequently to Dover, then there would be 
no record of their arrival. Furthermore, even for those whose entry was recorded, the purpose of 
travel, i.e. visiting, business, or settlement, was not noted.108  
In an effort to develop some sense of the immigrant population, officials at the Ministry 
of Labour and Employment compiled data from applications for National Insurance. This was far 
from a faultless system. Every time an Irish migrant entered the country, and it was common 
during this period for migrants working in the UK to re-enter as often as twice a year, they would 
be counted in the National Insurance tally.109 Therefore, an individual applicant could be entered 
into the tally multiple times, exaggerating the size of the immigrant population. An exaggeration 
of the size of the Irish population was not, however, the chief purpose of this statistical exercise. 
The real aim was to determine the size of the “coloured” population of immigrants. By noting the 
applicant’s country of birth, officials “deduced” which were likely to be coloured immigrants.110 
This technique remained the most commonly used method of calculating the “coloured” 
immigrant population in the UK until the introduction of an ethnic origin question on the 1981 
census. This system relied fundamentally on a kind of “common sense” coding of the world by 
nation state. Thus, any individual born in Rhodesia or Jamaica would be categorized as coloured 
or black; individuals with birthplaces in Canada or Australia were categorized as white. Civil 
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servants spilled much ink debating what to do about non-white individuals born in the UK. 
Initially, children born in the UK could easily be categorized according to the birthplace of their 
parents if they were in the care of their parents: children would rarely encounter officials 
engaging in data collection on ethnic origin in the absence of parents born abroad. But as time 
passed and these children became adults, statisticians were faced with a conundrum. If one, as a 
census-taker or official responsible for processing National Insurance claims, encountered an 
individual who was visibly not white but who gave their place of birth as the UK, how did one 
ensure that this individual was not entered into government records as a member of the white 
population? 
 While a new method of data collection was not introduced until 1981, various alternative 
possibilities for collection were examined through the 1970s. Among those civil servants 
responsible for determining the method by which data on coloured populations was collected, 
however, the risk of embarrassment was no small concern. Proposals that included a direct 
question about an individual’s ethnic origin, the method used to collect census data after 1981, 
were rejected as potentially causing offense to the individual being questioned.111 Civil servants 
suggested that some individuals might be particularly offended by the question if their origin was 
meant to be visible: if the census-taker could see that someone was black, it was best to simply 
note this fact, rather than to raise the ire of the respondent by suggesting that this was not an 
obvious fact. Statisticians and civil servants very much assumed the “obviousness” of ethnic 
origin: one could see whether someone was coloured or not. The General Household Survey, like 
other sources of ethnic data, also included some information collected by “observation.”112 







Officials noted that this was typically applied to questions such as gender and type of residence; 
whether or not an individual should be classified as coloured apparently fell in to the same 
category as whether they lived in a detached or semi-detached home. Civil servants accepted the 
fact that the birthplace calculation method was as, if not more, prone to error than visual 
judgement as a reasonable trade-off for not placing those responsible for collecting data in a 
position of social awkwardness. Officials relying on the birthplace technique would consistently 
offer the caveat that, of course, not everyone born in Rhodesia would be ethnically African. 
Some countries were like us; others were like them. Either way, whatever the popular 
assumption might be with respect to the “average” ethnic identity of the population in a given 
state was taken as sufficiently scientifically rigorous to be the sole basis of a massive and 
frequently referenced body of statistical data.  
 Thus, by the time the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was being debated in 1961 neither 
politicians nor civil servants had any real idea how many immigrants were actually resident in 
the country. With the introduction of the 1962 Act, however, immigration officials processing 
arrivals at ports of entry were required to fill out landing forms for all individuals entering the 
country. These forms included the entrant’s country of birth. From this point, the collection of 
data on immigration became a necessity on the grounds of incessant requests for information 
from both members of the government and the press, which civil servants perceived to stem 
largely from public pressure upon politicians to produce answers to the questions posed above.  
 The question of collecting ethnic statistics was contested by some of those in the 
immigrant support community. These individuals, such as Martin Kettle of the National Council 
for Civil Liberties, objected to the notion of compiling data on the basis of a category of 
difference that could be used to discriminate against those individuals who were identified as 
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belonging to minority groups. Statisticians rejected these claims on the grounds that “[s]tatistics 
are neutral and forms of tabulation which distinguish immigrants whether from the 
Commonwealth or elsewhere cannot be open to this charge; their purpose is to measure the 
relative well being – or lack of it – in one particular part of the community.”113 Others employed 
in the race relations industry, notably Mark Bonham Carter, head of the Race Relations Board in 
the late 1960s, concurred with the statisticians: “It seems to me that statistics in themselves are 
neutral – they are neither good nor bad. What matters about statistics is how you use them.”114 In 
1965, the Conservative Bow Group observed that “[i]t has been argued that keeping separate 
statistics for coloured immigrants is in itself a form of discrimination. In a technical sense this is 
correct. But without these statistics it is not possible to overcome the more serious kinds of 
discrimination with which we are concerned.”115 The Bow Group was concerned to emphasize 
that local authorities needed to submit detailed immigration-related statistics to the central 
government in order to ascertain which should be designated as “Special Areas,” which indicated 
that an area was in extreme financial need and required extra support from the state. Statistics 
were a means of targeting funding, partly so that areas in greatest need received the funding they 
required, but also to avoid the unnecessary expense that would follow an increase of government 
spending on services across the whole of the country. Immigration statistics were intended to 
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provide the central government with a means of addressing the problem without spending more 
money than was strictly necessary. 
 Statistics on immigration were, of course, highly scrutinized, and occasionally that 
scrutiny uncovered errors. This included, notably, a series of rather grave errors on 1973 returns 
that was exposed in 1976 in which the net inflow of New Commonwealth migrants was shown to 
be not 17,000, as had been reported, but rather 86,000.116 This error was seized upon, and widely 
publicized, by none other than Enoch Powell. Powell had, naturally, proved himself by this date 
to be the bugbear of the Central Statistical Office, Department of Health and Social Services, 
Central Register Office, and any other state office concerned with statistical data collection for 
the better part of a decade. Several files in the National Archives are devoted solely to 
correspondence addressing the “nuisance” caused by Powell, and strategizing about how to 
respond to his claims. Powell’s motivation was, as noted above, largely to do with his assumed 
role as defender of the common man, a crusader for truth committed to exposing government 
wrongdoing. In the midst of a particularly heated debate with the Home Office in 1970-1, Powell 
met with a government official who was probably Sir Philip Allen, an employee of the Home 
Office who had worked with Powell when he was a junior minister of Housing.117 In a brief to 
his colleagues, Allen speculated that Powell’s demeanour was that of a lonely man, and that he 
was “disturbed at the popular and superficial interpretation put on what he has intended as 
serious and closely reasoned contributions.”118 Allen went on to say that he did not contribute to 
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the meeting very much, and that instead Powell “made clear that what he was trying to do was to 
rehearse his own thinking and (I rather suspect) to persuade himself that he was not really getting 
things out of balance and grossly exaggerating a problem which was giving him so deep a 
concern but which did not seem to cause anything like the same anxiety to other people whose 
general judgment he trusted.”119 
 Powell was certainly not alone in his frustration with the manner in which statistical 
questions were handled by civil servants, particularly on the topic of projections about the future 
non-white population that had so exercised him in 1968. In response to a series of projections on 
the future NCWP120 population produced by the Central Statistical Office, then-Prime Minister 
James Callaghan fumed “[t]his isn’t statistics, it’s astrology.”121 For their part, civil servants 
were more concerned with the pressures placed upon them by inquiring politicians, and by the 
potentially explosive consequences that might follow from releasing the wrong information, or 
unfavourably presented data, to the wrong people or at the wrong time. A lengthy 
correspondence took place between officials at the Department of Health and Social Services, the 
Central Statistical Office, the Prime Minister and related ministers in 1978 over the release of a 
document projecting the growth of the immigrant population up to 1991.122 Prime Minister 
Callaghan commented on a draft that “[m]y recollection is that figures like this have been 
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published before. So we add nothing to our knowledge – all we do is to make better informed 
(perhaps) guesses. This won’t alter policy; it won’t alter the facts; it will give a certain spurious 
validity to the future…….I would not publish.”123 The proposal to publish the information that 
the Prime Minister was so reluctant to publicize as an article in “Population Trends” was met 
with skepticism from officials, as one speculated “[a]re we sure that those who collect the 
statistics are not allowing their natural pride in their profession to overcome their political sense? 
If there is no need to publish these figures until after the next Census, I cannot see why we 
should do so. The only result can be pain for the Government and I should be in favour of either 
eliminating the pain or keeping it down to a minimum.”124  
 A similar debate had occurred about the wisdom of publishing an article written by Prof. 
Claus Moser of the Central Statistical Office on the subject of immigration statistics in 1972.125 
The article similarly included projections of the size of the non-white population which were 
deemed questionable due to the fact that data from the 1971 census had not been included. The 
article had originally been set for publication in November of 1972, but following the Ugandan 
Asians crisis in August Home Secretary Robert Carr had written to Prime Minister Edward 
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Heath that “[i]t is clear that the admission of United Kingdom passport holders from Uganda will 
spark off all sorts of anxieties and resentments about the number of people from the 
Commonwealth in this country. Thus far from being a favourable time, I fear that November is 
now likely to be a most inopportune moment for the appearance of such an article in ‘Social 
Trends’.”126 By September, however, the Home Secretary had “formed the view that on merit the 
arguments for and against publication were finely balanced and in his view marginally against 
publication. But the danger of a leak is a decisive argument in favour of publication. For the 
Government to be accused of suppressing an article on this subject would be the worst position. 
The Home Secretary accordingly authorised Professor Moser to proceed with publication.”127 
Government ministers at the highest level concerned themselves with the release of statistical 
data because of its perceived power not only to fuel anti-immigrationist fervour, but also to be 
skewed and misunderstood. 
V 
 
While presenting their concerns as carefully reasoned and deeply logical, anti-immigrationists 
also seized upon a generalized uncertainty about the capacity of the welfare state to provide 
genuinely universal services to all those who were eligible to receive them. This suggests that 
general feeling about the welfare state was less confident than has been implied for the postwar 
heyday of “consensus.”128 In the anti-immigrationist worldview access to welfare services was a 
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net benefit: it was a privilege, and one that substantially improved the quality of life for those 
who partook of it. Furthermore, the welfare state was quintessentially British: it reflected the 
democratic ideal of equality, and the government’s commitment to the well-being of its citizens. 
However, the capacity of the state to provide welfare services was limited. Popular awareness of 
the substantial expense entailed in maintaining the services of the welfare state was entwined 
with an uncertainty about how far this expenditure could be extended to meet the demands of a 
larger, or needier population. What if the welfare state ran out? Where would Britons be then? 
Having recently adjusted to the benefits of welfare services, some were fearful that they might 
just as swiftly be taken away. Reluctant to return to the days of means-testing and uneven service 
provision, those who raised objections to immigrants’ access to welfare services took a defensive 
position: if the welfare state was a privilege, then only a select few were entitled to that privilege. 
In attempting to draw lines around a treasured and apparently limited resource, anti-
immigrationists fell back on the social logic outlined in chapter one: there are those who are like 
us, and those who are not. If they have not proven themselves to be sufficiently of our people, 
then they may not partake of this communal resource. Repeated claims by social scientists such 
as Mrs. K. Jones, which were reported in the press and echoed by politicians and policy officials, 
that on a per capita basis immigrants drew significantly less upon the services of the welfare state 
than those born in the UK, did not substantially affect anti-immigrationists’ perception that 
immigrants did precisely the opposite.129 
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 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes that “paranoia for all its vaunted suspicion acts as though 
its work would be accomplished if only it could finally, this time, somehow get its story truly 
known. That a fully initiated listener could still remain indifferent or inimical, or might have no 
help to offer, is hardly treated as a possibility.”130 While anti-immigrationist attitudes cannot be 
straightforwardly described as paranoid, they were certainly framed as such by their opponents. 
They were also characterized by a similar conviction that the immigrant problem could be solved 
if, at last, the truth – the genuine truth, the one experienced by engaged citizens on the ground – 
were exposed both to the broader public and to the political elite. The attempts to communicate 
anti-immigrationist knowledge over, and at the expense of, government narratives about the state 
of immigration suggest that anti-immigrationists thought that their audiences would be receptive 
to their claims, and indeed were willing to be persuaded by these superior versions of the “truth.”  
 The anti-immigrationists’ version of the “truth” was evidently normative, and designed to 
accomplish the particular goal of demonstrating that immigrants were unfit for participation in 
British society, and that on those grounds they should be prohibited from entry and residence. 
Chapter four will examine the manner in which the supposed unfitness of immigrant women and 
families were framed, and the ways in which anti-immigrationist women were key participants in 
this framing. 
                                                          




Chapter 4. Family Matters: Women and Domesticity in the Anti-Immigrationist Movement 
 
On 9 March 1962, a letter from Mrs. Armstrong of Gravesend, Kent arrived on the desk of 
Charles Bellairs at the Conservative Research Department. She had recently, she wrote, been 
nearly pushed into a window by “two Indian men” who had apparently refused to give way on a 
sidewalk. This was a frequent occurrence, she argued, and was something to which her brother, 
were he not away at sea, would take great offence. She urged Bellairs to prevent the 
implementation of a law that would “force people to mix with Indians & others not our Race”. 
On the back of her letter was a postscript: “Pleas [sic] do not make this letter Public as I am 
doing it for quite a lot of Women who have been pushed into the road.”1 
Bellairs was somewhat flummoxed by her letter: “I am afraid I am rather at a loss to 
understand to which particular Bill you are referring. The purpose of the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill now before Parliament is to control immigration, so that the flow of immigrants 
into Britain matches the jobs and housing conditions which obtain here. This is surely a 
commonsense proposal.”2 Mrs. Armstrong certainly was mistaken in her understanding of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, but her letter reflected the nature of much of the concerns about 
immigration beyond the question of entry as outlined in the previous chapter. Moreover, she 
viewed her experience as typical, not of British citizens, but of British women. Women were 
particularly vulnerable to the “rude” behaviours of immigrant men; furthermore, their treatment 
was an affront to their male family members (Mrs. Armstrong’s conviction that her brother 
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would have thrown the two men “clean through” the window in question was echoed by her 
husband’s reported statement that he would have done the same). The inappropriate 
comportment of immigrant individuals violated the accepted norms of British society, and fell 
foul in particular of those norms regarding attitudes towards women.  
Bellairs’ dismissal of the specific content of her letter was surely a tactic to emphasize 
the government’s competence in seeking to limit the entry of immigrants to the UK. But his 
decision to ignore the undertone of her complaint, the nature of interactions between immigrant 
populations and those who were already settled in the country, serves as representative of many, 
if not most, exchanges between women and representatives of the state on this issue. In the wake 
of the 1958 Notting Hill disturbances Mrs. June Turner had written to MP Maurice Edelman that 
“[a]s just a very ordinary woman with a little intelligence I saw this trouble between blacks & 
whites at least three years ago.”3 Despite Turner’s self-deprecation, women anti-immigrationists 
played a much more significant role in the movement than has hitherto been appreciated; a role 
that was fundamentally shaped by their gender. According to anti-immigrationists, there were 
two halves to the “immigrant problem.” The first was how many immigrants were allowed to 
enter the country. The second was what happened after they arrived. Women anti-
immigrationists often regarded the first half only as a solution to the second, their real concerns 
being rooted in the effect that immigrant residents had upon British communities. The perception 
that immigrants were unsuitable citizens on the grounds of their domestic practices was 
widespread and was frequently invoked by women participants in anti-immigrationist 
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campaigns, reflecting the continued dominance of a gendered view of citizenship based on a 
male-breadwinner family model.  
During the postwar period state policy emphasized as a matter of fact that immigrants 
should be required to adhere to British standards of household management and domestic 
practice. Maurice Foley, a minister with the Department of Economic Affairs in the mid-1960s, 
argued that while immigrants need not abandon their national cultures, they did need to 
“recognise that we have established in this country certain standards of behaviour, of hygiene 
and of sanitation.”4 Not only were anti-immigrationist women involved in campaigns against 
immigration that self-consciously emerged from their position as women, they were responding 
to a state-backed system that supported a gendered view of immigration. Anti-immigrationist 
campaigns against immigrants who failed to meet the standards for British domesticity and 
appropriate family values were bolstered by state restrictions that limited immigration on the 
basis of immigrants’ prospective capacity to meet a conservative vision of a nuclear family unit. 
State policies on both the admission of dependents and male fiancés were intended to create 
immigrant families in Britain that closely mirrored other British families. 
Wendy Webster has argued that during the Second World War and immediate postwar 
period the “‘inviolate centre’ which defined the boundaries of England was a white British 
woman.”5 Women figured as defenders both of the nation and of the home, and the anti-
immigrationist movement drew upon this view to argue against the admission of non-white 
people to the UK. This chapter will examine the ways in which women participated in the anti-
immigrationist movement, as well as the gendered nature of anti-immigrationist arguments. It 
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will argue that anti-immigrationist campaigns referred to a strictly gendered notion of families 
and domesticity that echoed views promoted by contemporary organizations such as the National 
Viewers and Listeners Association (NVALA). Indeed, the gendered nature of anti-
immigrationism in this period was part of a broader set of movements promoting a morally 
conservative agenda, many of which featured women in a leadership role. Despite the fact that 
these groups have often been positioned as marginal and ineffective, I argue that these 
conservative movements had a much deeper influence on wider cultural beliefs and other 
political organizations through the 1960s and 1970s than has previously been suggested.6 
Furthermore, the fact that state policy provided a framework that functioned to bolster anti-
immigrationist claims about the “right” way to be a family in Britain indicates that anti-
immigrationist arguments were closely aligned to mainstream values. Despite this state 
endorsement of anti-immigrationists’ gendered view of the world, I conclude that women’s 
participation in the anti-immigrationist movement was constrained by their gender, even as their 
gendered identity was used by the movement writ large to demonstrate its legitimacy. A series of 
examples from Smethwick in the West Midlands will be used to trace the gendered nature of 
anti-immigrationist demands, the participation of women in the anti-immigration movement, and 
their variable results. 
I 
 
Women who participated in anti-immigrationist campaigns were not anomalous. Indeed, despite 
the fact that a universal franchise was not enacted until 1928 large-scale women’s involvement 
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with domestic politics had a tradition that extended well into the nineteenth century. By the 
postwar period it was established that the party with the greatest success in attracting women 
supporters over time was the Conservative Party. More than either the Liberal or Labour parties, 
the Conservatives had found a way to integrate “women’s work” into their operations, much to 
their own benefit both in electoral and organizational terms.7 From the Primrose League to the 
Women’s National Advisory Committee, women played a central role in the social life of the 
party, which paid important dividends for the party’s political success; indeed, the Primrose 
League was the first political organization to admit women as members.8 David Jarvis argues 
that women’s work for the party most often took the form of “fundraising, sandwich-making, and 
envelope-filling,”9 in no small part because “Conservative ideology has been very sensitive to, 
indeed was originally predicated upon, idealized gender roles.”10 While Jarvis is critical of the 
limits imposed upon women’s involvement in the party hierarchy, particularly the paucity of 
women’s voices at the policy-making level, he notes that “Conservative women themselves were 
enthusiastic vehicles for [the Conservatives’] message. The Party’s emphasis on threats to 
domestic order, and on the moral well-being of children in particular, was reputed to ‘go down 
well on the doorstop’ and certainly implied a leading role for women in the fight against 
socialism.”11 In her study of Tory women voters in the 1980s, Beatrix Campbell argues that the 
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Primrose League “enabled women to become social beings before their claims for citizenship 
were finally and fully realised in the twentieth century…Women, in other words, were active in 
the modernisation of the Conservative Party from a cliquey élite to a mass party.”12 Conservative 
ideology dictated that women were figured primarily as defenders of the home and protectors of 
the family unit, and both their involvement with the party and their targeting by campaigners 
reflected this conception. For many women, an emphasis on the family and a defense of the 
moral order were appealing prospects. Fiona Grigg argues that “Conservative women constituted 
an important component in the mix of groups increasingly anxious about a post-war world 
characterized by ‘affluence,’ the welfare state, secularization, and ‘permissiveness.’”13 Campbell 
suggests that in the late 1950s and 1960s, a nascent “women’s agenda,” which was partly 
formulated prior to the Second World War, fully emerged and “associated women with the 
embryonic emergence of the new right, an anti-modernist axis which became Thatcherism.”14 In 
the postwar period, Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska suggests that “[t]he politics of affluence 
appealed to women in their role as homemakers and consumers,” framing Conservative 
campaigners’ emphasis on women as housewives.15 When Dame Barbara Brooke went on a 
speaking tour on behalf of the Conservative Party across the West Midlands in 1961, she “held a 
small Press Conference with the Women’s Editors of the Birmingham Post and Mail, the 
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Birmingham Dispatch and the Birmingham Weekly Post, and…met the Chairmen and Secretaries 
of the Women’s Divisional Committees...[she] addressed the audience and subsequently 
answered questions which ranged from deep concern about the Government’s attitude to Crime 
and Punishment, coloured immigration, unofficial strikes, the Common Market and the treatment 
of patients in hospital.”16 Evidently, by the 1960s Conservative women were reflecting a deep 
trend of anti-immigrationism, and were articulating their concerns in explicitly Conservative 
settings. 
Scholars have also highlighted important historical precedents for women’s participation 
in political activism, and of the gendering of activism, outside of the Conservative Party. Julie 
Gottlieb argues that in the worldview of the interwar British Union of Fascists “women were 
figured as the guardians of morality, decency, and respectability.”17 Indeed, “[w]omen fascists 
wished to see the family as the microcosm for the state, and thereby celebrate themselves as the 
gate-keepers of the national community.”18 These historical precedents did not only establish that 
a worldview which accommodated active political engagement for women while insisting that 
their proper role was that of domestic manager and child-carer was possible. They also served to 
situate anti-immigrationism within a pantheon of movements that were overtly political, and 
many of which made strong claims for their own respectability. The claims that anti-
immigrationist women made (that they could both advocate for a particular political future while 
operating chiefly within a domestic sphere) thus drew upon a long tradition of small-c 
conservative activism. Furthermore, party leaders could figure women’s participation in all these 
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movements as both a move towards moderation and respectability, and as representative of 
genuine democratic engagement. Gottlieb argues that “the feminine presence on the door-steps 
of the nation went some way towards disarming public apprehensions of BUF hooliganism and 
disorderliness,”19 concerns which plagued right-wing movements throughout the twentieth 
century.20 Women’s role was to temper the passions of male activists, and to uphold the 
movement’s claims to defend the nation. 
 Anti-immigrationist women also came to the fore in a context in which women were 
increasingly involved in political organizations and social movements across the political 
spectrum. A growing body of women who endorsed an active role for themselves and their 
gender while conforming to conservative moral standards emerged in the interwar period, and 
gained pace through the Second World War and its aftermath.21 The British Housewives League 
(BHL) was founded in 1946 to demand an “ample supply of reasonably priced food, housing and 
clothing, the abolition of rationing and an end to the universal enforcement of the National 
Health Service on clients and doctors.”22 Claiming 100,000 members at its peak, the BHL also 
aimed to “encourage housewives to become MPs, councillors and representatives on other public 
bodies.”23 Amy Whipple argues persuasively for the BHL’s historical significance as a body in 
which “[n]ot only did the housewives challenge a major initiative of the Ministry of Health, but 
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they simultaneously challenged their members to become more educated, more active citizens. 
Well-informed, committed protest, they argued, was the only way to defend one’s home against 
the tyranny of the state expert and bureaucrat.” This process married housewives dual identities 
as engaged citizens and emblems of a “domestic ideal of womanhood.”24 While the BHL proved 
to be ephemeral, the Conservative Party targeted housewives in part as a response to the BHL’s 
stated concerns.25 As Paul Byrne argues, in the late twentieth century women were more likely to 
participate in single-issue activism than directly in party politics.26 This trend is reflected in the 
higher levels of support for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament among women than men, 
such that 26 per cent of women who identified as Conservative voters also supported the CND.27 
Notably, many of these women supporters cited fears about the possible effects of nuclear 
radiation upon reproduction and childbirth as the primary reason for their support, a perception 
perpetuated eagerly by the CND itself.28 The Middle Class Alliance was far less successful than 
other contemporary movements, attracting minimal participation in the East Midlands in the late 
1950s, but it nonetheless was deemed significant enough to be monitored by Conservative Party 
Area Offices, which then informed the Central Office of the Alliance’s activities.29 Significantly, 
the Alliance was monitored under the same program of oversight as the People’s League for 
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Freedom, which in 1962 became known as National Fellowship and ultimately merged with the 
British National Party under the leadership of Edward Martell. The People’s League was noted 
for its opposition both to immigration and the Common Market. The chief concern of the 
Conservative Party in the 1950s, however, was the frequency with which members of the party 
were joining these smaller organizations, and the potential complications these dual members 
might introduce for party discipline.30  
One organization attracted far more attention, both from contemporaries and historians, 
than any other.31 Former schoolteacher Mary Whitehouse was no stranger to political activism by 
the time she founded a campaign called “Clean-up TV” in 1964, which by 1965 had transformed 
into the National Viewers and Listeners Association (NVALA).32 Whitehouse had been involved 
with the religious movement Moral Re-armament, which had at various points supported 
appeasement and anti-communism before becoming concerned with the rise of permissivism.33 
Lawrence Black argues that the politics of the NVALA were “not of the party or parliamentary 
kind,” and that the group was “middle class in its core participants but national, even 
international in its aspirations, concerned with consumers rather than producers and with the 
politics of everyday life.”34 Whitehouse’s campaign relied upon petitioning and letter-writing, 
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much as many anti-immigrationist groups did: her first major foray into the public’s view was a 
large public meeting at Birmingham Town Hall, followed by the presentation of a petition 
containing 366,355 signatures to Parliament in June of 1965.35 The aim of Whitehouse’s 
campaign was to enforce conservative moral standards for popular culture. The demands 
contained in her massive petition emphasized the Christian worldview of the NVALA, arguing 
that “[w]e men and women of Britain believe in a Christian way of life,” one that they desired 
“for our children and country.”36 According to the NVALA, the stability and safety of their 
families and the nation could only be ensured if conservative social values were upheld. Drawing 
connections between the sanctity of the family and the strength of the nation was certainly not a 
new line of argument, but it did run counter to contemporary popular culture’s increased 
emphasis on individuality and the rise of “free love.” Indeed, a preoccupation with “values” was 
one of the distinguishing features of the NVALA37: it argued that professional oversight of 
broadcasting ought to be counteracted by relying more frequently on non-experts who might 
counteract this emphasis on permissivism.38 Furthermore, Whitehouse claimed legitimacy for her 
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cause on the basis of a purported set of essentially British values. Many of these values were 
invoked in the criticisms of immigrants as morally suspect, particularly with respect to drug use 
and prostitution. Women assumed positions as defenders of the moral order, bolstered by their 
roles as wives and mothers.  
 Whitehouse had at one point been neighbours with Enoch Powell,39 and enjoyed 
connections with a number of well-positioned individuals. This network of support was crucial to 
her influence and apparent respectability.40 The most prominent politician to support her cause 
was James Dance, a Conservative MP and former military man who served as NVALA chair, 
and who convened a meeting at the House of Commons with prospective members. Those in 
attendance included the Conservative MP who served as broadcasting spokesman, Paul Bryan; 
those affiliated with the group where Whitehouse got her start, Moral Re-Armament; and “bodies 
with NVALA affinities – the Headmistresses Association (represented by Mrs. Manners), Baptist 
Union, Women’s Institute, Young Wives groups and Rotary Clubs.”41 The meeting was also 
attended by Jonathan Guinness, the eldest son of the former Daphne Guinness (née Mitford), 
now Lady Mosley, and the man who would become head of the Monday Club.42 The connections 
that existed within and between anti-immigrationist groups and individuals extended to embrace 
this wider set of organizations that emphasized a morally conservative view of British society. 
Victoria Gillick, noted for her activism in favour of restrictions on birth control, was also 
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reported to have been involved with the pro-Enoch Powell “Powellight” association.43 Placing 
anti-immigrationism within this broader network supporting moral conservatism further 
advanced a view of anti-immigrationism as respectable, in no small part because of the 
aggressive self-identification of these prominent individuals as respectable – not least 
Whitehouse herself. 
Whitehouse commented readily on issues related to immigration and racial tensions. In a 
1968 letter to James Callaghan, then Home Secretary, Whitehouse requested that the terms of the 
Race Relations Bill be extended to radio and television. While this would seem to be contrary to 
anti-immigrationist aims, a further letter to the Attorney-General asking him to “explain how a 
person banned from entering Britain can be allowed to appear and express racialist views on 
television and radio” made it clear that the source of Whitehouse’s complaint was the fact that 
American activist Stokely Carmichael had recently been seen on television advancing the same 
elements of Black Panther philosophy that had resulted in him being banned from entry to the 
UK by the Home Office.44 Racialism, to Whitehouse, was best represented by the language of 
black empowerment, rather than the language of anti-immigrationism. 
The NVALA’s emphasis on maintaining a particular set of moral standards for the good 
of the family and the nation was echoed in the rhetoric of anti-immigrationist campaigns which 
were both led by women and drew upon gendered language. Sylvia Jones was adopted as the 
parliamentary candidate for the National Front in the Wycombe, Bucks. by-election in 1978 
when she was aged 36.45 An article in the National Front News noted that Mrs. Jones and her 
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husband, a carpenter and chairman of the local NF branch, had lived in High Wycombe for 
twenty years and had a 12-year-old son.46 The article highlighted both her campaign strategy - “I 
will be fighting a very strong ‘Stop Immigration – Start Repatriation’ campaign in this election. I 
make no apologies for that. Our children must be protected” - and her motivation: “‘My husband 
and I used to be Labour voters,’ says Mrs. Jones, ‘but we have seen the Labour Party become 
increasingly dominated by Left Wing extremists whose sole concern seems to be the welfare of 
the Immigrants [sic], not the ordinary British people.’”47 At first glance it seems strange that 
Mrs. Jones was adopted as a candidate rather than her husband, considering that he was Branch 
Chairman and she Branch Secretary. However, it is likely that Mrs. Jones was not otherwise 
employed, and certainly not the breadwinner, since no mention is made in the article of any paid 
occupation. Furthermore, her campaign turned upon her position as mother and homemaker. By 
exploiting stereotypical assumptions about women’s proper role, Mrs. Jones was able to draw 
upon an established set of norms regarding gender roles to advocate for an extreme immigration 
policy.48  
Had they lived in the same constituency, Mrs. Jones’ campaign would likely have 
appealed to Maureen Proctor. Proctor, then 30 years old, announced her plan to vote for the 
National Front candidate at the Thurrock, Essex by-election in 1976 to a reporter from New 
Society. Proctor had three young children, and lived with them and her husband in a massive 
council estate in South Ockenden. Her husband was also an active member of the NF, attending a 
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rally at which hunger-striker Robert Relf spoke49 and plastering NF posters around the area. The 
New Society reporter was concerned to know Proctor’s motivations for supporting the NF 
candidate:  
“It’s going to affect the children, isn’t it? Especially the housing,” says Maureen. “The 
immigrants are getting priority over us.” “I’m not very intelligent, not very bright, like, 
but I wanted to do nursing,” she continues, twitching nervously. “The immigrants get first 
choice. The jobs are reserved for them when they come over here. I’ve had to do 
domestic work instead. I can’t get anything interesting. People say to me that I’m biased, 
but it’s about time it came out into the open. A lot of people think the same as me about 
the blacks, but they keep it behind closed doors.”50 
 
A neighbour confirmed his support for Proctor’s position, suggesting that “[n]o one else has 
done any good. We ought to get back with Australia and New Zealand. We should have stopped 
this British passports business right away.”51 The neighbour’s wife added “[t]he immigrants get 
all the help. The Labour government has let us down bad. It’s not stuck with the working class at 
all.”52 The National Front candidate did not win the seat, but there was a significant swing away 
from the Labour candidate.53 The disenchantment with the status quo evident in both Proctor’s 
and Jones’ political perspectives led them to endorse a fringe party, but it is clear that both did so 
only after feeling they had exhausted their options with mainstream politics. Both evidently felt 
that voting and the democratic process held the potential to resolve their complaints, but that the 
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politicians who had held power up to that point had failed to address their local concerns. These 
concerns, for both women, revolved around the effect immigration had upon their living 
conditions and communities, and particularly upon their children’s futures. In this respect they 
were typical of anti-immigrationist women. 
The most prominent woman endorser of anti-immigrationist causes was Jane, Dowager 
Lady Birdwood, who lent her name and presence to rallies for the National Front, the 
Immigration Control Association, and the Monday Club. Lady Birdwood had previously worked 
with her friend Mary Whitehouse, leading the London branch of the NVALA in the late 1960s,54 
and was known for her attempts to prosecute authors and playwrights whose work offended her 
sense of moral decency. She was also avowedly anti-union, and participated in a movement that 
attempted unsuccessfully to have one-time National Union of Mineworkers president Arthur 
Scargill charged with treason.55 Lady Birdwood was a Canadian expatriate born Joan Pollock 
Graham who had served as secretary to Christopher, the second Baron Birdwood until Lord 
Birdwood’s divorce from his first wife, following which the couple were married.56 Until Lord 
Birdwood’s death in 1962 the pair had focused their efforts upon his existing involvement in 
international aid projects. After his demise, she shifted her focus to increasingly right-wing 
movements, to such a point that she began referring to the National Front as “socialist” and 
Enoch Powell as a “moderate” in the 1980s.57 She stood in the 1983 Bermondsey by-election, 
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winning a total of 69 votes, and again in the 1992 general election in Dewsbury as a British 
National Party candidate.58 In later years she ran two organizations from her home: Choice, 
which “aimed to win a referendum on immigration”; and “English Solidarity, a mass pressure 
group opposed to multi-racialism.”59 Upon her death, the Irish Times commented that despite her 
claim that “I don't hate anybody,” “it was the multi-culturalism which she saw on her own 
doorstep in Acton, West London, that she used as her evidence of Britons being crowded-out by 
ethnic minorities.”60 Lady Birdwood’s associations were as colourful as the obituaries that 
marked her death in 2000 and the rainbow-coloured spectacles and stockings that had first made 
her a shocking member of high society in the late 1950s. Her positions were extreme, even in the 
context of the anti-immigrationist movement, but the starting-point for her activism was roughly 
the same as many other anti-immigrationists: immigration was placing an unbearable and 
unnecessary burden upon the British state, and the British people. Her invocation of the changes 
to her Acton neighbourhood reflects those mentioned by many other anti-immigrationists, 
particularly anti-immigrationist women. For all her privilege, the arguments raised by Lady 
Birdwood were often very similar to those used by working-class women in Essex. 
Despite the parallels between their arguments, the relationship between anti-
immigrationist women of different class backgrounds was not necessarily an easy one. Anti-
immigrationist women, though they shared concerns about the sanctity of the home and family, 
arrived at such concerns by very different paths.61 Middle-class women were more likely to 
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contextualize their objections to immigration within a broader set of ideals about Britain as a 
nation; working-class women’s arguments emphasized the impact of immigration upon 
communities as small as towns and neighbourhoods. Working-class women were also far more 
likely to interact with immigrants on a daily basis, and to live in the neighbourhoods where 
immigrants settled. These were the people whose anecdotal experiences about the strains on 
welfare services were taken most seriously, but it was often middle-class women who spun those 
anecdotes into a broader set of conclusions about the meaning and impact of immigration upon 
Britain as a whole, and who drew concrete conclusions about how to campaign against ongoing 
migration and settlement. Middle-class women were certainly more likely to take on leadership 
roles in the major single-issue anti-immigrationist groups. Beryl Carthew, Joy Page, and Mary 
Howarth all held positions of influence within the Powellight and Immigration Control 
Association groups, respectively, as well as forming links to the National Front and Racial 
Preservation Society. The networks between citizens at the grassroots and middle-class political 
operatives outlined in chapter two were utilized to circulate a set of arguments against 
immigration that were overtly gendered, and on some occasions the gender of those who 
originally raised the concerns was utilized to bolster these claims.62 While working-class women 
had the experiences necessary to persuade them of the utility of an anti-immigrationist platform, 
it was more often middle-class women who had access to the resources, free time, and sense of 
political entitlement to expand those attitudes into a full-fledged political campaign. 
Women also held leadership positions at many pro-immigrant organizations. Indeed, 
Nadine Peppard of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI) served as an 
                                                          




advisor to virtually every group concerned with immigration at some point or another,63 and the 
most prominent pro-immigrant organizer in Yorkshire during the 1960s and 1970s was Maureen 
Baker, who served among other posts as secretary for the Racial Equality Congress. In a postcard 
campaign conducted against Baker in August 1969 critics routinely referred to her as a “do 
gooder.”64 One writer asked “[t]o what lengths will do gooders go to devalue a Briton’s freedom 
and integrity in his own land [?]”, the clear implication being that Baker’s efforts were misled in 
their failure to adequately protect the rights of the (by default, male) British citizen.65 They 
condemned her for her liberalism, her involvement with immigrant groups, and for the existence 
of her job. Race relations professionals were not elected officials; rather, they earned their living 
on the basis of the existence of immigrant groups, and to a certain extent the conflict between 
minorities and the broader British public. Indeed, Indarjit Singh of the Anglo Asian Conservative 
Society argued that “the idea of a career in ‘race relations’ needs to be systematically 
discouraged.”66 Maureen Baker was not a legitimate democratic representative: as such, critics 
claimed she ought not to hold power over resources, and as a non-representative she failed to 
enact the political views of her fellow citizens. It is not clear whether male race relations 
professionals received the same kind of hate mail. It seems likely that women such as Nadine 
Peppard and Maureen Baker, who often emerged from a tradition of social work and voluntary 
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employment that stretched back to the late nineteenth century and work with the poor,67 and 
which was dominated by women, were treated differently than male representatives, who could 
be expected to have ideas of their own, wrong though they may be. The anti-immigrationist 
worldview hinged upon a conservative view of the nuclear family, and women who overstepped 
the bounds of their chiefly domestic role were aberrant, whether they were never-married race 
relations professionals or West Indian lone mothers working as cleaners. 
II 
 
The emphasis on domesticity and household management in anti-immigrationist campaigns 
occurred within a generalized emphasis on women’s place in the home during the postwar 
period. As Sonya Rose argues, “a spate of programmes were offered to help prepare women to 
return to a life of domesticity”68 after the Second World War, and this renewed emphasis on 
separate spheres echoed through political rhetoric in a much more general sense. Furthermore, as 
noted in chapter three, the critical narratives of immigration offered by anti-immigrationists 
emphasized the state’s capacity to provide welfare services to new migrants. The facets of the 
welfare state that were most emphasized were education, health care (particularly maternity 
services) and housing; that is, the areas of state intervention with the strongest historical 
association with women. Women’s participation in formal politics, both as voters on a broad 
scale and as elected officials, began with local government boards responsible for the provision 
of these services in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.69 As such, these services 
                                                          
67 See parallel examples within the moral reform movement in Canada: “The great paradox about femininity 
formation in/through moral reform campaigns was that certain middle-class women made careers out of studying 
“the problem” of the immigrant women or the urban girl.” Valverde, Age, 30. 
 
68 Rose, Which People’s War?, 142. 
 
69 Pat Thane, “Government and Society in England and Wales, 1750-1914,” in The Cambridge Social History of 




provided the training grounds for a significant number of female politicians, as well as being 
shaped by the influence of women officials much earlier than other branches of government. By 
the postwar period women were permitted to vote and stand for office at all levels, but gender 
norms continued to emphasize women’s ideal role within the home, as household manager and 
chief provider of child care. These welfare services – housing, education, and maternity care – 
were also those that were considered women’s responsibilities.  
In the context of a new emphasis on domesticity, anti-immigrationists turned their 
attention to the domestic failings of immigrants. One correspondent’s list of complaints was 
representative of anti-immigrationists’ objections:  
With reference to race relations between whites and coloured, it seems to me that no one 
has yet stated why we do not like them living amongst us. I give you herewith some of 
the reasons, they have a filthy habit of spitting outside in their gardens and, on the streets, 
they are extremely untidy, lazy, and dirty, their houses look dirty windows seldom 
cleaned, curtains never drawn, their gardens are like a wilderness, fences allowed to get 
badly into disrepair, in some cases completely collapsed and left, their places look like 
slums, their children use the gardens and streets as a urinal and even adults use the the 
[sic] front gardens to urinate, this we have seen with our own eyes.70 
 
Complaints about the standards of cleanliness maintained by immigrant families indicate the 
extent to which a particular brand of household management was seen as representative of 
“British values,” as well as of working-class respectability. It is worth noting that keeping a tidy, 
well-maintained home, even on a limited income, was one of the hallmarks of the “respectable” 
working class. It indicated thrift and shrewd management skills, as well as pride in one’s 
possessions, however humble.71 A well-kept home distinguished respectable working men and 
women from their shiftless, undeserving counterparts, many of whom would have earned 
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comparable incomes, but whose spending habits, especially with respect to alcohol, indicated an 
inferior moral character. The possession of moral character was among the few distinguishing 
factors between these sections of the working class, and a distinction cherished by those who 
deemed themselves in possession of such superiority.72 The kind of household management 
advocated by anti-immigrationists reflected nineteenth century ideals about moral strength and 
membership in the community: adherence to these values reflected a commitment to maintaining 
the social fabric. The idea of respectability as it emerged in the nineteenth century was flexible, 
but “it was also integral to working-class identity…and formed an important part of workers’ 
claims to be incorporated into the polity.”73 Respectability “increasingly meant participating in 
the separation of spheres. Respectability depended on a woman’s ability to maintain a domestic 
haven for her husband.”74 This view was based on the premise that women’s chief, indeed sole, 
role ought to be maintaining a home and raising children, and that wage-earning labour ought to 
be performed by a man.75 
The imperative of distancing oneself from the undeserving was not diminished within 
anti-immigrationist circles by the postwar period. The aspiration of many anti-immigrationists to 
appear as respectable members of society was bolstered by their efforts to position new 
immigrants as the undeserving poor. New migrants whose housekeeping practices fell foul of 
these expected standards were deemed unsuitable citizens in part because they fell into the 
category of undeserving poor: those who ought not to be entitled to the services of the state 
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because they did not demonstrate moral character. Such standards had not applied, or in theory 
ought not to have, since the creation of the universal welfare state in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War. But culturally, many of the distinctions within the class structure of the 
interwar period carried over into the postwar years, and were also reflected in the structure of 
postwar welfare service provision.  
When immigrants were deemed to have failed the test of acceptable domestic behaviour 
required to deserve the benefits of membership in the British polity, anti-immigrationists would 
take action. In July 1961 the residents of Price Street in Smethwick threatened to undertake a 
rent strike if the council persisted in moving a Pakistani man named Sardar Mohammed into a 
flat at number 49. The residents of the four flats nearest number 49 spearheaded a group of 900 
residents who promised not to pay their rent if a coloured family was allowed to move in.76 The 
resident of no. 51, Mrs. Turton, who lived there with her son and husband, a “riveter’s holder-
upper,” told a reporter from the Daily Mirror that “[t]hey are different from us…It’s not the 
colour of their skins. Their cooking smells different. It’s all that curry and rice – the smell leaks 
through the whole block. They don’t live like us, do they? If they lived westernised [sic] it would 
be different.”77 Mrs. Irene Lovelass of no. 45, who had two young daughters with her husband, a 
baker, said that “[t]hey can’t talk the same as us…And they have visitors in droves, don’t they? I 
don’t object to coloured people. It’s just that I don’t want them living so close to me.”78 A dozen 
people arrived at Smethwick Town Hall on 24 July 1961 to present the mayor with a petition; 
among them Mrs. Patricia Jones was reported as saying that “[w]e are absolutely determined to 
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keep Indians out. They are not civilised. They are the riff-raff from their own country – that’s 
why they did not stay there…What right has the council or the Government to make us live with 
them?”79 Another petitioner stated that he had moved out of the area because many of his 
immigrant neighbours “did not know what a flush toilet was for” and were instead using the 
street.80 The mayor, for his part, stated that since Mr. Mohammed had paid his first week’s rent 
there was no question of him not being permitted to take up occupation; indeed, the mayor felt 
that residents had become “unconsciously anti-colour” as a result of campaigning by the 
Birmingham Immigration Control Association, which had “whipped up” opposition from their 
position outside the community.81 The rent strike eventually fizzled out, as did a similar 
controversy on Baldwin Street in the same year, and a subsequent episode in the Ladywood area 
of Birmingham in 1969.82 Tensions, however, remained high, and by the time of the threatened 
Ladywood rent strike, white residents were increasingly reluctant to speak to reporters about 
their feelings on the issue of “colour.”83 
The residents of Price Street were not the only ones, nor indeed the first, to be up in arms 
about the impact of immigrant neighbours. Mrs. Henrietta Moore-Brabazon, Chairman of the 
North Kensington Conservative Association, wrote to Lord Hailsham, then chair of the 
Conservative Party, in June of 1959. She outlined concerns that had been reported to her by a 
number of women working as landladies in the area. They had found, she said, that following the 
                                                          
79 Ibid. 
 
80 Ibid.  
 
81 Ibid.  
 






negative press surrounding the 1958 disturbances in Notting Hill it had become nearly 
impossible to find tenants for their lodgings. This was despite the fact that these landladies, who 
formed the core of Tory support in the area, were resident in respectable Notting Hill Gate, not in 
Notting Dale or Kensal New Town, slum areas in which immigrant populations were high. Could 
the party please do something about this public relations issue, Moore-Brabazon asked? This was 
a particularly pressing issue, she argued, because “[c]anvassers in the Borough Council elections 
were quite frequently informed that people who had voted Tory before would vote for Mosly 
[sic] next time because of the Government’s attitude to unrestricted immigration.”84 She attached 
a letter from a fellow constituent who argued that “North Kensington will soon be a Haarlem 
slum [sic], as so many decent British people are leaving the district. I agree with Socialist Mrs. 
Olive Wilson. I would deport all undesirable people, and that includes the undesirable Irish. In 
fact anyone who cannot behave. I have quite a lot of facts about thugs here. I wrote a letter about 
them to the Prime Minister some months ago, & I was told that the letter had been referred to the 
Home Office.”85 Moore-Brabazon’s concern was not simply about the impact immigration was 
having upon living conditions in Notting Dale and Kensal New Town, but about how the media 
coverage of immigration was affecting the bottom line of more affluent neighbours, and how in 
turn this was affecting Conservative fortunes. The distinction between the actions taken by the 
residents of Price Street and Moore-Brabazon reflects the divergence outlined above between 
working-class and middle-class activists, but both parties arrived at their complaints on the 
grounds that immigrants made poor neighbours.  
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By the 1960s, government and party policies were beginning to reflect the concerns about 
household management outlined by frustrated constituents. A guidebook for recent immigrants 
published by the Bradford City Council in the 1960s was available in both English and Urdu.86 It 
listed services provided by the council specifically for immigrant populations and for residents in 
general. However, much of the content of the guide was given over to an explanation of daily life 
in Bradford and the expectations that were demanded of new residents. Only certain types of 
heating implements were permitted in British homes; paraffin heaters were deemed too unsafe. 
Rice, waste fat, tea-leaves and cloth ought not to be deposited in the water-closet. Household 
refuse should be placed in dustbins and left out for collection in order to avoid “[u]npleasant 
smells.”87 The guide noted tuberculosis as a particular risk of moving to a colder climate, and 
provided lengthy instructions for testing and prevention services. Immigrant children were 
entitled to a place in schools, but parents ought not to expect that the school in which their 
children were placed would be anywhere near their home, or that parents would be able to 
influence the placement of their children. Though perhaps published in a spirit of inclusion, that 
inclusion was tempered by a strong desire to constrain immigrant behaviour to an appropriate, 
British standard. So, “Commonwealth citizens have the same privileges and rights as everyone 
else in this country, but must obey the laws of the land.”88 Perhaps more importantly, and less 
formally, they must modify their actions and expectations so as not to place an undue burden 
upon the structures already in place, as it was made clear that their presence would not result in 
much change to the way things were already done. 
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As referenced in chapter three, a study conducted by the West Midlands Conservative 
Political Centre Study Group in 1962 devoted itself to assessing the impact of immigration upon 
the region. The authors of the study noted that  
One of the consequences of overcrowding in a district is a distinct lowering in the 
standard of appearance of the houses and gardens. Broken windows patched with 
cardboard are common; light shades are noticeably absent…The streets become littered; 
paint peels from the woodwork of houses; garden gates are broken or removed. An 
atmosphere of hopeless decay settles on the district. Some houses do literally stink and 
the persistent smell of unusual cooking does offend. Many occupiers of nearby houses 
feel that they cannot struggle to maintain proper standards and move out as soon as they 
can…overcrowded houses are certain to be neglected and stand like rotten stumps, 
infecting with decay surrounding houses, streets and districts.89  
 
The study continued: “The awareness of undesirable conditions in which these people live 
heightens the revulsion of the indigenous population and makes integration more 
difficult…Noisy late-night parties held by West Indians cause widespread resentment amongst 
Birmingham’s working population. People also resent the dumping of domestic rubbish in front 
gardens, which causes serious deterioration in the appearance of streets.”90 Wendy Webster notes 
that when Sheila Patterson wrote her watershed 1963 study of West Indian immigrants in 
Brixton, Dark Strangers, she “also focused on domestic boundary-markers—clean lace curtains, 
clean windows, neat house fronts, washed front steps—that stood for what she called ‘our 
ways—a conformity to certain standards of order, cleanliness, quietness, privacy and propriety’. 
She noted that ‘no immigrant group has in the mass so signally failed to conform to these 
expectations and patterns as have the West Indians’.”91 The chief distinction between anti-
immigrationists and these commentators was not whether or not immigrants should be permitted 
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to maintain culturally distinct practices, but whether or not they should be permitted to stay. 
Insofar as many women’s concerns about immigration related to immigrants’ capacity to 
assimilate into British society, they were supported in this line of argument by government 
agencies, political parties, and academics. Assimilation was not an option but a condition of 
membership in the British polity. 
III  
 
The work of assimilation did, however, fall disproportionately upon immigrant women. 
Immigrant behaviour was called into question not only when it violated the norms of appropriate 
household management but also when it appeared that immigrants did not conform to the British 
standard of family management and creation. In April 1968 Mrs. J. Willoughby of Coventry 
wrote to inform her MP that she had sent a petition to Enoch Powell supporting his stance on 
immigration following the “Rivers of Blood” speech. She noted that “apart from myself all the 
signatories are young women in their early twenties, some are married and some are about to 
marry and like myself are neither Racialist nor Fascist or [sic] suffering from hysteria,” but 
rather felt pity for people whose hardship was brought upon them “by ignorance and archaic 
customs, for instance their polygamy, child brides and arranged marriages, customs completely 
alien to the British way of life.”92 She continued that she and her husband had been married for 
twenty years and had only one child, a son, because they had wanted to limit the size of their 
family to better provide materially for their child. Indeed, “we are like all the other working 
people who elected the Labour Government, we were under the impression we were working to 
help our own exploited underprivileged, we were not told then we were expected to hold open 
                                                          





house.”93 Unlike immigrants, she argued, “[b]oth my husband and I work to buy our own home 
and support our own child we take nothing from the state and like most of our fellow country 
men and women we pay our taxes honestly, the least we expect is education for our children but 
apparently even that is too much to ask, from politicians we were stupid enough to believe in.”94 
Mrs. Willoughby’s objection to immigration was rooted in a very specific vision of the 
“right” way to build a family.95 This family would be nuclear and live in a single family home, 
which would be purpose built and put to appropriate use. Unlike Mrs. Willoughby, the ideal 
mother in this family would likely stay at home to tend her children and house, but would still 
participate in the civic life of the area by cultivating friendships with neighbours and attending 
appropriate social functions. Their children would live with their mother and father and attend 
school, and would not work until they had reached an appropriate age to do so. Critics claimed 
that immigrant communities failed to meet these standards, although in different ways. The 
National Chairman of the Young Conservatives concluded that immigrant children often 
struggled, particularly with their education, due to “[p]roblems caused by the prevalance [sic] of 
working mothers in West Indian families and by multi-occupation,” the latter of which was also 
common in South Asian families.96 He went on to note that  
Welfare provision in the U.K. is geared up to the nuclear family while in contrast to this 
the ethnic family unit is of an extended type. This type of family structure has come 
under great pressure within our society since the economic well being of the family unit 
depends too often upon the mother as well as the father having to work. This has caused a 
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consequential reduction in the control parents have over their children and the result has 
been a larger number of homeless and rootless and increasing fragmentation of the family 
unit. A considerable strain is then placed on welfare services which at present cannot 
cope with the problems of black families.97  
 
The Conservative Commonwealth Council also addressed the problem of working mothers. They 
argued that greater support was needed for such women, particularly in the form of “crèches, 
baby-minders and nurseries.”98 According to the Department of Health and Social Services, West 
Indian mothers were particularly likely to be employed outside the home, and if they were to be 
expected to assimilate to British society they would have to overcome the problems of 
insufficient child minding and of absent fathers, particularly given the prevalence of common 
law marriage within this community.99 Both the Conservative Party and the bureaucracy agreed 
that the current system in which West Indian women worked and left their children with minimal 
supervision, either due to the absence of fathers or other family members who might be called 
upon, was untenable and ought to be changed swiftly. 
At the 1978 Conservative Party conference MP Keith Speed, speaking on behalf of the 
government in support of a motion rejecting the tenets of the National Front and extremist 
organizations, took the opportunity to observe that “[t]he vast majority of wives and children 
entering Britain now as immigrants do not speak English. That holds the children back in their 
education and makes it difficult for the adults to get jobs. Inability to speak the language can 
isolate the mother entirely from the community and from would-be friends of different races.”100 
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This was evidently a reference to the South Asian community, in which native English language 
skills were less frequently found among first-generation immigrants in comparison to those from 
the West Indies. South Asian mothers were also more likely to stay home with their children, 
rather than going out to work as West Indian mothers did, but this meant that they had little 
opportunity to improve their English. Officials at the Department of Health and Social Services 
had similar complaints about the burden placed on services by South Asians, due both to 
women’s poor English and cultural differences: “They prefer women doctors and need special 
health visitors, interpreters and time for interviews.”101 Officials observed that the rarity of 
working women in South Asian communities meant that “[c]hildren are generally well cared for 
in their homes,” but that there were further “special problems” caused by “all-male households 
and the habit of communal living when several branches of a family live together in a small 
over-crowded house. These problems throw extra burdens on public health inspectors.”102 The 
isolation of South Asian mothers was as aberrant as the tendency of West Indian mothers to 
leave their children alone to go to work, not least because both were perceived to have a negative 
impact on the children themselves. West Indian mothers were too much in the world; South 
Asian mothers were not enough in the world. In their study of the impact of immigration upon 
welfare and social services the Five West Midlands County Boroughs Joint Committee reported 
that child care officers devoted a disproportionate amount of their efforts to the care of 
immigrant children due to “the health of children or of mothers suffering because of living 
conditions; where immigrant fathers do not accept responsibility for the practical care of their 
                                                          
 







children; where children join parents here and there may follow a virtual rejection of one for the 
other; and where children of immigrant parents are in care of private foster mothers and daily 
minders.”103 The committee also noted that in Birmingham immigrant children made up 50% of 
short term admissions to the care system and 30% of medium and long term admissions, 
reflecting a trend by which a disproportionate number of immigrant children also appeared in 
children’s homes, before a juvenile court, and in remand homes across the West Midlands.104 
This disproportionate level of intervention in the lives of immigrant families reflected the extent 
to which immigrant families did not meet the ideals expected of them. Even as British society 
transformed around them,105 immigrant families were held to a standard emphasizing a 
particular, conservative view of the right way to build a family, and were almost universally 
found to have failed. 
Critics saw the conduct of immigrant women as unacceptable on a number of levels. The 
first was, evidently, their household management. Their manner of behaving in public, 
particularly differences in dress and customs regarding speaking to non-family members, were 
called into question by native Britons. Even for those who supported ongoing immigration to the 
UK, complaints about dress code violations were relatively common. Indeed, one race relations 
expert noted that concerns that had been raised about dhoti, loose trousers worn by some female 
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students, were a result of female teachers’ worries that such clothing represented a form of 
discrimination against the students.106 Critics also frequently expressed anxiety about the 
violation of sexual norms. Family creation evidently has a great deal to do with norms regarding 
appropriate sexual conduct. A number of scholars have drawn attention to the ongoing 
prevalence of fears about miscegenation in this period.107 This was certainly a concern among 
anti-immigrationist circles, particularly in the early years of New Commonwealth migration. 
Anti-immigrationists objected most frequently not simply to sexual intercourse between mixed 
race couples, but to the creation of mixed race babies. One male resident of Kensington wrote in 
1958 that “[q]uite frankly white people have lots to lose from mixed marriages – the production 
not of white skinned ‘English roses’, but of coloured people with thick lips, fuzzy hair and rather 
bulbous eyes…ours is the more civilized appearance.”108 Another male constituent from 
Peckham, a self-described “red hot Conservative since the Boer War era,” wrote to Harold 
Macmillan in 1957 with an inquiry: “I was just wondering Sir how many putty coloured kids will 
be floating about in a few months?”109 Eugenicist statements about the dilution of British “stock” 
by intermarriage and multiracial children were no longer the most prominent or widely 
articulated anti-immigrationist concerns by the 1960s, but these examples highlight that these 
ideas were still circulating in anti-immigrationist circles, and that they were articulated using a 
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mode of expression which some individuals felt was reconcilable with more mainstream 
conservative principles. 
Anti-immigrationist groups were also deeply concerned with sexual health and hygiene. 
Critics made much of the increased rates of venereal disease found among West Indian migrants 
in the Midlands (although South Asian men were congratulated for their comparatively low 
rates).110 Along with references to VD, these critics frequently asserted that increased 
populations of migrants concentrated in a particular geographic area led to a significant rise in 
prostitution in the same area. In one fell swoop, anti-immigrationists suggested that not only 
were immigrants diseased in their bodies, they were also spreading moral illness among the 
“host” population. The West Midlands Conservative Political Centre Study Group reported that 
between 1952 and 1958 the rate of gonorrhoea had increased by 54% across the UK.111 The 
report further argued that “[w]hilst the ordinary population were responsible for a good part of 
this heavy increase, the 1958 figures show that there were thirty-six cases of similar infection 
amongst every 1,000 West Indians, a rate of infection well above that of the indigenous 
population,” noting that the absence of immigrant women within these communities resulted in 
increased congress with prostitutes (indeed, the report surmised that white prostitutes in the 
Balsall Heath area were to blame for the spread of gonorrhoea through the neighbouring 
immigrant communities).112 The report’s authors concluded that “[c]oncern must be caused by 
this obvious social deterioration.”113  
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Concerns about this kind of “social deterioration” sparked yet more action by anti-
immigrationist groups in the West Midlands. In Smethwick in 1961, vigilante groups were 
established to patrol the Spon Lane area as an unofficial “vice patrol.” Coordinated by Donald 
Finney, the founder of the Smethwick branch of the Birmingham Immigration Control 
Association, the patrols were a response to rumours that the area had become a hotbed of sexual 
misconduct: “[s]everal white residents pointed accusing fingers at nearby houses where coloured 
people lived and told of ‘wild parties’ being held until the small hours with ‘numerous white 
girls’ and ‘deafening’ music.”114 One local woman informed a reporter from the Smethwick 
Telephone that she had been solicited by an Indian man to “earn some money”; another woman 
lamented that if she was not able to move away from the area soon, with its bottle fights and 
young girls being chased by immigrant men, she would have a nervous breakdown.115 The 
reporter was skeptical of his informants, chiefly working-class residents of small homes in the 
area, suggesting that “on a damp and dismal Wednesday night, I found about as much of it [vice] 
as one would find at a vicarage tea-party.”116 But “local gossip” indicated that it was on the 
weekends that most events occurred, and as discussed in chapter three, even gossip that is not 
entirely founded on reality has the power to shape perceptions. 
IV  
 
While the British state and society may have been equivocal about the role of women as active 
citizens, they did not hesitate to endorse a gendered view of immigration. Anti-immigrationists’ 
greatest success in this arena was not the encouragement of direct participation in politics by 
                                                          








anti-immigrationist women, but rather state support for a view of the British family that closely 
mapped on to that proposed by anti-immigrationists. The entire system of immigration to the UK 
throughout this period was premised on a male-breadwinner model of society.117 Insofar as 
officials expected chain migration to occur, males of working age were expected to arrive in the 
UK, work for some time while sending remittances to their families in their country of origin, 
and attempt to secure accommodation for the whole of their family in anticipation of their 
arrival. All legislation on immigration through this period was written on the basis of the 
assumption that applicants for admission vouchers would be exclusively male.118 Legislation on 
the admission of dependants spoke almost exclusively of wives and children, with no mention of 
husbands. It was not particularly innovative to base a set of legislation on the assumption that 
men would serve as breadwinners; indeed, the welfare state had been developed on the basis of 
the same assumption.119 State-funded unemployment benefit from the early twentieth century 
onward was based on the premise that women were mothers, not workers, even when they did 
leave the house to earn a wage.120 A particular vision of nuclear families led by wage-earning 
men, then, underpinned a substantial body of legal and policy-related thinking. 
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As suggested in chapter three, anti-immigrationists and the state alike were attentive to 
the admission of dependents, and this topic was one of the chief sources of anti-immigrationist 
ire following the 1962 and 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Acts. The government 
increasingly limited the entry of immigrants by reducing the number of vouchers available on an 
annual basis, and used the number issued as the measure of incoming migrants, which evidently 
showed a net decrease over the course of the decade. Anti-immigrationists, however, emphasized 
that in fact each voucher issued could represent many more individuals entering the country as 
male immigrants brought family members to join them after establishing themselves 
economically. It was impossible to know exactly how many people would eventually join a 
family unit in the UK, or when such a reunion would happen, as male migrants would often live 
alone in the UK for months or years before saving the necessary funds to pay for family 
members’ journeys. Much of this debate was based on the general perception that “a proportion 
of dependants, who join settled immigrants, are in fact distant relations or no relation at all.”121 
The possibility that family relationships might be falsified in order to gain entry to the UK 
violated ideals both about the appropriate process for being admitted to the country, and about 
participating in family structures. A 1965 White Paper outlined one proposal for handling this 
issue which would require dependents “to obtain an entry certificate in their country of origin on 
the basis of a declaration made by the bread-winner on receipt of his voucher.”122 This policy, 
generated by the Labour government, was also supported by the Conservatives. By 1966, 
however, the emphasis had changed from entry certificates to the registry of dependents debated 
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in chapter three. The 1966 proposal would “[r]equire all immigrants to register the names of any 
dependants who might at any time wish to join them, so that their numbers will be known. In the 
case of new immigrants the number of dependants will be an important factor in deciding 
whether entry will be permitted.”123  
By the time Conservative MP William Whitelaw came to embrace the concept of a 
registry policy-makers were proposing that dependents whose head of household had arrived 
prior to 1973 would only be permitted to enter the country if the head of household had placed 
their name on the register prior to a specified closing date.124 Offering a rationale for the 
dependents registry, Indarjit Singh suggested that “[a] majority category of immigrants is the 
dependant,”125 and argued that the adoption of a registry would “assuage fears and minimise the 
possibility of illegal entry.”126 Conservative officials also proposed further restrictions on the 
categories of individuals eligible for entry as dependents: “Heads of household should be 
allowed to enter only one wife; and while there may be exceptional circumstances in which 
children over 18 and under 25, and parents over 65 should be allowed to come into the country 
on compassionate grounds, their applications should be dealt with separately, at the Home 
Secretary’s discretion.”127 While senior party staffers suggested that the government might 
eventually relax restrictions on the admission of aged parents and grand-parents, staff at the 
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Conservative Research Department were nonetheless told that they should expect to be “pressed 
on the inhumanity of this particular proposal.”128 Questions of legitimate family relationships 
and appropriate and desirable family size and structure were thus fundamental factors in shaping 
state policy, and not simply the isolated concern of anti-immigrationists.  
Fiancés and fiancées created particular challenges for officials since they could not, by 
definition, be added to a dependents register which required names to be added in advance of a 
set deadline.129 The debate over the entry of male fiancés indicates the extent to which male-
breadwinner models permeated immigration legislation and policy. The admission of fiancés and 
fiancées was a matter of policy and thus could be altered by the government without bringing a 
bill before the House. In the late 1970s, the Labour party altered the existing policy so that 
foreign men engaged to women legally settled in the UK would be eligible for admission to the 
UK as dependants. Women engaged to men legally settled in the UK were already eligible for 
visas, so the policy change introduced by Labour simply made the provision available to both 
genders. However, after Home Secretary Merlyn Rees concluded that substantial abuse was 
being made of the provision for the purposes of admitting, ostensibly for the purposes of 
arranged marriage, primarily Asian men who never intended to reside with their wives, the 
provision for automatically admitting male fiancés was suspended in 1977.130 Men who wished 
to obtain visas by marriage to a British woman instead had to satisfy conditions for entry, as well 
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as serve a “probationary period of married residence” in order to qualify.131 No secret was made 
of the fact that “[t]he abuse of the arranged marriage tradition” was the root of the problem. The 
South Asian community was held to be most likely to participate in this practice, despite the 
claim that the 1977 prohibition had been a response to “substantial abuse of the spirit of 
immigration rules by men from a wide variety of nationalities who were gaining permanent 
settlement on the basis of marriages of dubious validity.”132 Indeed, different rules were applied 
for women who were born in the UK and those who were not, and the agreed policy was that 
“entry should not normally be granted under the Rules to the husbands or fiances [sic] of non-
U.K. born women. Such cases will be dealt with by ministerial discretion outsied [sic] the 
Rules,”133 effectively giving the Home Secretary veto power over the marriages of immigrant 
women to non-British men. 
Nick True outlined the grounds for the exclusion of male fiancés as the Conservative 
Party saw it: “On the question of sex we discriminate undeniably. However, I am wholly 
unrepentant in this area and believe that we should argue that the exclusion of fiancés is…in 
accordance with the historic traditions of Europe and the Indian sub-continent which guide us to 
the expectation that the abode of the husband in a marriage should be the natural abode of the 
wife and presumably of any ensuing family.”134 Conservative officials also assumed that, on the 
male-breadwinner model of immigration, a man who gained entry as a fiancé would 
subsequently be eligible to set in motion a new series of chain migration, eventually bringing his 
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extended family to the UK to join him.135 One female correspondent to the Conservative Party 
objected to the exclusion of male fiancés from government admission policies. In a letter to Lord 
Thorneycroft, Mrs. Reid wrote “where has that precious Freedom of Choice gone to if we must 
now tell our daughters, so carefully educated under their Mother’s watchful eye in order to 
obtain the optimism from her attention & encouraged to travel far & wide in the world as an 
Ambassadress of this great nation in her chosen career; that she (unlike her brother) may only 
choose her partner in life from a few European nations, for if not she will become an exile. What 
hypocrisy!”136 Evidently, Mrs. Reid’s objection was on behalf of British-born, and presumably 
white, women. She was less concerned with the capacity to maintain chain migration than she 
was to establish the rights of British women as equal to those of British men. Her objection 
emerged from concern for her gender, not for the rights of immigrant women much more likely 
to avail themselves of such a policy change. Indeed, the response she received reassured her on 
these grounds alone: “The Conservative Government has indicated it has no intention of 
obstructing the entry and settlement of the husbands and fiancés of British born women…the 
undoubted abuse of marriage purely as a means of gaining permanent settlement in this country, 
requires that some element of discretionary control should be retained by the Home Office in 
certain cases. This abuse was recognised as occurring in the Asian community by Mr. Callaghan 
in 1969.”137 In the government’s view, the need to eliminate “illegitimate” marriages, and by 
consequence illegitimate migration, was the focus of the policy, and the intervention of the state 
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in immigrant marriages was both necessary and fair, while such interference in the relationships 
of British-born women was neither necessary nor desirable. 
As late as 1975, a brief circulated by the Conservative Research Department argued that 
“[a]buse of regulations covering dependants and spouses is often believed to have contributed 
significantly to the rise in the number of dependants admitted. No figures are available to suggest 
the size of any such problem.”138 The perception that dependents were a significant source of 
illegal, or at least undesirable, settlement in the UK came into conflict with anti-immigrationists’ 
emphasis on the central importance of the family in British life, and produced something of a 
dilemma. On one hand, allowing men who had settled and found employment in the UK to bring 
their wives, children, and potentially other family members to stay with them would necessarily 
entail an increase in the population. Indeed, one of the most strident arguments against 
immigration was targeted at precisely those family members who were deemed tangential to the 
nuclear family unit and who presented a significant burden to the welfare state, notably elderly 
grandparents.139 On the other hand, it was common practice for newly arrived men to live 
together, often with other men from their extended families, in “bachelor” households.140 This 
arrangement struck some commentators as unnatural and potentially immoral, as a household 
without women would necessarily suffer from low standards of housekeeping, as well as being 
drawn to prostitution.141 
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Beyond these objections, the arrival of dependents prompted concerns because it 
indicated that the first wave of immigrants intended to stay and make their lives in Britain. 
Initially, many had assumed that migration to Britain was a temporary phenomenon: men would 
work, save money, and return to their countries of origin. The realization that immigration was in 
fact a process of permanent settlement was part of the transition in official circles from policies 
addressing the “immigrant problem” to “race relations,” as immigrant families increasingly 
included children born in the UK. By 1978 Indarjit Singh was cautioning that “[t]hose settled 
here from the New Commonwealth, particularly those born here, should no longer be given the 
permanent and stigmatic [sic] label ‘immigrant’. This is not done to people with a lesser pigment 
of the skin. Those that have British citizenship should be termed ‘British’; others that are in the 
process of doing so or have otherwise made their home here are settlers.”142 This shift was not 
simply rhetorical but conceptual, and its effect upon both official and anti-immigrationist 
thinking on policy should not be underestimated.  
V  
 
At the heart of many social movements is a core of individuals who perform the often forgotten, 
thankless tasks of political organizing. Delivering pamphlets, stuffing envelopes, and writing 
letters are mindless, repetitive drudgery, but are essential to modern political campaigning. Such 
tasks are often delegated to the less powerful or privileged among activist ranks. The anti-
immigrationists benefited from the support of a significant number of individuals belonging to a 
demographic that was not only disempowered, but very accustomed to mindless, thankless 
drudgery: housewives. The most famous, or perhaps infamous, instance of housewife 
                                                          
142 Indarjit Singh, “Strangers in our midst,” Anglo Asian Conservative Society (London: Grenadier Press, May 




involvement in anti-immigrationism was the activism of the housewives of Marshall Street. As 
one of the key episodes during the 1964-1966 tenure of Peter Griffiths as MP for Smethwick, it 
has become emblematic of a certain kind of grassroots racism.143 Reconstructing this episode 
illuminates important facets of women’s participation in the anti-immigrationist movement and 
underscores several of the themes evident in elite responses to women’s activism. It also 
highlights the limitations of women’s activism, revealing that it was the gendered nature of anti-
immigrationist complaints, rather than the actual participation of women, that was most 
successful. 
Peter Griffiths worked hard to market himself as a parliamentarian noted for his 
“common touch,” and indeed concerned constituents solicited his support for what became one 
of his most public pet projects. Since 1961, residents of Smethwick had been expressing 
concerns about the creation of ghettos, and consequently local anti-immigrationists had 
supported moves to prevent immigrant families from purchasing homes in a geographically 
concentrated fashion.144 In late 1964 a group of housewives got in touch with the local council in 
Smethwick. Their concern, they said, was with Marshall Street, as they claimed that too many 
immigrants were moving to the area, creating the danger that it might soon become a ghetto. 
They proposed a simple solution: the council should simply buy up available houses on the street 
and refuse to either let or sell them to immigrants, in order to maintain some form of parity 
between immigrant families and white families.  
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This was a cause Griffiths could get behind. In January 1965 he publicly endorsed the 
housewives. A photograph of him with the housewives appeared in the Times, grinning broadly 
amongst the (rather daunted-looking) women dressed in their Sunday best. This was printed on 9 
April, after a meeting had been conducted with the Minister for Housing in which the deputation 
of housewives sought the national government’s support for their project.145 The meeting did not 
go well. Not only did the minister, Richard Crossman, refuse to offer government support, he 
claimed that “they were difficult to talk to, and weren’t prepared to listen very much,” and that 
he was unable to hear his colleague, Mr. Mellish, speaking amongst the furore.146 The 
housewives, he suggested, were not behaving in a manner appropriate to a deputation of citizens 
appealing to a political figure. They were disorganized, loud, and immoderate in their 
expression. They were emotional where they ought to have been rational. In his rejection of the 
scheme, Crossman stated that “[t]he housewives of Smethwick have no great or more peculiar 
problem than people anywhere else in the country.”147 By framing the issue in this way, 
Crossman denied the validity of the women’s reaction to what they perceived as a matter of great 
political import, implying that they did not have the requisite political intelligence to make any 
claim against the state. 
Following Griffiths’ election, there was a rash of comments about those residents who 
had elected him, and what they must have been thinking when they voted as they did. This 
debate was prominent enough that the mayor of Smethwick was motivated to mount a public 
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defense.148 The people of Smethwick, he argued, had not been duped by Griffiths. They were not 
the target of a masterful political ploy by a subversive, marginal faction. They were informed 
citizens engaging in the democratic process in the same manner as electors in any other 
constituency during the election. In short, they were all the things that the press were beginning 
to say they were not. The Conservative Weekly News Letter went so far as to say that Wilson’s 
“parliamentary leper” remark had been calculated so that he “seemed to be denying the people of 
Smethwick their right to have the M.P. of their choice admitted to the corporate life of the House 
of Commons.”149 Reports began to circulate that some Smethwick residents became embarrassed 
in the months following the election. All the publicity had given them a bad name: they were 
associated with a man who was popularly affiliated with extreme right-wing groups and referred 
to in derogatory terms by the prime minister. Furthermore, their status as legitimate citizens of a 
democratic nation was being called into issue, both as a result of questions about whether that 
status had been exercised properly given the result it had produced, and also about whether, 
having produced this result, they remained entitled to the privileges citizenship conferred. 
The Marshall Street episode demonstrates the limitations of women’s involvement in the 
anti-immigrationist movement. From the critics’ perspective, the participation of housewives in 
this campaign was yet another reason to doubt the movement’s validity. Crossman’s framing of 
the women as over-excited, frantic in their desire to speak over each other, and incapable of 
presenting their case in a calm, orderly, rational fashion, sits within a long tradition of framing 
women as incapable of reason and critical thought, and prone instead to bouts of hysteria. It also, 
however, reinforces the critical framing of the entire anti-immigrationist movement as 
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embodying this brand of emotional hysteria.150 When Crossman’s aide Mellish spoke at the 1965 
Labour Party conference, he stated that “I come to this rostrum today, I hope, as one who is 
known to be no anti-racialist,” yet he still conceded that “[m]y name in Smethwick, I gather, is 
not all that friendly amongst some of the housewives.”151 Mellish’s objection was not to the 
content of anti-immigrationist objections in a general sense, but rather to the housewives 
specifically. The use of irrational, emotional women to make the anti-immigrationist case 
bolstered conclusions emphasizing the unreasonable nature of anti-immigrationist demands, and 
also reinforced certain perceptions about the role of political leadership in anti-immigrationist 
campaigns. To a critic, Griffiths could appear less as a concerned representative advancing the 
case of his constituents than as a canny political operative exploiting the irrationality of these 
women for his own electoral gain, possibly by inculcating them with misinformation and 
baseless rhetoric.152 During the height of interwar fascism in Britain, women campaigners were 
prized on the grounds that “women were considered best equipped to drive home a message with 
the utmost emotional charge.”153 But this power cut both ways: women’s emotionalism might be 
persuasive in certain contexts, particularly in appealing to other women, but it was also subject to 
criticism and minimization by men whose more “rational” approach trumped any such appeal. 
This dilemma is reflected in Beatrix Campbell’s argument that “wives were women’s conduit to 
the ear of their MP.”154 Women’s networks might be the most effective means of gaining access 
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to men in positions of political power, but this did not guarantee that their concerns would be 
treated with equal gravity as those proposed by men.  
That women were seen as peacemakers was evident in the December 1962 meeting 
between Jeannette Griffiths, Peter Griffiths’ wife, Mrs. Rai, wife of the president of the Indian 
Workers’ Association, and Mrs. Jouhl, wife of the IWA secretary. Mrs. Rai and Mrs. Jouhl were 
invited to the Griffiths’ for tea and a chat about marriage, children, and clothes.155 The meeting 
between the women was an attempt to smooth over the heated relationship between Peter 
Griffiths, then prospective parliamentary candidate for Smethwick, and the leadership of the 
IWA over a number of public remarks made by Griffiths. The symbolic meeting, emphasizing 
the common interests of women (marriage, children, and clothes), was meant to highlight the 
common plight of Griffiths and the IWA members as leaders, and defenders, of their 
communities, protecting the interests of their families. In the picture taken to commemorate the 
event, however, only Mrs. Griffiths is photographed flatteringly, the other two women caught 
mid-movement.156 The role of women, then, was conflictingly either to smooth troubled waters, 
or to maintain the status quo. Even if anti-immigrationist women endorsed a traditional view of 
gender roles, they ran up against the limitations of their own active citizenship and the 
curtailment of their participation as equal actors in political debates. The activism of women 
served, in some cases, as a valid excuse for those in positions of power to refuse to take the anti-
immigrationist cause seriously. 
VI 
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Assessing the emergence of Thatcherism, Beatrix Campbell argued that “[a]lthough the crisis 
over crime and immigration was once again articulated as law and order, the discourse of the 
revolt originated in the very architecture of commonsense: home meant many things; it meant 
England in her Empire and it meant housewives and houses and high streets…the perpetual 
themes were violence against women and children; the nature of national identity in a 
multinational society; the nature of homes and neighbourhoods; the crisis of the patriarchal 
family.”157 This overtly gendered view of the world was wholeheartedly endorsed by the anti-
immigrationist movement, and in adopting this position they enjoyed the support of the state. 
The enforcement of a traditional family in which women held a subordinate and domestic role 
worked to the advantage of the anti-immigrationist cause because of the extent to which it drew 
not only on this state support, but on a long history of separate spheres and domesticity, and also 
the networks and resources of a broader movement supporting moral conservatism that emerged 
in opposition to the counter-cultural movement. The connection between women and anti-
immigrationism in the context of this broader movement was part of what made it respectable. 
Middle aged housewives were not known to run about throwing bottles at brick walls. 
However, the active participation of women in the anti-immigrationist movement was 
less successful. Even in the context of a new brand of social movement, women’s capacity to be 
politically active in the same way as men was limited. Despite the role played by anti-
immigrationist women to legitimate the movement by their appeal to traditional gender norms, 
their very involvement in the movement made it possible for their appeals to be rejected by 
senior politicians who privileged a particular brand of political argument and engagement. 
Convictions about the sanctity of the nuclear family stymied efforts to stem the inflow of 
                                                          




immigrant populations, but similar ideals about the gendered power dynamics inherent in such a 
family model enabled elites to contain popular demands to curb these admissions. Female 
immigrants existed only as dependents. Female anti-immigrationists operated within the same 
paradigm. 
While all women who were involved in the anti-immigrationist movement were not 
actually housewives, the grounds for women’s objections to immigration were firmly rooted in a 
set of domestic concerns that contemporaries could frame as “women’s” issues. The restriction 
of the entry of male fiancés, for example, was widely considered unobjectionable because it 
bolstered, rather than compromised, these ideas about gender, particularly within the 
Conservative Party. The activism of women within the anti-immigrationist movement supports 
claims made about the conservative tendencies of women through most of the twentieth century, 
but it also highlights the limits of that activism, even within a conservative context. The 
constraints placed upon women as activists stymied the efforts of anti-immigrationists in a 
number of cases; their illegitimacy as political participants made it possible for elites to reject 
their appeals. The next chapter will assess how elite foreclosure of anti-immigrationism resulted, 
ultimately, in its collapse. 
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One of the most pressing questions facing historians of immigration is the apparent disconnect 
between the language and the actions of politicians at every rank with respect to immigration 
policy. As I have argued, anti-immigrationism’s success as a movement was premised upon the 
existence of a series of networks between grassroots individuals and politicians and policy-
makers. Yet, despite the degree to which anti-immigrationist policy infiltrated politics at all 
levels, including the introduction of increasingly, dramatically restrictive immigration policies, 
few of the most senior politicians at the national level ever spoke in the language used by the 
majority of anti-immigrationists. Few ever endorsed a view of immigration that did not recognize 
the right of some immigrants to take residence in the UK or which denied them the right to 
remain there even after the introduction of restrictive legislation. Elite politicians, particularly 
within the cabinet and equivalent positions, went to some pains to prevent the groundswell of 
opinion opposing immigration from being endorsed at the most senior level, and this desire to 
contain the influence of anti-immigrationist language was also evident among senior members of 
party organizations and high-ranking civil servants.1 While increasingly restrictive immigration 
legislation fulfilled many anti-immigrationist demands, its implementation was never couched in 
the language preferred and utilized by anti-immigrationists. 
 Chapter four outlined the restrictions faced by women anti-immigrationists on the 
grounds of their gender, despite the fact that their gender also functioned to legitimate anti-
immigrationism in a general sense. The anti-immigrationist movement as a whole also faced a 
                                                          
1 My use of the term “elite” throughout this chapter refers to senior members of each of these groups, some of whom 
would have been elected, as in the case of cabinet ministers, others of whom would have been appointed to their 
position as in the case of high-ranking employees of the Conservative Central Office. 
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similar paradox: during the period under study, a huge proportion of their legislative aims were 
met, notably the implementation of an almost absolute prohibition of migration from the non-
white countries of the New Commonwealth as well as an increase of targeted welfare spending 
by the central government directed towards areas of high immigrant population. While the 
proposals touted by those at the more extreme end of the anti-immigrationist spectrum, notably 
forced repatriation, were not implemented, the existing system of voluntary repatriation 
continued to be in place. Persistent scholarly framing of anti-immigrationist repatriation demands 
as extremist and fringe is likely due to a lack of awareness that this voluntary repatriation 
programme even existed. Certainly, the central government did not go to any great effort to 
publicize it, and in fact, as outlined in chapter one, some government officials actually felt it was 
important to repress knowledge of the programme for fear of the consequences that broader 
awareness would bring. This attitude is, indeed, typical of the central government’s attitude 
towards anti-immigrationism through this period and the source of the anti-immigrationists’ 
paradox. On one hand, anti-immigrationist demands were being met. On the other hand, very few 
at the highest levels of government would publicly refer to themselves as anti-immigrationist, 
and indeed many went to great lengths to deny any such identification of themselves. What is to 
be made of this? How is it that the central government could implement anti-immigrationist 
policy while rejecting the anti-immigrationist movement as a whole? 
 This chapter will examine the means by which large-scale, popular anti-immigrationist 
sentiments were contained. Controlling a branch of popular opinion that was bolstered by the 
support of select MPs and a large proportion of local government required careful planning, 
including the collection of data on public opinion and the circulation of elite-approved 
messaging. This included both public and party-specific opinion polls, as well as internal party 
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strategies to ensure that official policies were absorbed by members at the constituency level. 
This chapter will then assess the reasons why anti-immigrationism was controlled, including the 
spectre of America’s perceived struggle to govern a multi-racial population, the challenges posed 
by Cold War ethno-nationalist movements, and the emergence of the National Front as the group 
most strongly associated with anti-immigrationism despite their use of violent and illegal tactics. 
Elite rejection of anti-immigrationism as it was popularly articulated had a great deal to do with 
controlling the image of the party, and by extension the nation, and it was this desire to maintain 




Within political parties, there were tremendous pressures to ensure that the party elites and the 
grassroots membership were toeing the same party line. A modern party is meant to be united on 
any given political issue. The struggle to maintain this unity was evident at the 1965 Labour 
Party Conference, where an emergency resolution was introduced by John Fairhead which stated 
that “[t]his Conference urges the Government to withdraw the White Paper on Immigration from 
the Commonwealth (Cmd. 2739), believing this to be the expression of a surrender, however 
disguised, to the currents of illiberal opinion. Conference further requests the Government not to 
introduce legislation along the lines of this reactionary White Paper.”2 This attitude was in line 
with Labour’s earlier opposition to legislative controls on immigration, and reflected the spirit of 
the party’s refusal to support such restrictions. However, change was afoot. MP Roger Mellish, 
who had been so dismissive of the Smethwick housewives, said in response:  
 Is this Conference saying to me that I shall go as Parliamentary Secretary of Housing to 
Lambeth and say to Lambeth, who have got a waiting list of about 10,000 of their own 
                                                          
2 Labour Party Report of the 64th Annual Conference, Blackpool, 27 September-1 October 1965, 212, PHM. 
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people, ‘Nevertheless you will give a preference here to these coloureds who have come 
in, without any measure of assistance before, and you will give them this rehousing,’ 
which they rightly deserve? If you ask me to do that and you say this is a Socialist 
approach, I say to you frankly and firmly that I shall be asking Lambeth to create the 
most grievous racial disturbances we have ever seen in London and this is a fact.3  
 
The emergency resolution was defeated by a vote of 4,736,000 to 1,581,000 in a card vote.4 This 
resolution had generated havoc at the conference and indicated the depth of division within the 
party. In this case, the need to maintain law and order overwhelmed demands of principle to 
maintain an attitude of complete equality. White Papers were meant to function as detailed 
statements of the party’s position and proposed policies on a given issue; that the party 
membership called such a statement into question highlights the extent to which party solidarity 
was compromised by this issue. 
 Labour, of course, found themselves pulling their membership in the direction of a 
restrictive immigration control policy against the liberal impulses of select sections of their 
grassroots support, notably those groups supporting anti-racialist and anti-colonialist efforts. The 
Conservative Party by contrast was trying to push their membership to accept the fact that 
immigration was a permanent reality of life in Britain, and of the need for race relations 
legislation, against grassroots convictions that immigration needed to be reversed and the fabric 
of British society returned to its prewar composition. In both cases, the imperatives of 
governance had a major role to play in determining the stance of the party hierarchy and the 
nature of the demands that elite placed upon its membership. While the level of dissent within 
these two parties was substantial, the Trades Union Congress faced the deepest divide between 
the party hierarchy and membership on this issue. Moreover, unlike party elites, union leaders 
                                                          
3 Ibid., 217.  
 
4 The exceptionally high voting numbers can be accounted for by the fact that union representatives were permitted 
to cast votes on behalf of their entire membership. 
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could not marshal arguments about the need to maintain a politically viable plan in defense of 
either position.  
 Individuals who spoke at the Trades Union Congress annual meeting were typically 
senior representatives of their own union and were rarely shopfloor workers. As such, the 
statements given at the Congress generally reflected the views of the leadership. At the 1965 
TUC conference, Mr. W.G. Price of the National Union of Journalists, drawing attention to the 
absence of “coloured delegates” present at the conference, stated “I come here as a prospective 
parliamentary Labour candidate for a highly marginal seat in the West Midlands where it pays 
you to keep your mouth shut on immigration. To be a ‘nigger lover’ is fatal. I am ashamed to 
come here and say this, that in relation to immigration we have adopted apartheid, social and 
economic apartheid.”5 The preamble to the 1966 TUC Conference noted that “[i]n October the 
Minister of Labour was reminded of the previous correspondence and of the interest of the 
General Council in the development of a coherent immigration policy, and the difficulty of 
making useful comments in the absence of any continuing means of consultation on the 
underlying issues or of indications of the Government’s intentions on such matters as organised 
recruitment schemes.”6 The question of consultation was particularly thorny: the TUC could hold 
power on questions of immigration only insofar as it was granted by political representatives, 
even though from 1962 onwards immigration policy was premised in the first instance upon the 
prospective immigrant’s employment future. The TUC were eventually granted seats on the Race 
Relations Board conciliation committees, as well as an advisory role on the Community 
                                                          
5 TUC Report of the 97th Annual Trades Union Congress, Brighton, 6-10 September 1965, 542, PHM. 
 




Relations Commission, in 1969, but only after repeated requests to the government.7 Following 
this appointment the General Council “informed” affiliated unions that racial discrimination in 
employment was unlawful under the terms of the Race Relations Act.8 
 Mr. J.A. Peel of the National Union of Dyers, Bleachers & Textile Workers highlighted 
the conflict faced by union representative with the statement that “[e]very sensible and civilised 
person deplores racial discrimination at least in principle. The crunch really comes when you try 
to look at the practical application, which is really soul searching. Would you, for example, have 
a coloured immigrant as a foreman or shop steward, or would you let your children play with 
those of a coloured immigrant, or would you live next door to a coloured immigrant?”9 As the 
seventies and recession crept closer, TUC member antipathy towards immigration increased, and 
was progressively more reflected in the reports given even by union representatives who were 
not sympathetic to such views themselves. By the 1976 Congress, Mr. K. Thomas (Civil and 
Public Services’ Association) stated that “[w]e are aware of the difficulties we face in 
overcoming deeply ingrained feelings. My Executive Committee recently published anti-racialist 
material to our branches, and the response was very mixed.”10 The debate on race relations 
policy at the 1976 Congress was one of the longest on the subject in the TUC’s history, and 
reflected the strength of the divisions faced by union leaders within their respective 
memberships. All the speakers drew connections between the availability of jobs, the strength of 
the economy, and the existence of discrimination, as well as frequent comparisons to the 
outbreak of fascism in interwar Germany. It is clear that union leaders were fearful of where 
                                                          
7 TUC Report of the 101st Annual Trades Union Congress, Portsmouth, 1-5 September, 1969, 374-5, PHM. 
 
8 Ibid.  
 
9 TUC Report of the 99th Annual Trades Union Congress, Brighton. 4-8 September 1967, 587, PHM. 
 
10 TUC Report of the 108th Annual Trades Union Congress, Brighton, 6-8 September 1976, 465, PHM. 
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their members’ sympathies might lead them, but also that, in the face of a shifting economic 
climate, it was a difficult set of convictions to dislodge. Mr. C.D. Grieve of the Tobacco 
Workers’ Union observed that “[w]ith the present situation of inflation in Britain, scapegoats are 
looked for. You hear people who would seem to be reasonable, normal citizens mouthing phrases 
like ‘Send the blacks home. They are taking our jobs. They are taking our houses.’ How 
ludicrous can you get? Unfortunately I bet each one of us in this hall knows someone like that.”11 
The challenge both for the TUC leaders, and for the elites in the mainstream political parties, was 
how to reconcile the distance between their own potentially conflicting convictions and political 
imperatives, and those of the grassroots membership. A range of tools were used to assess these 




Electoral politics had always had something to do with public image, but in the era of mass 
enfranchisement and mass communications, modern political campaigning took on a new guise. 
Politicians no longer gave their responses to political crises on the floor of the Commons, or 
even in the pages of the Times, but to an ITV cameraman on the street outside their home.12 In 
order for politicians to exercise control over a political issue, they needed to have a good idea of 
what popular opinion on that subject was. Opinion polls were widely used by contemporaries as 
a methods of gauging popular opinion.13 Despite the increased role of polling in politics in 
                                                          
11 Ibid.  
 
12 See for example “Bomb Attack on the Home of Peter Griffiths, Smethwick MP,” 1 November 1965, 
ATV/1965/10, Sandwell Community History and Archives Service. 
 
13 For the American example, see Sarah E. Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens and the Making of a 




general, opinion polling on immigration was shockingly rare. That it was so haphazardly 
conducted suggests the high degree of confusion and opacity that surrounded the whole question 
of immigration, but it also underscores elites’ concern that they did not have access to the 
opinions of “real people” and a fixation with obtaining them. Those who concerned themselves 
with the collection of opinion data on immigration, like those responsible for statistics on 
immigration itself, constantly lamented the lack of information, and insisted that further research 
and inquiries were necessary in order to have a full picture of the situation on the ground.  
 The Conservative Party internally circulated Public Opinion Surveys based on a collation 
of reports received from constituencies about the issues that were of greatest “anxiety” and 
“encouragement;” that is, which issues constituents were thinking about positively and which 
were causing consternation. There is no information to indicate what method was used to collect 
or collate the information, but it seems likely that this was both ad hoc and anecdotal; a note was 
made on a number of the surveys that “[t]he opinions expressed below are verbatim and direct 
reports received from the Constituencies.”14 No information is provided about how the 
constituencies came to possess this knowledge, though it was likely circulated through the 
Conservative Agent for the area.  The Conservative Central Office did occasionally issue 
questionnaires to constituencies requesting information on specific topics, accompanied by 
instructions on how to go about obtaining this information.15 The increase of immigrant 
populations, notably West Indians, was noted in polls repeatedly through 1955, with the report 
for 26 January 1955 indicating that “[t]he influx into this country of West Indians is causing 
                                                          
14 Certainly, there is no indication that the party or its members were terribly concerned with what academic 
researchers would term ‘methodology,’ and there is no evidence of any efforts to ensure consistency across 
constituencies, or of self-conscious selection of poll respondents.  
 
15 There is again no explicit indication of how the CCO determined which questions to ask, or who decided how 
they ought to be phrased. 
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increasing concern among all parties. Norwood reports that Socialist propaganda is suggesting 
that ‘the Government is importing Jamaicans to get cheap labour to work transport in the event 
of a general strike’.” 16 Further reports contained similar concerns about the concentration of 
immigrants in the Midlands in December 1955.17 Immigrants typically fell at the bottom of the 
list of causes for “anxiety” in 1955; by 1956, immigration had begun to climb through the 
ranking, and continued to do so over subsequent years.  
 The Conservative Party also conducted a number of limited polls for their own purposes, 
chiefly in the run-up to a general or local election. These polls frequently had a sample size of 
around 200 respondents, and little information is available about the method for selecting 
respondents.18 The polls were conducted in person, and respondents were often provided with 
multiple choice format questions. One such survey of Bradford North and West constituencies in 
1969 identified immigration as the chief concern for constituents.19 Respondents were apparently 
reluctant to state their opposition outright, with polling staff noting that people would offer 
immigration as an answer to open questions only if it was first mentioned by the polling agent. 
However, immigration emerged as one of the issues that constituents felt was most badly 
mishandled by the Government, and a particular concern for local residents.20 Controlling 
immigration ranked fourth overall on the list of most important issues for people and their 
                                                          
16 “Summary of Reports on Public Opinion up to 29th January, 1955,” CCO 4/6/336 Public Opinion Surveys 1954-
6, CPA. 
 
17 Ibid.  
 
18 Again, the method adopted by the Conservative Party on these surveys would likely not stand up to present-day 
academic scrutiny. 
 
19 “A Survey On: The Constituencies of Bradford N. & W,” Carried Out for CCO by Opinion Research Centre 
ORC/400 Fieldwork 4-10 June 1969, CCO 180/35/1/12 Public Opinion Surveys, CPA. 
 




families.21 Both this survey and one conducted in Halifax, also in 1969, stated explicitly that they 
were not meant as a detailed guide to public opinion, but rather “to give guidance to those who 
will be involved in fighting the next General Election Campaign in this constituency.”22 A 
survey of Nottingham South in 1969 also noted a discrepancy between the way respondents 
answered questions when posed openly, and when they were provided with a list of potential 
answers.23 Unlike the respondents in Bradford, respondents in Nottingham were more likely to 
name immigration as a chief concern if the question was posed openly than if they were provided 
with a list of options.24   
 The survey conducted in Walsall South in August 1978 had 213 respondents, and the 
report noted that “[c]ontrolling immigration is the issue on which the policies of the parties are 
most likely to be seen as different.”25 Over half the electors polled opposed further immigration, 
and “[n]early two thirds of the electors of Walsall South agree that it is local issues rather than 
national ones which influence their voting…The most pressing local problems in the 
constituency are immigration, vandalism and inadequate council housing.”26 41% of those polled 
deemed controlling immigration one of the most important problems, second only to 
unemployment at 44%.27 Most significantly for the party, the survey revealed that immigration 
                                                          
21 Ibid.  
 
22 “A Survey On: Constituency of Halifax,” Carried out for CCO by Opinion Research Centre ORC/402 Fieldwork 
22-28 May 1969, CCO 180/35/1/48 Public Opinion Surveys, CPA. 
 
23 “A survey on: The Constituency of Nottingham South,” Carried out for Conservative Central Office by Opinion 
Research Centre ORC/449 Fieldwork 18-24 June 1969, CCO 180/35/1/82 Public Opinion Surveys, CPA. 
 
24 Ibid.  
 
25 “Walsall South survey of parliamentary constituency,” Prepared for CCO (CRD) by Opinion Research Centre. 
47890/CTB, p. 1, CCO 180/35/1/123 Public Opinion Surveys, CPA. 
 
26 Ibid., p. 2. 
 
27 Ibid., Table 1. 
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was seen as the most important issue where there was “a big difference between what a 
Conservative Government and what a Labour Government would do.”28 Since the poll had not 
been conducted during an election campaign, “[r]espondents were asked which party they would 
support for classification purposes only.”29 Evidently, the party felt that the collection of 
information on potential future election issues was useful enough to be worth the time and 
expenditure outside of election campaigns. 
 A similar report conducted in Birmingham Stechford in 1977 was in fact undertaken in 
the run-up to a by-election.30 The report again noted that controlling immigration was the issue 
on which the Conservatives were most clearly deemed to outperform the other parties, although 
the chief concerns in the area had more to do with the cost of living and local problems with 
vandalism and hooliganism.31  Despite the fact that immigration was not a pressing concern, 
“[t]hree quarters of the electors felt that no more immigrants should be allowed into the country. 
One fifth were prepared to allow in the families of those who are already settled here. Only one 
in twenty thought more immigrants should be allowed into the country if they have jobs to go to 
and almost none (1%) thought that there should be no restrictions on immigration.”32 In spite of 
high levels of support for anti-immigrationist policies, 58% reported that they would be 
                                                          
 
28 Ibid., p. 10. 
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30 “A Report on a Survey of the Parliamentary Constituency of Birmingham Stechford,” JC7607 CTB/JAW 
Prepared for CCO (CRD) by Opinion Research Centre, January 1977, CCO 180/35/1/121 Public Opinion Surveys, 
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displeased if the National Front won the by-election, reflecting popular reluctance to endorse 
violently extremist methods of addressing immigration.33  
 As ever, a concern with immigration did not fall along strictly partisan lines. In a brief 
prepared for the Labour Party’s Study Group on Immigration, Dr. Mark Abrams surveyed the 
three major polls conducted by polling agencies over twelve months in 1968-1969.34 National 
Opinion Poll conducted a series of surveys on immigration, including one in March 1968, a 
second six weeks later following Enoch Powell’s April 1968 “Rivers of Blood” speech and 
subsequent dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet, and a third following Powell’s speech on 
immigration in Eastbourne in September. The sample, representing all segments of the 
electorate, “was almost unanimous” in feeling that immigration should be cut drastically. Indeed, 
the first survey, which focused on the question of whether the migration of Asians from East 
Africa should be curtailed, “reported a more than 5 to 1 response in favour of the [1968 
Commonwealth Immigrants] Bill; among Labour supporters the proportion was more than 6 to 
1.”35 Nearly two-thirds of the sample supported proposals for future repatriation. Abrams noted 
that “[t]he May survey again did not distinguish between white and coloured immigration, but by 
linking Enoch Powell’s name with the issue it is probable that most people answered the 
questions in terms of coloured immigration.”36 Abrams also observed that a subsequent survey 
conducted by Research Services indicated that most people were reasonably well aware of the 
substance of Enoch Powell’s views on immigration, primarily his stance on dramatically 
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reducing the admittance of new immigrants. In a final survey conducted by N.O.P. at year’s end 
not linked to any particular immigration-related event, Abrams noted that it “looks as if the 
proportion of the sample prepared to ban all coloured immigrants has gone up substantially – 
from 42 per cent in October to 64 per cent (51 per cent plus 13 per cent) in December. 
Intolerance scores were slightly higher among Conservatives, working class people, and the 
elderly.”37 Abrams also assessed the first Gallup poll on immigration, conducted in March of 
1968, and subsequent follow-ups in April and November. After two polls conducted in April 
both indicated a high level of support for both Powell and restrictions on immigration, the 
November poll “did a repeat of most of the questions asked earlier in the year; the latest survey 
showed practically no change in popular attitudes – a substantial majority agreed with Enoch 
Powell, considered the numerical controls on immigrants to be not strict enough, and opposed 
the entry of dependents.”38  
 Research Services also conducted a poll on immigration at the end of 1968 which 
covered “all sections of the present electorate except for those who had voted Conservative at the 
1966 General Election – i.e. it was restricted to those one would expect to hold more tolerant 
attitudes on the question of immigration.”39 Despite this attempt to focus on a presumably more 
tolerant segment of the population, “the results were almost identical with those expressed by the 
total population questioned by N.O.P. and Gallup.”40 Some variation did occur: “agreement with 
Mr. Powell was greatest among those who had least education and among those who had stopped 
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supporting the Labour Party since 1966.”41 Another survey was conducted by Research Services 
of the white population in a handful of areas with high immigrant settlement: Lambeth, Ealing, 
Bradford, Nottingham, and Wolverhampton. Much of the survey dealt with questions of race and 
race relations more generally, but a specific question on immigration asked “[d]o you think 
coloured people should be let into Britain to settle on the same basis as other people from abroad, 
or should there be special regulations for coloured people?” The responses fell into three chief 
categories:  
(a) Those referring to alleged undesirable characteristics of coloured immigrants; 83 per 
cent gave such replies and claimed mainly that coloured immigrants, unlike others, 
created slums and that they brought disease into the country. (b) Those referring to types 
of special regulations which should apply to coloured immigrants; 59 per cent gave such 
answers and the most frequent demand was that before entry they should produce that 
they had a job to go to. (c) Those referring to the special impact of coloured immigrants 
on the supply of scarce social resources. Only 38 per cent of the discriminators gave such 
replies and usually they talked about the strain on schools, hospitals, and housing.42  
 
Eighty per cent of respondents supported restrictions on immigration, and half agreed that 
dependents of immigrants ought not to be admitted to the country.43 Abrams’ conclusion was 
that, in short, “[t]hose who favour further restrictions on coloured immigration justify their 
position mainly on the grounds that they compete for jobs, housing and the strain they put on the 
social services.”44 E.J.B. Rose, who served as director of the Survey of Race Relations in the 
1960s, argued that “20% of the population is prejudiced against coloured immigrants and 10% in 
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their favour. The remainder are neutral but could swing either way.”45 The results of national 
polls, then, indicated unequivocally that at least a substantial minority was committed to anti-
immigrationist policy, and potentially a much larger proportion was sympathetic to such views. 
 The collection of data was not motivated by simple curiosity. Obtaining information 
about popular opinion on immigration enabled the political elite to manage their own responses 
and to attempt to influence the views of those whose perspectives did not match the party line. 
Within the Conservative Party, the Conservative Political Centre served as one of the chief 
institutions to control and assess constituency-level opinion. Contact briefs functioned primarily 
to describe the party’s policies in plain language, and were typically circulated to area and local 
associations for use at gatherings of members. Contact briefs were designed to provide a way for 
the party to discuss itself with itself: to disseminate opinions which it would be desirable to 
associate with the Conservatives from an electoral or general influence perspective, as well as to 
stimulate conversation within the regional membership. The September 1970 contact brief 
contained the text of the Queen’s speech of that year, including the statement that new legislation 
to control immigration would be introduced. A Queen’s speech was perhaps the most concise 
articulation of a government’s plans for the year, and it was in the party’s interest to circulate its 
contents as widely as possible for the purposes of informing members about the totality of the 
government’s planned programme for the coming year.46  
 The August/September contact brief of 1978 focused solely upon the issue of 
immigration and race relations, and was far more detailed in outlining the opposition’s views on 
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how to proceed with immigration policy.47 The brief argued that, given the long history of 
immigration to the UK (an unusual observation in and of itself) and an ostensible lack of ill 
effects following this trend, “there was little public or private concern when, after the war, 
immigrants from the new Commonwealth began to settle in Britain.”48  The brief continued with 
the argument that immigrants “were attracted to this country by our living standards which, in 
the case of those from the Indian sub-continent were many times higher than they could expect at 
home. And in many quarters they were welcomed because they were prepared to undertake work 
which British people were not willing to do for the pay provided.”49 This lackadaisical attitude 
was, however, doomed to fade: “Conservative ministers began to be concerned with the level of 
immigration in the 1950s, although the lack of statistics made an accurate assessment of the 
numbers involved difficult to achieve. Their first reaction was to ask Commonwealth 
governments to agree to restrict emigration to Britain themselves. Only when this failed was 
legislation considered.”50 In this version of the history of restrictive immigration legislation, 
Conservative ministers acted only when their hands were forced by the inaction of 
Commonwealth governments, not as a pre-emptive strike, but rather as an essential preventative 
measure to protect their constituents.  
 The brief then proceeded to detail the advance of restrictive legislation through the 1960s 
and 70s, highlighting Labour’s U-turn from opposing controls in 1962 to introducing them in 
1968.51 The brief also outlined Shadow Home Secretary Whitelaw’s plan to restrict the entry of 
                                                          




49 Ibid., p. 1. 
 
50 Ibid., p. 1-2. 
 
51 Ibid.  
267 
 
male fiancés outlined in chapter four as well as the results of the Franks Committee which had 
advocated for the creation of a register of dependents. Reflecting the party’s turn away from the 
National Front and its policies in 1976-7 (see below), they emphsized that “[t]he Conservative 
Party is determined that all British citizens, irrespective of race or religion should enjoy equal 
rights and equal opportunities. It is opposed absolutely to any policy for compulsory 
repatriation,” even while arguing that “[m]any Conservatives remain sceptical about the value of 
legislation in race relations; believing that a fair and tolerant society depends most on individual 
attitudes.”52 The brief concluded by emphasizing the impact immigration had upon the primary 
“reception areas,” those towns and cities in which the majority of immigrants settled. Citing 
Bradford as “a typical example,” the brief outlined how “[a]lmost one in ten of the population is 
now non-white, and the proportion is rising. Asians occupy row after row of back-to-back 
Victorian dwellings.”53 This fear-mongering statement was followed up immediately by a list of 
the policies Whitelaw proposed to introduce to deal especially with places like Bradford, notably 
an emphasis on the expansion of small businesses, cuts to state spending, support for an increase 
in privately-owned rental properties, and encouraging voluntary groups aimed at reducing 
unemployment among teenagers: in effect, Thatcher’s vision for Britain, repackaged as a 
solution to immigration.54 The brief concluded with a list of questions: “What are your views on 
the Conservative Party’s immigration proposals?...Do you think that making racial 
discrimination illegal helps or hinders race relations? What practical steps can be taken to 
alleviate the problems of discrimination?...What constructive suggestions do you have for 
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improving the situation in the reception areas?”55 While these questions appear framed in order 
to generate discussion, the brief itself offered its own responses to each, and so it is likely that 
any discussion would have begun with the government’s proposals, rather than any alternative. 
 Conceived in the same conceptual vein as contact briefs, “Two-Way Topics” were also 
designed for use at association meetings. “Ten Minute Topics” joined Two-Way Topics in 1960 
with a similar function, but aimed at a less politically fluent audience with simplified discussion 
points and more basic language.56 Evidently, it was a common practice for members of the 
Conservative Party to sit down on regular occasions for the express purpose of discussing party 
policy. While the Two-Way Topics and Ten-Minute Topics were framed by the CPC as a way of 
generating conversation at these meetings, it is clear that they were, like the contact briefs, also 
designed to push those conversations in a particular direction. The October 1961 Ten-Minute 
Topic, a simplified version of that month’s Two-Way Topic, contained only one question: “Are 
you for or against the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of Commonwealth 
immigrants?”57 The preamble, however, was several pages long, with an opening paragraph 
outlining the numbers of immigrants currently resident in the UK, emphasizing the rapidity and 
scale of increase in the immigrant population, before proceeding with the observation that 
“Britain traditionally keeps her doors wide open to immigrants from other Commonwealth 
countries. She is virtually the only country in the Commonwealth to do so. Should this policy be 
continued, or should it be modified? Domestic problems are used as the main arguments for 
modification.”58 The “domestic problems” were then named as “differences in standards and 
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customs,” “aggravated housing and other social problems,” and “employment problems” which, 
while not a present concern, were projected to become an issue in the future.59  
 The Two-Way Topic of the same month included more pointed questions: “What 
methods would you favour for improving conditions as regards the existing immigrant 
population?...Are you for or against the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of 
Commonwealth immigrants? What are your reasons?...If your answer to Question 2 is ‘for the 
imposition of some restrictions,’ what kind of restrictions do you suggest?”60 The preamble was 
similarly more detailed, noting that “[i]t is frequently argued, for example, that if more jobs were 
available in the West Indies there would be less need and less desire to emigrate. In principle, 
this argument is sound; and a great deal has been, and is being, done to create more employment 
and more hopeful economic conditions there.”61 The Two-Way Topic also emphasized the 
impact of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act introduced by the United States Congress 
which had dramatically curtailed West Indian migration to the US, leading to a spike in arrivals 
in the UK.62 The preamble concluded by outlining the results of the recent Gallup poll on 
immigration, indicating that “[t]he restrictions most frequently suggested by the majority were 
that immigrants should have no criminal record, a clean bill of health, and adequate housing 
accommodation and a guaranteed job to go to” before proceeding to the questions for 
discussion.63 By asking for members’ opinion on these matters, the party elite were fostering a 
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sense of engagement with the party, and developing the notion that the party was attentive and 
responsive to members’ concerns, without actually committing themselves to taking any action 
on the topic. While some suggestions forwarded by members may have been implemented, the 
collection of this information also served to provide the party with perspective on how to present 
the policies they had already decided to implement, and to assess how best to market themselves 
to various sectors of the electorate. 
 The discussions conducted by regional areas were compiled and forwarded to the 
Conservative Political Centre, and occasionally circulated among ministers, depending on the 
topic, although the records of these discussions are now largely unavailable.64 The Conservative 
Central Office and the party’s area offices also corresponded frequently, providing policymakers 
with information about how various topics were being received by the membership. This was 
particularly important during an election campaign, in which local members were likely to be 
responsible for door-to-door canvassing, and thus called upon to represent party policy and to 
answer any questions undecided voters may have. For example, one memo from the West 
Midlands office in the mid-1950s noted that “[t]he Birmingham Conservative and Unionist 
Association is self-supporting and extremely jealous of its atomony [sic]...From a political point 
of view Birmingham becomes increasingly more difficult for us because of the rapidly changing 
character of the city. There are approximately 50/60 thousand Irish, 8/10 thousand coloured 
workers in the city and a very considerable contingent which has been attracted by the 
employment and high wages offered, from the NE and Wales.”65 Area offices aimed to inform 
the Central Office about the difficulties campaigners might encounter during an election 
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campaign, and also to warn about the emergence of possible competitors. As such, 
correspondence from the Yorkshire and East Midlands offices in 1956-57 assessed the threat 
posed by the Middle Class Alliance, as well as the possibility of loyal Conservatives’ defection 
to the League of Empire Loyalists.66 
 Those in positions of greater power also sought to obtain approval from the Central 
Office before proceeding with potentially divisive activities. Miss Goldsworthy, Deputy Central 
Office Agent for the London Area, wrote to her superior, Miss Walker, in 1961 to inquire about 
the acceptability of including a discussion on immigration at the Area Women’s Annual 
Conference.67 Miss Goldsworthy explained that “I realise this might be dynamite,” and laid out 
the reasons why the area members wished to have such a discussion, including the observation 
that “[t]here is no doubt that in this Area, the question of coloured immigration is becoming a 
major issue. There is evidence both of discontent with the Government’s attitude and of a growth 
of anti-coloured feeling. The subject comes up constantly both at meetings and in public opinion 
reports (missioners, etc.).”68 In order to counter “prejudice and mis-understanding,” Miss 
Goldsworthy proposed attacking the “factual basis” of these views, which, if it were successful, 
meant that “it should be possible to establish the Government’s position and the background to 
the problem which, even if it did not entirely convert members, would at least give a balance to 
their outlook and make them realise that there is more to the matter than ‘keep the blacks out and 
let us have our houses and hospitals to ourselves’.”69 Miss Goldsworthy’s solution was to stage 
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an interview of both a government spokesperson and “a national of the West Indies (suitably and 
carefully selected),” who would discuss a curated list of topics. The government representative 
would address “[t]he political background, the reasons for Government action, an assessment of 
the particular ‘grouses’ involved, i.e. housing, health, National Assistance.” The West Indian 
national would then respond with the “[f]actual background of his country. Why they come. 
What they feel about the attitude over here,” with Goldsworthy suggesting that they would “[t]ry 
to keep this part human and appealing emotionally.”70 Miss Walker’s reply to this proposal was 
not encouraging: “One is torn between the will to grapple with vital problems and the need to 
avoid adding fuel to the flames of conscientious objection. In all the circumstances I believe it 
would be wisest not to undertake a session of this kind.” Given the present government policy, 
she continued that “[w]hile there are genuine anxieties and continued deliberations in all the 
proper quarters, there is little more that can be said with any degree of authority.”71 She added 
the cautionary note that “we might create dissatisfaction which we were unable to meet 
constructively.”72  
 Miss Walker’s concerns about “fanning the flames of conscientious objection,” while 
oddly phrased, reflected broader trends within the party elite. Given the level of uncertainty 
about the future impact of immigration, especially before the introduction of restrictive 
legislation, it was dangerous to invite too much discussion about a topic the party could not 
guarantee they could control: that is, which might spawn renegade individuals or groups 
advocating policies and legislation not in line with a Conservative ethos, at least as the party saw 
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it. The perceived volatility of immigration as a topic of debate through the whole of this period 
made party and political elites’ reluctant to engage with it in great depth. In many cases, they 
were not possessed of any more information on the topic than the electorate: as we saw in 
chapter three, even the officers at the Chief Statistical Office could not produce the kind of 
information that government ministers were comfortable releasing to the public. Such 
uncertainty was no basis for running a campaign. The Conservatives could offer further 
restrictions on immigration and suggest greater funding for areas of high immigration. Beyond 
these two policies, it was wildly unclear what measures might be effective in tackling those 
elements perceived as problematic. In no small part this confusion was a consequence of the lack 
of consensus about what, exactly, was problematic about immigration. Who ought to live in 
Britain? How many people should live in such a country? Should people of different ethnic 
backgrounds be encouraged to live differently or in the same manner? What of languages? 
Religion? Education and social mores? In order to resolve the immigration “problem,” one 
needed to generate an idea about the kind of society Britain ought to be, and then to create 
policies designed to mould society in that vision. By the early 1980s, there was no consensus 
about what British society should look like.73 There was only agreement on what, at all costs, 
they should avoid. 
III 
 
It is clear that a powerful proportion of British elites was not comfortable with the way in which 
anti-immigrationism had come to the fore but remained undecided about how best to resolve the 
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challenges faced by a multi-racial society. One of the rationales for this indecision was the 
spectre posed by their cousins across the Atlantic. It is difficult to overstate centrality of the 
American experience in the popular imagination about immigration and race relations. American 
political culture served as a touchstone and a reference for British politics both among politicians 
and the electorate. In virtually every case, America served as a model of what Britain was not, 
and ought not to become. The presence of racial conflict, and even of the civil rights movement, 
was interpreted by British observers as an indication of the troubled legacies of slavery and Jim 
Crow, and of the damage that such divisions did to the social fabric of the country. Anti-
immigrationist British commentators, then, used America as a model both of historical processes 
and contemporary policies that marked America as different from the UK, and argued that this 
distinction ought to be maintained: the UK must not under any circumstances follow America 
down this destructive path. 
As early as 1957 a paper presented at the Conservative Commonwealth Council’s Annual 
Conference made reference to local journalism classifying Bolton, Lancashire, near Manchester, 
as “Manchester’s little Harlem.”74 One constituent also wrote to Harold Macmillan in 1957, 
lamenting that “the present Govt wont [sic] be satisfied until the [sic] have a Harlem in every 
town in the British Isles.”75 But no event prompted comparisons to the American example more 
dramatically than Peter Griffiths’ election. Indeed, the response to Griffiths’ rise to power was 
intertwined with one of the most significant interactions between the American and British civil 
rights movements of the postwar period: Malcolm X’s visit to Britain.  
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Four months after Griffiths’ election in October 1964, Malcolm X went on a tour of 
Smethwick. Followed by a BBC camera crew, the prominent activist walked the streets and 
spoke with a BBC correspondent. They had time to kill: Peter Griffiths had cancelled the debate 
they had been scheduled to conduct.76 Later in the day, Malcolm X carried on to Birmingham 
and held a press conference, where he stated that he would not wait until the “Fascists” had built 
their “gas ovens” in Smethwick, to which the mayor of Smethwick responded that “these 
television people” and the press more generally, were “endeavouring to turn Smethwick into a 
kind of Birmingham, Alabama.”77 Nine days later, Malcolm X was assassinated. That he should 
have seen fit to visit Smethwick, and indeed felt it worthwhile to even consider meeting with 
Griffiths, highlights the extent to which knowledge and awareness of “the Smethwick Affair,” as 
it came to be called, had reached an international audience.78 Events in Smethwick had been 
widely reported in the North American press since the run-up to the General Election in 1964. 
The first wave of articles covered Harold Wilson’s condemnation of the “nigger neighbour” 
slogan, followed by a wave of features on the increased role the “race issue” was seen to have 
played in the campaign. These articles appeared not only in the major American newspapers, but 
in local papers across the country. Individuals from California, to Minnesota, to Arkansas read 
about Patrick Gordon Walker’s hopes for the Foreign Office and the “threat” of the “immigrant 
flood.”79 Almost universally, both Britons and Americans saw parallels between the situation 
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emerging in Smethwick and that in the United States. An article printed in an Indiana paper 
included a report from a correspondent sent to Smethwick who previously, it was conspicuously 
noted, reported on racial conflicts from Washington, D.C. The turn of phrase most frequently 
used in these reports was “white backlash,” a term traditionally used in reporting on American 
elections to describe the voter turn to anti-civil rights politicians in areas with proportionately 
high black populations.80 
 There was a further unique dimension to the American reports. Coverage in Irish 
newspapers, particularly the Irish Times, was almost always negative and disparaging of 
Griffiths’ views. The Times of India and The Gleaner, published in Kingston, Jamaica, took a 
more or less equivocal view, though the occasional feature article expressed concern for the 
future of immigrant populations in Britain. American papers, however, more than those from 
anywhere else, covered Griffiths, the campaign, and his subsequent struggles with a significant 
element of empathy. Certain papers took a line closer to the London Times, of cautious 
scepticism, but often smaller papers, whether located in the Midwest or the Deep South, were 
understanding of Griffiths’ concerns.  
 While Americans evidently had ample access to reports from Britain, news did not only 
move across the Atlantic from east to west. Indeed, many British papers and politicians used 
American references to explain and describe the phenomena occurring in Smethwick.81 In one 
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case Griffiths was referred to as a “Goldwater conservative,”82 comparing him to the Republican 
presidential candidate of 1964. Roger Mellish, in his capacity as parliamentary secretary for the 
Ministry of Housing, caused a public furore when he claimed that “Smethwick is highly regarded 
in Alabama.”83 The statement that Griffiths was a “McCarthyite” bore a similar cultural 
imprint.84  
 Why would American examples arise so frequently in what, rhetorically, was an election 
run on local issues with a specific, limited immigrant population, and particularly their influence 
on local housing supplies? One of Griffiths’ campaign statements sheds some light: a few weeks 
before the election, Griffiths was quoted as saying that if Labour were to win in Smethwick, a 
riot would ensue.85 Certainly Britain had experienced race riots before, and the Notting Hill and 
Nottingham riots of 1958 were in recent enough memory. But even more recent were the riots in 
July and August of 1964, within three months of the election, in New York, Philadelphia, 
Chicago, and elsewhere. These riots, beginning only a few weeks after President Johnson had 
signed the 1964 Civil Rights Act into law, provided an image of what might occur in the UK if 
racial “mixing” were to continue unabated. Concerns in this vein could not have been appeased 
by the Watts riots in July 1965, which occurred only two months after the passage of a Race 
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Relations Bill meant to address racial discrimination and inequality in Britain. In August 1964 
race riots also broke out in Singapore, and while these occurred for different types of reasons 
than those in America, and even those in Britain in 1958, any newspaper-reading individual in 
Britain would have been aware that ethnic divisions were causing serious havoc in a former 
colonial possession.  
Coverage of these riots was so widespread in the British press as to be unavoidable. 
Policy-makers and journalists were aware of the spectre of violence, and feared the spread of that 
violence to Britain’s shores. Britons were broadly aware of the civil rights movement and hailed 
the achievements of Dr. King and his moderate allies but grew increasingly hesitant about the 
future of integration beyond the abolition of Jim Crow.86 In 1962 a Birmingham city councillor 
was quoted in the Birmingham Evening Despatch, outlining his plan to organize a petition to the 
government asking to end immigration by coloured people for three to five years, arguing “[w]e 
don’t want a Little Rock here.”87 Mike Sewell has suggested a broad shift in perceptions of the 
American example from the British viewpoint, from a disinterested superiority to a growing 
concern as the American model seemed to have an increasing presence on British shores. Most 
significantly, he notes that this transition was largely informed by the American experience with 
riots, extremism, and racial tension, and suggests that the riot in Watts was a turning point.88  
The debates on the Race Relations Bill in the spring and early summer of 1965 take on 
new dimensions when situated in a trans-Atlantic context where bubbling inter-racial tensions 
were boiling over in a dramatic and violent way. In his speech made in opposition to the Bill, 
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Griffiths suggested that it would act as fodder for members of what he referred to as “extremist 
Right-wing elements,” as well as “extremists from the immigrant organisations.”89 He further 
claimed that it had already “created a hardening of attitude” because it sought to “create separate 
legal categories of people because they have different colours of skin.”90 Labour MP Dingle Foot 
responded to these claims with the assurance that “the Bill will act as a gag only on those who 
deliberately set out to stir up racial hatred.” This claim was partly intended as a slight to Griffiths 
himself, as a purported stirrer of hatreds, but also points to the central concern at the heart of the 
Bill: a fear that certain elements in British society might use race as a basis to generate social 
unrest, much as was the perceived case in America.91  
In Britain, letter-writers became increasingly concerned about the ever-more evident 
connections between the two countries. A consulting physician in London, H.N. Hereward wrote 
in 1964 that “I wasn’t the least bit surprised at Mr. Gordon Walker’s downfall at Smethwick. 
And there will soon be other Smethwicks.”92 He continued: “It needs more than mere control; it 
needs to be stopped entirely, and, if possible, put into reverse. The way to keep the poor folk is 
the establishment of new industries in their homelands…But no! We are bent on leaving to our 
posterity Haarlems [sic], so as to keep up with the Jones – no, the present-day Americans – from 
whose experiences we should learn - & won’t! Nations, like individuals, are liable to attacks of 
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hysteria.”93 In this analysis, efforts to mirror the American way of things were to blame for the 
deteriorating state of affairs in the UK.   
In October 1964 Capt. J. Foxe, OBE, wrote to the Conservative Party to inform them that 
despite the fact that he was a “life long Conservative,” he had voted Labour at the last election, 
because “[t]he only way of getting rid of the Yankee influence in the Government seemed to be 
to vote Labour into power.”94 In a rather confused tirade, Foxe argued that the American 
influence was to blame for everything from the British exit from India, to the decline of sea 
power, to the “indecent” mode of women’s dress, to the influx of new immigrants. He argued 
that “[i]t is no use talking of human dignity and human rights and all the other Yankee bagman 
type of blather, baloney, when the right of every unborn child in this country to be born WHITE 
like the rest of its race has been taken away together with its inborn legacy of civilisation, 
culture, and human decency which has taken centuries to form.”95 In Foxe’s mind, the media 
were to blame for encouraging intermarriage, and “[t]he insidious conditioning of the people to 
do this over the years and by introducing the Yankee way of life, the bestial way of singing and 
dancing to music which originated in the wildest parts of the African Bush, the lowering of 
morals, and the cheapening of family life and parentage” were all interconnected effects of the 
American influence.96 He concluded that “[m]any Conservatives, like myself, would like to see 
the Conservative Party return to power, but, without American influence. NO MORE ANGLO 
YANKEE PRIME MINISTERS.”97 Foxe’s perspective rested at the extreme end of the political 
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spectrum – he also argued that the only solution to increasing crime rates was to reintroduce 
corporal and capital punishment – but it is noteworthy that in a follow-up letter to the CRD he 
claimed that “I have nothing against Negroes,” concluding rather that there was simply not 
enough room to house the additional population.98  
References to the American example did not cease with Griffiths’ departure from office. 
A letter-writer to the Streatham News made reference to the Watts riots of 1965 and Chicago 
disturbances of 1968 as ominous indicators of what might happen if race relations in Britain 
were not sufficiently addressed.99 Indeed, the paper had previously reported that the 1968 Race 
Relations Act was specifically designed to prevent “another America.”100 British politicians 
undertook fact-finding missions to America in order to assess their methods of dealing with 
mixed-race urban areas. In many cases, the reports of these missions were as likely to emphasize 
which techniques would not work in the British case due to the political and historical 
differences between the two states as they were to determine which tactics were likely to 
succeed. Christopher Chataway undertook one such research mission on behalf of the 
Conservative Immigration Policy Group in 1965, in which “[h]e had investigated fair 
employment practices in New York, and had visited the New York State Commission for Human 
Rights,” noting that “[o]fficials had been very frank about the limitations of this machinery and 
that they were only touching the fringe of discrimination.”101 In conclusion, “[h]e did not believe 
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that a parallel between this country and the United States was close enough to draw any real 
lessons from their system,”102 and that the system used in New York further required massive 
investment and huge numbers of lawyers. Chataway was not alone among contemporaries who 
were keen to assert that the experience of slavery in the United States necessarily made their civil 
rights movement, and race-related policy more generally, different from any that would emerge 
in the UK. Mr. F. Hayday argued at the 1967 TUC Conference that “[t]here is no history in this 
country of black slavery, no memory of a Civil War, no mass denial of civil rights, and so no 
sectional civil rights movement.”103 A report produced by Pressure for Economic and Social 
Toryism in 1965 argued that “[c]omparisons with the American Civil Rights Bill [and the 1965 
Race Relations Act] are totally misleading. Such discrimination as exists in this country is on 
quite a different scale to that which exists in the Deep South nor is it enshrined in state 
legislation.”104 In a treatise written for the Conservative Political Centre, MP William Deedes 
highlighted that  
The Negro population of the United States was in existence before the United States 
became a nation. They are descendants of the original slaves and among the earliest 
inhabitants. Great Britain’s coloured immigrants are entirely of twentieth century 
origin…It follows that the coloured population in America is culturally speaking 
thoroughly American. In Great Britain it is culturally heterogeneous and culturally alien. 
On the other hand, the Commonwealth immigrant came to Britain as a full citizen and at 
once entitled to the rights of every citizen from the vote to treatment under the National 
Health Service.105  
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He nonetheless emphasized that “[i]f we are to profit from past mistakes, and the harrowing 
experience of America, then we ought to see that these developments have serious implications 
for town planning,” and that “[w]e too have what America calls ‘the white fringes’ or suburbs,” 
arguing that “this is the most valid comparison between the American situation and our own, 
although our higher proportion of public housing gives us additional means of tackling it.”106 It is 
remarkable that those commentators who drew upon American history to justify their distaste for 
American policy made no parallel references to Britain’s own history with slavery and empire. 
Indeed, references to any aspect of Britain’s long history with racial difference were non-
existent: racial conflict, according to these observers, was a thing that happened “over there,” a 
characteristically American problem, not a phenomenon that had any basis or evidence in the 
British context. The danger was that racial conflict might be imported, literally, not that it might 
emerge from any facet of Britain’s own historical experience. While migrants might have arrived 
from former imperial holdings, conflict was more likely to cross the Atlantic from America.107 
In contrast to many of his contemporaries, A.J. Gilbert blamed the lack of emotion 
exercised by “middle way” British politicians for the state of race relations in the country, but 
nonetheless concluded that this attitude would lead to the same conclusions as experienced in 
America. He argued that “[w]hilst I believe that most middle way British politicians are sensible 
enough to acknowledge the factors in the situation as outlined above I also believe that the strand 
of political opportunism which besets British political life…is a very serious handicap in getting 
to grips with the problem. Who doubts when being honest with themselves that the situation in 
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this country can be any better than that being experienced by America say when one looks 
forward 20 or 30 years?”108 Gilbert’s assessment of British political culture did not lay the blame 
for failure at the feet of America, but rather upon a reluctance to seize the initiative when dealing 
with controversial subjects. Nonetheless, America functioned as a cautionary tale, and a state of 
affairs to be avoided if at all possible. 
America operated not only as a spectre of all that was horrible and which might befall the 
United Kingdom if something were not done at all, but also if the wrong tactics were applied. At 
the 1966 Conservative Commonwealth Council Annual Conference, Mrs Taya Zinkin argued 
that “[a] policy of discrimination in employment and housing can in the long run only result in 
the sort of race-relations which have become the curse of American life.”109 At the 1965 
conference, Mrs Zinkin, along with her colleagues Patrick Wall, Maurice Chandler, James 
Moorhouse, and James Russell, had argued in a paper on Commonwealth immigration that 
second-generation immigrants were in a position to be disappointed by the opportunities they 
were offered in life, and cautioned that “[i]f the youngsters get a raw deal, there may be some 
who will turn to rabble-rousing and try to emulate Malcolm X.”110 
The connections drawn between American and British political traditions were rendered 
more complicated when articulated by individuals who associated themselves with the 
emergence of the New Right. The edition of Solon: A Right Wing Journal in which Ferdinand 
Mount launched an attack on Enoch Powell which made reference to his distasteful similarity to 
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American populists also included an article outlining the relationship between the British and 
American right, and the resurgence of American conservatism.111 Mount argued that Powell “fits 
nicely into the American tradition of Southern Populism...[in which people] believe that folks in 
Washington aint [sic] good for nothing but welfare payments; they distrust and even refuse to 
admit the existence of economic and social progress...they deny loyalty to their leaders and 
friendship to any fellow-citizen who comes from a different background.”112 But, six pages later 
another writer was taking heart from the resurgence of hardline conservatives in America, and 
suggesting that the shared intellectual beliefs among both Americans and the new brand of 
British conservatives meant that a similar resurgence must be in store for the British branch of 
the right-wing family. 
It was not only British letter-writers who sounded a cautionary note about the Anglo-
American comparison. American correspondents also did so. Mr. Andrew James from Chicago 
wrote to Maurice Edelman in the 1950s to express his concern that Britain was headed in the 
same direction as Little Rock. He was convinced that the root of the issue in both America and 
Britain was that black populations were seeking to “destroy” the white population through 
intermarriage, and that the only solution was wholesale repatriation from both countries.113 
American feedback sometimes occurred in response to particular British individuals who seemed 
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to have developed an appealing platform. Oswald Mosely, for example, wrote that Powell’s 
repatriation proposals and the government-backed policies of integration were not the only 
options. There was “a third possibility [to solve the immigrant problem] which I long ago 
suggested in America before it appeared so likely that our government would deliberately create 
the American problem in Britain,” which was an apartheid-esque proposal of separate but 
“equal” communities.114 Mosley argued that “pride in their own community and a desire to live 
in it and develop their own culture is now notable among many of the black intellectuals of 
America, and the movement in this direction is continually increasing. In Britain, of course, such 
a tendency is entirely natural in an advanced community like that of the Sikh.”115 Evidently 
Mosley was no great fan of America in general, as his personal aide E.J. Hamm had written to 
one correspondent in May of 1968 that “[y]ou will know that we stand (in brief) for the union of 
Britain, Europe, the white Dominions and southern Africa, in order to create a great “third force” 
in the world, independent of both America and Russia.”116 One resident of Riverside Drive in 
New York City wrote to Mosley in 1959 to express his concern for the British state and people in 
light of ongoing immigration, and noted that “I have enclosed for your perusal some clippings 
from the current American Press that speak eloquently in projecting conditions you will shortly 
be called upon to face, if you permit this foreign intrusion to take root and undermine the 
morality of your Nation.”117 This correspondent closed by wishing for Mosley’s success in the 
                                                          





116 Letter from Hamm to P. Burnard, Wigan, Lancashire, 21 May 1968, MS 124/1/1 [1 of 2, 2 redacted] “A” file 
Correspondence, CRL. 
 




upcoming election, in which Mosley was standing as a candidate in North Kensington. The 
National Front were similarly fond of using the Americans as bogeymen in their publicity 
materials: one pamphlet entitled “Stop Immigration!” stated that “You know that if nothing is 
done NOW we face the prospect of American style chaos.”118 
The role that America played in anti-immigrationist arguments is in stark contrast to that 
which it played in those circles which did not oppose immigration. Scholars such as Stephen 
Tuck and Saladin Ambar have assessed the crucial role the American civil rights movement 
played within British black and Asian communities, particularly in leading to the development of 
similar self-supporting, ethno-nationalist movements, but also in linking to related campaigns 
such as the anti-Vietnam war movement.119 Broadly speaking, the left of the British political 
spectrum, and particularly those who operated outside parliamentary politics, were much more 
likely to look favourably upon the American example, although it is worth noting that the 
individual Americans who so impressed them were the extra-legislative actors who oftentimes 
were acting in direct opposition to state policy. Anti-immigrationists were certainly not keen to 
identify with individuals like Malcolm X, but they were also skeptical of the policies that had 
been adopted by the American state. It is nonetheless hugely significant that America played 
such a pivotal role in the worldview of both anti-immigrationists and proponents of immigrants’ 
rights, with an emphasis on the agency of the state for the former, and on that of civil society for 
the latter. The anti-immigrationist fixation with the state’s capacity to control civil society actors 
like civil rights activists in part belies their fixation with genuine democracy, and highlights their 
latent view that “real” citizens only pursued their aims with the use of a particular set of (non-
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violent, parliamentary) tactics. The notion of “respectability” has equally deep roots in both the 
American and British contexts, and it is no coincidence that anti-immigrationists were much 
more sympathetic to Dr. Martin Luther King than to the Black Panthers.120 According to anti-
immigrationists, violent nationalists were no more playing by the rules than were immigrants 
who falsified family relations or parroted a disingenuous commitment to Britain. 
Politicians legislating on immigration were torn between representing the electorate and 
acting in pursuit of a different set of values during this period. While anti-immigrationists 
demanded that their political representatives pursue policies that reflected the viewpoint of the 
electorate, important sections of the political elite prioritized policies that would serve the state’s 
interests in a dramatically and rapidly changing international context. In addition to the 
American civil rights movement, newly-empowered nationalist regimes took office in former 
colonies and quickly found themselves being courted by representatives of both West and East in 
a Cold War contest. 
In a speech given at Birmingham in 1964 Harold Wilson outlined the reasons for 
Labour’s reluctance to take a divisive line on race relations. He argued:  
We are not prepared to see this handled in a way which would inflame colour prejudice in 
this country. The biggest question of race and colour has now become one of the biggest 
issues in world affairs. There is the apartheid programme of the South African 
government and the Tory leaders are still shipping arms to the South African government. 
You have the problems in the Southern States of North America, and we all remember 
the courage of President Kennedy fighting this oppressive evil, and the courage with 
which his successor, President Johnson, has carried on the fight.121  
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Mr. A. Lester of the Society of Labour Lawyers similarly stated in a speech on a resolution 
expressing concern at the extent of racial discrimination pervading Britain introduced at the 1966 
Labour Party conference, “[w]e have before us the American experience of what happens if you 
do not provide an effective remedy for a disadvantaged minority.”122 He went on to argue that 
“[n]o doubt, Ted Heath will go the way of Goldwater and Poujade and attempt to play up the 
race issue in order to win back votes that he lost at the last election,” predicting that in advance 
of the next election, “racialist lobbies will be developed.”123 At the 1967 TUC Conference, “[t]he 
Home Secretary referred to American and Canadian experience and expressed the view that so 
much disadvantage arose for immigrants and for coloured workers from lack of educational and 
other opportunities that legislation could not result in preference being given to them.”124  
Postwar anti-immigrationism occurred within a Cold War context, and was informed by 
the geopolitical forces that underpinned that global conflict and by the ancillary movements it 
spawned. Britain could not risk creating militant ethno-nationalist movement which might be 
drawn by the appeal of Soviet support; nonetheless, the American side of the Cold War conflict 
offered no more obvious direction about how to deal with the creation of a multi-racial society. 
The expulsion of apartheid South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961 underscored the 
impossibility of using such a system in the UK, but the Watts, Chicago, and New York riots 
suggested that the Americans were no better qualified to handle the situation than either renegade 
ex-colonialists or the ostensibly multi-cultural Soviets. Indeed, even as moderate American civil 
rights activists provided a language that would come to be claimed by British politicians, those 
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same politicians disavowed any connection to the historical legacies that had precipitated such a 
movement. Every strategy had its historical example; every example had its evidence of failure. 
In this context it is perhaps unsurprising that the British political elite took a stance of 
doublespeak, of endorsing racial equality while enacting restrictive legislation. No one had any 
idea what else to do.  
IV 
No one, that is, but the National Front. As the most prominent extreme right-wing party in the 
1960s and 1970s, the National Front established themselves quite purposefully as the action-
taking alternative to mainstream party politics, particularly in, though not limited to, policy on 
immigration. This policy included not just the contest of elections and public demonstrations, but 
increasingly made recourse to violent brawls, destruction of property, and generally illegal and 
certainly unsavoury tactics that stood in stark contrast to most of those used by the mainstream 
parties. As early as 1967, a letter to the editor of the Young Conservatives section of the Leeds 
Searchlight had claimed that a meeting of the Anglo-Rhodesian Society at Leeds Town Hall had 
included a number of National Front members working as unofficial stewards, and that during 
the meeting “[s]everal of the N.Fs ‘stewards’ attacked two hecklers without either asking them to 
keep quiet or to leave.”125 The letter-writer went on to express disgust at the conduct of the NF 
members. Increasingly, the NF became associated with opposition to immigration and a multi-
racial Britain, and also with violence and havoc. The NF had begun its anti-immigrationist 
campaigning through the same respectable spheres as the rest of the anti-immigrationist 
campaigners, and their success at the ballot box generated an increased public profile. This 
increased profile, in turn, led to an increased cultural association between the NF and anti-
                                                          




immigrationism as a whole that was in part generated through media coverage. When the NF 
began to attract attention less for their electoral success than for their violence and destruction, 
anti-immigrationism as a whole came to be associated with those same tactics, rather than the 
respectable mechanisms with which it had previously been affiliated. The NF achieved the height 
of its postwar influence after a number of successes in the 1976 local elections. In response to 
this success all the major political parties undertook major efforts to disassociate themselves 
from the NF.  
A debate at the 1976 Labour Party Conference included the statement from Merlyn Rees 
of Leeds South that “[w]hat is new in recent years is the propaganda activities of the National 
Front and the National Party, the lies perpetrated by those organisations and the fears and 
antagonisms engendered by their activities must be condemned by the whole Labour Movement. 
But the answer is not to ban them, but to beat them. Beating racialists by argument is a job for 
democrats.”126  A year later, an emergency resolution was introduced by Andy Hawkins 
(Lewisham East CLP) at the 1977 Labour Party Conference, which argued that “This Conference 
believes that marches by the National Front and other racist parties through multi-ethnic 
neighbourhoods such as occurred in Lewisham on 13 August must not be allowed…Conference 
recognises that the emergence of Neo-Nazi racist parties poses a threat to both our Labour 
movement and the whole basis of our hard won democratic system.”127 In response to the 
resolution, Merlyn Rees argued that “[r]acialism is the problem today. Let us not confuse it with 
public order. There may be public order reform, but let us deal with the National Front for what 
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they are – racists, not to be confused with normal political parties. This is the direction in which 
we should go.”128 The emphasis on the way in which the National Front conducted itself was key 
to Rees’ interpretation: as one of the Labour MPs who had been most sympathetic to demands 
for immigration control and increased funding for areas of high immigrant settlement, Rees was 
not necessarily convinced that an opposition to immigration was wrong in principle, but opposed 
dramatically the manner in which the National Front expressed this view. Thus, the problem was 
not just public order, or even just that the National Front could be classed as racists, but that as 
an organization they posed a threat to the conduct of parliamentary democracy. 
The Conservatives in particular scrambled to distance themselves from political practices 
and positions that became overwhelmingly associated with the far right. This trajectory was most 
clearly evident at the annual Conservative Party Conferences. The 1976 Conference debated the 
motion that “This Conference believes that it is in the interests of both the indigenous and 
immigrant communities in Britain that the following principles are accepted as the basis of our 
immigration policy: (a) all efforts must be made to ensure that the immigrants now in Britain are 
equal and welcome members of our society; (b) no further immigration except of the close and 
proven dependants of immigrants already in this country will be allowed.” One respondent to 
this resolution sounded a note of fear, reminding attendees that “a few months ago in the 
Thurrock by-election the National Front candidate obtained 3,255 votes – nearly 7 per cent of the 
poll.”129 At the 1977 Conservative Party Conference, John Pritchard of Norwood introduced a 
resolution that “This Conference deplores the threat to good race and social relations posed by 
the extreme parties from both the ‘left’ and the ‘right.’ Conference therefore supports 
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government measures to alleviate urban problems such as youth employment, and urges local 
parties actively to campaign against racial discrimination by, for example, countering 
inflammatory literature and participating on Community Relations Councils.”130 Mrs. K. 
Hopkins of West Lewisham responded, on the basis of her work at the Community Relations 
Council on the Deptford High Street, that “[u]nless one can get across a moderate viewpoint, 
extremists will sway the various ethnic groups…People only want work, a good home, and 
education for their children with a certain standard of living.”131 Dissenting from the motion, 
John Gregory of Stretford asked “are we saying we should shut our ears to any demand or 
suggestion that might be construed as being ‘extreme’? Or that extreme measures are not 
necessary?...the most necessary measure even to improving the Community Relations which the 
Motion claims to have at heart, is a complete stop to further immigration. It is an extreme view, 
perhaps, but is it one we are to deplore, and am I to be deplored for voicing?”132 In response to 
this query a representative from the floor shouted “Yes.”133 Gregory continued: “[m]ost sinister 
of all, I suggest, is what is meant by actively campaigning against racial discrimination. Does 
that mean acquiescing in the suppression of the National Front merely because it has committed 
the cardinal sin of controversy, which is the sin that this conference desires so desperately to 
avoid? ‘Discrimination’ is as much a human right as breathing free air.”134 Gregory concluded 
that “[i]t also means we shall be turning our backs on the great majority of the electorate who 
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desire and demand forthright action, action which no doubt the proposers of this Motion would 
dismiss as being extreme.”135 Evidently displeased with the line of Gregory’s argument, the 
Chairman of the debate intervened: “I am afraid the temptation is almost irresistible to point out 
to Mr Gregory that that subject and this Motion were themselves chosen by ballot, and were the 
free choice of those who had the opportunity to select it.”136 Evidently, the demand for “action” 
no longer held the appeal it might once have, evoking as it now did the NF’s violent out-of-doors 
politics. 
The challenge faced by the Conservatives in distancing themselves from the unsavoury 
NF was complicated by the popular perception that in terms of policy, the Tories and National 
Front had gone hand in hand for much of their existence. Miss Ruby White of Derby North 
complained that “[o]ne morning my friend next door…rang my bell and said ‘You have a 
National Front poster in your window’…I decided it must have been my Tory posters that caused 
this to be put on. I was incensed.”137 After White wrote a letter to the local paper the National 
Front apologized for the misunderstanding, although they also assumed that as a Tory supporter 
who wrote letters to the paper, she must be a man. White continued: “I also object to the National 
Front shouting at me as I enter the Council House to hear an address by David Lane. To make 
things more harmonious, the Socialist Workers were shouting at the other end. As a moderate, 
and as a true Conservative, I want none of this appalling behaviour.”138 The rise of the National 
Front laid bare the conflicts between the middle-ground of Conservatism in which many paid-up 
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members refused to endorse the tactics of extremist groups, and the anti-immigrationists who had 
previously laid claim to that middle-ground, but who were increasingly associated overtly or 
implicitly with extremists. While Ruby White was unusual as a former teacher who had 
encouraged the parents of her students to teach racial tolerance, her disapproval of the National 
Front’s tactics (“shouting at me as I enter the Council House”) was typical of a larger section of 
the Conservative Party than perhaps the NF had appreciated.  
Michael Alison’s speech on behalf of the party on the 1977 motion highlighted the 
changing context that surrounded these shifting views: “there are no jobs in Brixton for the 
young unemployed whatever their colour. There is no great float of spare council house 
accommodation in Bradford or any other city for housing applicants whatever their colour.”139 
The motion was carried by an overwhelming majority. A year later, an even more strongly 
worded version of the same sentiment was introduced at the 1978 Conference: “This Conference 
rejects the evil of racism as exemplified by parties such as the National Front and policies such 
as compulsory repatriation and confirms the Conservative belief that ethnic minorities in Britain 
should enjoy equal opportunities in a society which is fair and just.”140 Speaking on behalf of the 
government, Keith Speed underscored the shift in tone which was to become characteristic of 
Thatcher’s tenure as party leader and subsequently Prime Minister. He argued that “[w]e start 
from the belief that good and harmonious relations between the various communities in Britain 
will be established only [sic] a lasting basis only when the numbers coming into this country 
from abroad are finite, accurately defined and under the close control of the Government. That 
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situation clearly does not exist at the moment.”141 He proceeded to outline the main facets of the 
Conservatives’ proposed policies on immigration, emphasizing the necessity of establishing how 
many dependents of non-patrial Commonwealth immigrants were entitled to settle in the 
country: that is, a dependents register.142 He went on to include the introduction of quotas for 
immigrants from all countries outside the EEC, the ending of special concessions to husbands 
and male fiancés of women of immigrant origin, a general tightening of the definition of groups 
allowed to settle in the UK, and a major crackdown on illegal immigration, describing the total 
package of policies as “tough but fair.”143 He was at pains to underscore that compulsory 
repatriation was to have no part in this policy programme.  
This attitude, of endorsing the content of many anti-immigrationist demands while 
rejecting the extremist package in which the National Front and others presented them, became 
the hallmark of Thatcherite immigration policy. Speed deplored the “mindless violence and 
vandalism that has increased over the past few years” and stated 
There is particular concern where these crimes have racist overtones. We must spare no 
effort to ensure that all our citizens, whatever the colour of their skin, can walk in peace 
and safety on our streets…those who spread terror and hatred in the East End of London 
are caught, convicted and severely punished. We should not underestimate the crisis of 
fear that many ethnic minorities, particularly the Bengalis are going through in Brick 
Lane and elsewhere in our great cities.144 
 
The solutions he proposed, however, were centred on two main areas: the increase of police 
forces in these areas and more effective punishment through legal avenues; and the improvement 
of English-language skills within immigrant groups, so as to reduce the isolation of immigrant 
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mothers. The latter policy was very much in line with those proposed from the early 1960s 
onward, in no small part by those employed in the social services, while the former was part of 
what would become Thatcher’s emphasis on law and order as a solution to Britain’s ills and the 
emergence of policing as one of the most visible and controversial elements in race relations 
practice. Speed concluded that “[w]e have to recognise the evil threat that is posed to society by 
organisations such as the Socialist Workers Party and the National Front. We have to warn 
people that the Anti-Nazi League is not some cozy umbrella beneath which all those who are 
confronted by the evils of racism can gather. It is yet another far Left organisation, the key 
members of which will smash the Conservative Party, free speech and free enterprise if they are 
given half the chance.”145 This statement is typical of Thatcherite tirades against the evils of the 
left, and the claim that the Socialist Workers were as bad as the National Front was part of a 
calculated move to associate the left with the hardships of recession-era life, as well as with the 
misconduct of British political power. 
By 1979, the dialogue surrounding immigration had returned to its earlier confidence in 
the face of the virtual decimation of the National Front and the triumph of Thatcher’s 
Conservatives at the polls. That year’s Conservative conference saw the introduction of a 
resolution that originally moved that “Government should recognise that Britain is a small and 
overcrowded island and great care is needed to ensure that the future identity of the nation is not 
overwhelmed by outside influences and that houses, hospitals and jobs are readily available to 
our own people without suffering additional demands from immigrants.”146 The resolution, 
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however, was amended to read “That Her Majesty’s Government takes strong measures 
immediately to limit the entry of other nationals into this country. Government should recognise 
that Britain is a small and overcrowded island and great care is needed to ensure the future 
identity of the nation. Conference accordingly re-emphasises the policies set out in the Manifesto 
upon which the election was fought and won and which it regards as essential for racial 
harmony.” In this form, it passed by an overwhelming majority.147 No mention was made of the 
National Front. The 1980 Conference witnessed the most blatantly triumphalist motion to date, 
moved by Muhammad A. Naqui of Oldham, that  
This Conference congratulates the Home Secretary on changes so far made to strengthen 
the legal position of immigrants in the country and welcomes the introduction of a White 
Paper on British Nationality Law as laying the essential foundations for the improvement 
of race relations in Britain. It believes that changes in the attitudes of the people of this 
great country can be brought about only by peaceful means, through the goodwill of the 
people, and not through unenforceable legislation or coercion.148  
 
Speaking on behalf of the government, Minister of State for Home Affairs Timothy Raison 
argued that “[t]he new citizenship will reflect the reality of today’s world rather than of our 
imperial past.”149 The spirit of this new order was explicitly laid out in his statement that the 
Conservatives supported  
an ethos which accepts people for what they are, regardless of the colour of their skins, 
which welcomes all those who have the right to be here, which asks of the minorities that 
they enter fully into our lives, not abandoning their culture but learning our language, 
observing our laws and playing a part, a full part, in our institutions, contributing to our 
renewed prosperity. This is an ethos which I see as enduringly British in its tolerance and 
good sense and because it is the British way it is the Conservative way. The approach we 
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are taking is the only way of dispelling the fears that have been expressed in this 
debate.150 
 
Thatcher’s Conservatives were laying claim not only to superior expertise in race relations, but 
also to the qualities of broad-mindedness and common sense, marrying the most attractive facets 
of both sides of the pre-1980 debate on immigration: the tolerance of the left, and the anti-
immigrationists’ appeal to ordinary citizens disenfranchised by an out-of-touch elite, while 
shrouding the whole in an aura of patriotism reminiscent of the Second World War. 
Changes within the National Front through this period also played a significant role in the 
shifting relationships between the various parties, both mainstream and extremist. In 1970 the 
NF had put forth only ten candidates for election. By 1974, they offered sufficient candidates to 
qualify for a Party Political Broadcast, fielding fifty and ninety candidates respectively at the 
first and second elections of that year.151 Their presence on a number of local councils and the 
contest of seats at central elections led to the assessment that “[i]n the middle to late seventies 
the National Front was keen to keep up a respectable image.”152 The maintenance of this image 
required refusing membership to “known thugs,” and “denials were always forthcoming when 
the press raised the question of links between the Front and racial or political violence.”153 
However, in the months before the 1979 general election, members of the Anti-Nazi league were 
at pains to highlight the associations between various members and fascist or neo-fascist 
organizations. With these revelations occurring in concert with the strict immigration policy 
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promoted by Thatcher’s Conservatives, the NF was also involved in a substantial number of 
major, violent disturbances, including confrontations with their anti-racist opponents that 
required hundreds of police. It is generally accepted by scholars that the 1979 election campaign 
was the period in which the NF’s claims to respectability were utterly destroyed.154 The general 
election was a great defeat for the NF, and in the aftermath the group went through a series of 
tripartite splits that led to former leader John Tyndall founding the British National Party, and the 
remnants of the party losing ground to smaller fringe groups like Column 88.155 
By the early 1980s, the view put forth by the Leeds Trade Union Council and Anti-
Fascist Action group that “the Conservative party of Margaret Thatcher has swallowed up many 
of the Front’s older, more respectable racists” was widely shared on the left.156 Their diagnosis 
was that “[t]he internal struggles in the NF allowed a new, younger breed of fascist to take over. 
Under their leadership the Front has developed into a more openly violent organisation that has 
welcomed into its ranks many of the types that the British Movement used to cater for.”157 
Perhaps more terrifying was the fact that, apparently, the National Front was also developing 
international links with like-minded movements abroad. The Leeds groups identified among 
these partner organizations the Italian Fascists, including Roberto Fiore, who had been convicted 
of criminal offences by an Italian court, and the group responsible for the August 1980 bombing 
of the Bologna Railway Station. In addition, “[a] number of the NF directorate now works full-
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time on links with Protestant organisations in the North of Ireland and members of Ulster 
paramilitary groups have run training camps for fascist activists on the British mainland.”158 In 
the assessment of the Leeds groups, “[t]he concept of the ‘political soldier’ has entered NF 
rhetoric and they no longer worry about presenting the respectable image they did in the 
1970’s.”159 Nick Griffin, one of the Front’s ruling triumvirate, was heard by Yorkshire Post 
reporters to advocate the “‘traditional British methods of the brick, the boot and the fist’ in 
dealing with opponents.”160 The pamphlet produced by the Leeds organizations included a 
chronology of right-wing activity in West Yorkshire over the period 1967-1987, and aimed to 
show “that throughout the period fascist activity has been accompanied by violence, and that 
many members of local fascist organisations have been convicted of violent offences.”161 This 
was in stark contrast to the tactics of earlier right-wing individuals who had explicitly sought 
affiliation with the mainstream political parties, and indeed of the NF’s own tactic in the 1970s 
of contesting elections. 
V 
The tactics utilized by an increasingly visible National Front were emblematic of a violent form 
of youth politics that alienated older participants. The growing popularity of the National Front 
with young skinheads, particularly in urban areas, was in stark contrast to the political culture of 
earlier, respectable anti-immigrationism.162 This was a major reason why the anti-immigrationist 
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movement failed to take hold at elite levels. Despite continued support for a relatively 
conservative view of society, explicit racism was increasingly unrespectable. Direct statements 
opposing the creation of a multiracial society were a bad public relations strategy. Any effort to 
actually contain or construct the ethnic composition of Britain needed to be sotto voce and 
discreet in the utmost. Nigel Copsey’s claim that “[n]ot many would argue that the collapse of 
the NF vote at the end of the 1970s was due to diminishing racism”163 is certainly true, but the 
manner in which those claims could be expressed altered significantly in the aftermath of the 
NF’s collapse. Middle-class, middle-aged, Middle England racists no longer wore their emotions 
on their sleeve, and became covert about expressing their views. This meant both that they 
turned to the subtler, more insidious forms of racism that have both persisted into the twenty-first 
century and have proved to be even more difficult to detect and eradicate, and also that they grew 
more resentful of their perceived muzzling in private. British legislators continued to reject the 
chaos experienced by America in their attempts to manage racial conflict as a policy model. 
Between the bad press generated by the National Front and the poor example of the Americans, 
policymakers who had been sympathetic to anti-immigrationism now treaded a fine line between 
limiting immigration and admitting that they were attempting to forestall the creation of an 
ethnically diverse Britain. Most crucially, events in the 1970s demonstrated that those 
mechanisms of political influence, and particularly of knowledge circulation, that anti-
immigrationists had so successfully co-opted to secure their own cause could also be co-opted by 
even more extreme constituencies. When those extremists began to move beyond the pale of 
political legitimacy that had provided anti-immigrationism with the basis of its success, the 
                                                          
163 Nigel Copsey, “Meeting the Challenge of Contemporary British Fascism? The Labour Party’s Response to the 
National Front and the British National Party,” in British Fascism, the Labour Movement and the State, eds. Nigel 
Copsey and David Renton (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 189. 
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public image of anti-immigrationism as a whole was tainted as well. Simultaneously, the British 
political elite made decisive moves to abandon anti-immigrationist rhetoric about genuine 
democracy and active citizenship and embraced instead, if hypocritically, the language of 
inclusion propagated by civil rights and ethno-nationalist movements around the globe. Caught 
between a retreating elite and a damaged reputation in the eyes of the general public, the fortunes 





In February of 1980, William Whitelaw contributed an article to the Oxford University 
Conservative Association magazine. In a draft of the article, ghostwritten by Conservative 
Research Department employee Nick True, Whitelaw argued that “[n]o good can be served by 
members of our ethnic minorities being seduced into paths of violence that are wholly alien to 
their religions and traditions. Still less by members of the indigenous community following the 
National Front and its banners of hatred. Why do people turn in those sterile and wholly self-
defeating directions? Suspicion, uncertainty, fear, these are the evils that drive them on. These 
we must set ourselves to remove.”1 In the mind of the Conservative Party’s elites, violence by 
black nationalists was as bad as violence by members of far-right extremist groups; but, indeed, 
violence by members of far-right extremist groups was as bad as violence by black nationalists. 
Whitelaw highlighted the correlation between diverse groups that endorsed courses of action that 
fell outside the acceptable rubric of political activism, underscoring the necessity of remaining 
within the realm of the respectable in order to be viewed as a legitimate political actor. Whitelaw 
also, however, drew attention to the role of “suspicion, uncertainty, [and] fear” in motivating 
these misled political actors. Fear of the unknown, fear of change, and fear of 
disenfranchisement certainly unpinned a great deal of anti-immigrationist activity, even when it 
did fall within the rubric of legitimate political action. While Whitelaw urged Conservatives to 
“set ourselves to remove” fear, suspicion, and uncertainty from the political landscape they were 
not wholly successful in their project, even as the new Conservative Prime Minister oversaw the 
introduction of the most restrictive immigration legislation to that date. 
                                                          
1 “Draft Article on Immigration for Magazine of O.U.C.A.” authors NET/CD, 4 February 1980, CRD/L/4/55/3 
Letter book Nick True 1979-1980, CPA. 
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While Margaret Thatcher must be positioned within a longer tradition of anti-
immigrationism, the era of Thatcherite anti-immigrationism bore notable differences to the 
previous three decades. My argument is not that anti-immigrationism died in 1981, but rather 
that it changed tack. In keeping with earlier trends the Thatcherite regime established itself 
strictly in opposition to hooliganism of all kinds, including far-right anti-immigrationist groups 
like the NF and BNP, and government rhetoric reflected the ostracization of these groups. At the 
same time, Thatcher strengthened already-restrictive immigration legislation, virtually 
eliminating all vestiges of non-EEC immigration. While she fell short of implementing either a 
larger-scale voluntary or a compulsory repatriation scheme, she did introduce many of the 
measures anti-immigrationists had advocated. In a sense, the anti-immigrationists had won. But 
their efforts were certainly not commended. On the eve of the introduction of the 1981 British 
Nationality Act the stricter measures were not framed as a concession to popular opinion, but 
rather as a necessity demanded by a foreign relations and economic reality.2 Even as a restrictive 
attitude towards immigration was ever-more entrenched at the highest level, the most powerful 
politician in the country rejected the notion that she had adopted such views on the basis of their 
popularity among the citizenry. Anti-immigrationists had finally found their heroine, and she had 
rejected the role outright.  
Thatcher’s relationship with immigration was undoubtedly a complicated one, and one 
that will likely not be fully exposed until the files from the whole of her period in office are 
opened. What is clear, even without the benefit of access to those files, is that on the subject of 
immigration Thatcher was not a political actor like Enoch Powell, or like Peter Griffiths, or 
indeed Duncan Sandys or Patrick Wall. Both ideologically motivated and keenly attuned to her 
                                                          
2 See correspondence in CRD/L/4/55/3 Letter book Nick True 1979-1980, CPA. 
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own political survival, Thatcher never definitively crossed the line into the realm of the 
politically unacceptable, beyond the parliamentary pale, as both Griffiths and Powell had 
publicly been accused. Rather, her public pronouncements on immigration were always carefully 
calculated, specifically designed to speak to particular subsections of the British electorate and 
political elite.3 Thatcher introduced a number of policies that targeted members of visible 
minorities in ways that implied her conviction that they were at best undesirable and at worst 
criminal members of the British community. But apart from the 1981 BNA, these policies were 
disguised as something else; chiefly, as efforts to maintain law and order. The introduction of so-
called “sus” laws, the creation of Anti-Social Behaviour Offenses, and changes to policing 
practices in areas of high immigrant settlement indicate that whatever Thatcher thought about a 
multi-racial Britain, she was not going to openly admit that non-white populations were her 
target, or that addressing racial conflict was her goal.4 This was, perhaps, a new brand of 
respectable anti-immigrationism – respectable by means of being disguised as something else. 
Thatcher was both the apotheosis of postwar anti-immigrationism and its worst enemy. 
She implemented, in the strongest form, the restrictions on immigration that anti-immigrationists 
had been lobbying for. At the same time, she rejected substantial proportions of the worldview 
that had led anti-immigrationists to support this cause. She may have taken steps to reduce the 
number of immigrants on the waiting lists for council housing, but she also oversaw the largest 
sell-off of those council houses to date. In part, postwar anti-immigrationism drew upon and 
made reference to a brand of social solidarity that was most powerful from the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War. Hostility to immigrants emerged partly 
                                                          
3 Whipple, “Ordinary.” 
 
4 See Hall, Policing the Crisis for the earliest years of this trend, which Thatcher wholeheartedly embraced. 
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from a concern about the impact they might have upon the integrity and close-knittedness of 
existing communities. Thatcher prevented a new influx of immigrants from threatening these 
communities, but did so as part of a political agenda that attacked those same communities 
through sweeping economic and social reforms that ushered in a new era of neoliberalism and 
individualism. Postwar anti-immigrationists never suggested that the solution to the 
overburdening of the public health service might be to sell off the NHS.5  
Her infamous “swamping” remarks aside, the way Thatcher dealt with immigration was 
much the same as political elites had been doing for the previous thirty years – behind closed 
doors. While the 1981 BNA may have answered the prayers of many anti-immigrationists, 
Thatcher was certainly not proclaiming an end to immigration from the rooftops in the style of 
previous anti-immigrationist politicians, particularly Powell and Griffiths. In part this is likely 
because Thatcher did not, and perhaps could not, endorse a critical element of previous anti-
immigrationist politicians’ attachment to the cause: the conviction that an end to immigration 
would be a key solution, if not the solution, to Britain’s ills. Anti-immigrationism could get 
Thatcher votes, but it could not wholly reshape Britain in Thatcher’s preferred image. So, she 
went just far enough on the question of immigration to snatch back a section of wandering Tory 
votes from the National Front and left the burden of societal reform to her economic 
programme.6 Amy Whipple’s argument that the New Right emerged in part from the cultural 
force of a diverse range of groups of conservative “ordinary people” who felt repressed by a 
                                                          
5 Jackson and Saunders emphasize that Thatcher’s rhetoric was not entirely matched by her actions, and that much 
of the welfare state remained intact. However, she was committed to eliminating all vestiges of ‘socialism,’ and this 
conceptual transition is an important departure from the spirit that animated earlier anti-immigrationist arguments. 
See Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, “Introduction: Varieties of Thatcherism,” 15; and Robert Saunders, “‘Crisis? 
What crisis?’ Thatcherism and the seventies,” in Making Thatcher’s Britain, eds Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 33, 40. 
 
6 See Camilla Schofield, “‘A nation or no nation?’ Enoch Powell and Thatcherism,” in Making Thatcher’s Britain, 
eds Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 110.  
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liberal cultural elite reflects anti-immigrationists’ emphasis on the legitimacy of citizens’ 
complaints and the responsibility of elected officials to reflect and address those complaints.7 But 
the force of these ordinary people, while sufficient to bring Thatcher into office, was not enough 
to force her to adopt the language they had chosen, or to overrule her own convictions in 
moments when they came into conflict with her own.  
While the political potency of Thatcherism and Thatcher herself certainly offers a partial 
explanation for the nature of anti-immigrationism after 1981, it is not a sufficient explanation. 
Demographic change through the late 1970s and early 1980s is also worthy of note. In this 
period between the extinction of New Commonwealth migration and the first major influxes of 
European labour in the 1990s, it became clear that a massive and increasing proportion of non-
white individuals in the UK were in fact British citizens. Deprived of its anti-immigrationist 
veneer, popular racism was exposed as its true self. In this new light, fresh hope was given to the 
old strategies of Labour and the left, i.e. “not to debate with the [National] Front but to demolish 
the myths about race and immigration that were being spread by it. Labour’s strategy was thus an 
educative one.”8 This strategy had failed against an anti-immigrationist movement that laid claim 
to its legitimacy on the basis of political acumen and activism-related intelligence, but it seems 
possible that it might have borne greater fruit in a more starkly exposed environment of 
discrimination. 
 The anti-immigrationist movement attracted supporters from all classes, although it was 
members of the middle-class who were most visible in organizing and delineating the trajectories 
of anti-immigrationist campaigns. Anti-immigrationists were also located across the UK, but 
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8 Copsey, “Meeting,” 185. 
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concentrated in areas of higher immigrant population. They also staked out territory in both 
major political parties, in addition to founding single-issue organizations. While the groups of 
the far right are included in the range of options available to those of anti-immigrationist 
persuasion they were never the most popular groups, in part because they had a reputation for 
violating one of the most important aspects of anti-immigrationist campaigning: an air of 
respectability. 
 This respectability was founded partly on the anti-immigrationists’ conviction that they 
ought to conduct their campaigning within the established conventions of political and social 
activism. By relying on practices and lines of argument invoked by pre-existing and 
contemporary activist groups, anti-immigrationists effectively laid claim to a place within the 
pantheon of legitimate political organizations. Indeed, anti-immigrationists saw themselves as 
active citizens defending the practice of genuine democracy.  
 Anti-immigrationists also developed a reputation for respectability by attaching anti-
immigrationist arguments to existing political debates which were definitively viewed as 
legitimate, including those about access to the welfare state. That anti-immigrationists repeatedly 
intervened in debates about the collection of statistical data on immigration also indicates that 
they saw their own use of government practices, such as the collection of statistical data, as a 
mechanism that they could also use to appropriately and legitimately intervene in the broader 
immigration debate. Anti-immigrationists also posited themselves as more accurate reporters on 
the lived conditions of those residing in areas of high immigrant population; as such, they 
positioned themselves as beneficent defenders of the common man in contrast to purportedly 
manipulative or disinterested government officials.  
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 The prevalence of women within the anti-immigrationist movement also bolstered the 
anti-immigrationists’ aspirations to respectability. However, while a linguistic and policy 
emphasis on conservative gender roles and domesticity represented an additional appeal to 
existing political standards by the anti-immigrationists, it also served to foreclose or limit the 
opportunities for anti-immigrationist women to be viewed as legitimate political actors. Indeed, 
the very arguments that were used to bolster anti-immigrationism generally could be used to 
delegitimize women anti-immigrationist activists specifically. 
 Combined, these factors served to create an anti-immigrationist movement that was 
deeply embedded in the existing political world in Britain. One might presume, then, that the 
anti-immigrationist movement was destined for great success. While they did succeed in respect 
to the introduction of dramatically restrictive immigration legislation, they were unsuccessful in 
obtaining credit for the introduction of that legislation. Indeed, anti-immigrationism as a 
movement was increasingly marginalized in popular discourse. This was partly a result of 
international forces, including global ethno-nationalist movements and the American civil rights 
movement, which pushed British officials at the highest levels of the government and civil 
service to adopt a language of inclusivity and diversity. This emphasis on inclusivity and 
diversity stood in contrast to the anti-immigrationists’ preferred language of active citizenship 
and genuine democracy, even as those same officials implemented restrictive legislation 
reflecting anti-immigrationist goals. The decline of anti-immigrationism was also a result, 
however, of the public relations crisis that emerged as the anti-immigrationist movement became 
increasingly related in public conversation with the violence and infamy of the far right. Anti-
immigrationists effectively lost their claim to respectability not because agents of the left 
successfully agitated to ostracize them, but because agents of the far right laid claim to the 
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discursive space occupied by anti-immigrationists – to the detriment of the more moderate forces 
that had underpinned the earlier successes of the anti-immigrationists. 
It is possible that one of the explanations for the emergence of the anti-immigrationist 
movement, and its continued success, was the repeated error of its opponents: it seems that those 
opponents underestimated the potential for change when led by a relatively small group of 
committed individuals.9 This maxim is as true of those groups whose aims were and are 
pernicious and exclusionary as those whose contributions we valorize. Anti-immigrationists 
defined the terms of the debate not only on immigration but on citizenship and the nature of 
British identity for most of the second half of the twentieth century. Successive legislation on 
both citizenship and immigration has not altered the trajectory set by the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act. Indeed, the rhetoric employed by twenty-first century British politicians is 
eerily similar to that employed by, in particular, Harold Wilson and Edward Heath. While its 
most popular targets may have changed slightly, xenophobia, and indeed anti-immigrationism in 
its literal sense, is very much alive and well in present-day Britain. 
In 1978, Indarjit Singh lamented the future of tolerance towards immigrants: 
Allied to this, on first sight at least, comparatively rational fear of the economic 
consequences of immigration, there is the less rational, but wholly understandable, fear of 
‘strangers in our midst’ with a colour of skin, mode of dress and customs quite different 
from our own. This fear, though rooted in prejudice and misunderstanding, is 
nevertheless very real (and universal), and can only be ignored at our peril. Regrettably it 
is a fear that can be, and often is, easily exploited by unscrupulous and extremist political 
groups, using emotive terms and phrases. If these fears existed in only a minority of the 
population they could be ignored and time itself would show their fallacious nature, but 
such fears are widespread and exist, at least partially, in a majority of the human 
population.10 
 
                                                          
9 Though it seems unlikely that Margaret Mead had intended for anti-immigrationists to follow her maxim either. 
 
10 Indarjit Singh, “Strangers in our midst,” Pamphlet produced by the Anglo Asian Conservative Society, (London: 
Grenadier Press, May 1978), 3, PUB 121/30, CPA. 
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Singh highlighted the uneasy relationship between legitimate political concerns and outright 
discrimination, “rational” prejudices and “emotive” ones. This tension might be used to 
characterize the anti-immigrationist movement as a whole: carefully walking the fine line 
between respectability and illegitimacy, making claims about their rightful place as the defenders 




Epilogue: Respectable Anti-Immigrationism (Reprise) 
 
“the unfacts, did we possess them, are too imprecisely few to warrant our certitude” 
-James Joyce, Finnegans Wake 
 
On 11 December 2013 the front page of the London Times covered the memorial of a prominent 
political figure. Several pages later the obituary of another political figure appeared. The first 
was Nelson Mandela. The second was Peter Griffiths. Few men could be more diametrically 
opposed in their political views, not least because Griffiths’ 1966 book, A Question of Colour? 
explicitly endorsed apartheid as a system of governance. Yet they share the problem of political 
legacy. Griffiths’ political legacy is largely referred to in terms of his period as “parliamentary 
leper” – indeed, this is a commonly used phrase in his various obituaries.1 But to refer to him as 
a parliamentary leper and nothing else is too dismissive, too easy.  
At the 1965 Annual Conference of the Conservative Party Mr. R.E. Simmerson of the 
London University Graduates Association stated “[w]hen people look back in twenty years’ time 
on the present they will say, even more so, ‘How could the people who were making the 
decisions then have been so stupid as to allow into an already overcrowded island people at all, 
but even more so coloured people.’ The whole thing will prove to be ridiculous. No one will be 
able to understand.”2 Simmerson spoke on a resolution introduced in the aftermath of Griffiths’ 
campaign and in the midst of the controversy it provoked. He was wrong. Popular opinion on 
race moved in precisely the opposite direction, as evidenced by the global celebration of Nelson 
                                                          
1 See “Peter Griffiths – Obituary,” Daily Telegraph, 27 November 2013 [online edition accessed 21 January 2016]. 
 





Mandela’s life and achievements. Among opinion-makers, politicians, and much of the general 
public, multi-racialism and multiculturalism became not simply facts of life, but cause for 
celebration. What Griffiths’ example reminds us, however, is just how near a thing this change of 
opinion was. In no way was the Britain that exists today an inevitability. Accounts of history that 
present proponents of a diverse Britain as the inevitable victors in a twentieth century morality 
tale do violence to the historical record. 
It is easy to tell ourselves stories about Peter Griffiths. It is easy to tell ourselves that he, 
like many others, was part of a chapter in British history that was antiquated in its own time. It is 
reassuring to think that his views were, even if more widely held than we would prefer to think, 
never truly appealing to the mass of the population, never really at risk of being implemented. 
But Griffiths was not just a straw man. He was a democratically-elected representative who 
enjoyed the support of his constituents, who could not possibly have been idiots to an individual. 
His power was the result of calculated decision-making processes by political actors. He was 
also a man who represented a genuinely popular trend of thinking, whose battle landed him on 
the wrong side of history. Peter Griffiths may have been wrong about apartheid, and he may have 
been wrong about race. But recent events suggest that his conviction that the British nation was 
an exclusive one, and that there were groups of individuals who did not deserve to be admitted to 
that nation, continues to find supporters. 
The local elections in May of 2014, which occurred while I was completing the main 
stage of research for this project, attracted a great deal of public notice. This was not particularly 
because of the major stakes in these elections, but because commentators widely anticipated that 
UKIP, the UK Independence Party, would take a much higher level of the vote than before. 
UKIP had previously sent elected members to the European Parliament, including its leader, 
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Nigel Farage. This was despite the fact that one of the main platforms of their party was to take 
the UK out of the EU. The other major platform of their party, and the one that was attracting the 
attention of the national press, was a sharp limit on immigration to the UK. Among the chief 
targets of UKIP’s ire were those citizens of EU nations who enjoyed complete freedom of 
movement, and the right to work, in the UK. In a post-recessionary economy, UKIP argued that 
high unemployment for British-born individuals meant that there should be strict restrictions put 
up against the influx of EU workers, many of whom were perceived to be willing to work for 
less money and under less-desirable conditions than British citizens. They further insisted that 
the dramatic increase of housing costs and shortages of rental units in particular was being driven 
by these new arrivals. UKIP also opposed the perceived massive influx of asylum seekers – 
refugee claimants, chiefly from Africa and the Middle East, who UKIP argued were placing 
undue burdens on social services and health facilities. This is a familiar refrain. In 2014 UKIP 
leader Nigel Farage prompted an outcry at his claims that immigrants to the UK who were 
carriers of HIV ought to be banned from entering the country.3 Trade “HIV” for “leprosy” and 
his claims would not have been out of place in 1960s anti-immigrationist circles. 
While UKIP won only one seat in the 2015 General Election, they earned nearly 13% of 
the popular vote, well out-pacing the mere 8% won by the former coalition party the Liberal 
Democrats, and the Scottish National Party, which swept Scottish seats with 5% of the popular 
vote. Because UKIP’s supporters (unlike SNP supporters) were spread throughout the UK they 
did not pose a threat to most incumbents, and it is possible that, like the NF, they will find that 
the first-past-the-post electoral system will not ever provide them with an opportunity to win a 
substantial number of seats. The greatest hope for those on the left that would wish to see the 
                                                          




demise of UKIP probably lies in the fact that to date, UKIP has not proven itself to be terribly 
good at internal governance. Ongoing disputes between Farage and the party’s only sitting MP, 
Douglas Carswell, indicate that the in-fighting that circumscribed the success of far right parties 
in the 1970s may well be the undoing of UKIP too.4  
While Farage, a former commodities broker with no university education who has been 
active in electoral politics since the mid-90s, may not fit in well with either the Oxford-educated 
members of David Cameron’s Conservatives, or with the equally Oxford-educated members of 
Ed Miliband’s or Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour, his electoral appeal seems only to be enhanced by his 
lack of attentiveness to the typical conduct of British politics.5 His Bayeux tapestry silk tie, 
roundly mocked in broadsheets like the Guardian, sold out after he was photographed wearing 
the tie during a Rochester by-election campaign in November 2014, in the course of which he 
stated “[i]t [the Battle of Hastings] was the last time we were invaded and taken over.”6 Farage 
makes a point of being routinely photographed in pubs, pint in hand. Indeed, he appeals to much 
the same qualities as did Peter Griffiths: he figures himself as a man of the people, a better 
representative of their concerns as a political outsider, and one who is more concerned with 
patriotism, or some brand thereof, than with the careful image management that has become a 
hallmark of British politics since the Blair era. 
Even as David Cameron openly rejects association with Farage, his Home Secretary, 
Theresa May, has introduced policies and legislation further restricting the rights of entry and 
settlement to the UK, including by those from the EU. In this respect Cameron mirrors the 
                                                          
4 Carswell disagreed with Farage on Farage’s HIV-related claims, among many other things. Daily Telegraph, 3 
April 2015 [online edition, accessed 21 January 2016]. 
 
5 Although, as ever, the publicly-educated Farage is surely posher than he aims to appear.  
 




actions of those Conservative elites who publicly disavowed the language of anti-
immigrationism even as they introduced restrictive legislation. Indeed, while cultural views on 
race and immigration may appear to have changed dramatically at certain cultural levels, striking 
continuities in policy and legislation remain. 
This is not to say that anti-immigrationism in the twentieth century and anti-
immigrationism in the early twenty-first are exactly the same thing; certainly there have been 
shifts in language. The far-right English Defence League (EDL), which played a central role in 
the riots in London during the summer of 2011, calls itself “a human rights organization that 
exists to protect the inalienable rights of all people to protest against radical Islam’s 
encroachment into the lives of non-Muslims.”7 The tactic of attaching anti-immigrationism to 
legitimate political anxieties and vocabularies remains: some of the vocabularies to which it is 
attached seem, however, to have changed. Anti-immigrationists are less invested in showing 
themselves to be “doing one’s bit” for their country than in defending their rights to protest and 
freedom of expression on the basis of a “rights regime” which has gained global currency in the 
last several decades.8 
The problem of anti-immigrationism, then, is evidently linked to some ongoing trends in 
British, and perhaps global, society; as such, it behooves us to identify what those long-term 
trends are, and how they might be implicated in generating a solution. The success of anti-
immigrationism through much of the second half of the twentieth century was based upon the 
capacities of anti-immigrationists to draw connections between their complaints about 
immigration and a set of broader political debates. Twenty-first century anti-immigrationists 
                                                          
7 Lauren Collins, “England, Their England,” New Yorker, 4 July 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/07/04/england-their-england [accessed 6 January 2016]. 
 
8 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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have so far been deploying the same tactic: the criticisms UKIP has launched chiefly refer to the 
burden immigrants are purportedly placing on state services. David Cameron’s bid to persuade 
the UK to remain a member of the EU hinges in part upon his recent efforts to restrict migrants’ 
access to job-related benefits for a period of four years after their arrival in the UK. Popular 
political culture admits criticisms of the welfare state and of state spending as legitimate 
complaints. Indeed, they are among the most frequent criticisms referenced in virtually any 
media coverage of British politics, by any outlet, anywhere in the UK. Members of the left who 
have been attempting to combat anti-immigrationism, however, emphasize that criticisms of 
immigration are not legitimate, claiming that such criticisms are premised upon racism and a 
misunderstanding of the effect immigration has upon the British economy and society. If the left 
seeks a solution to anti-immigrationism, then, they must contend with the great success anti-
immigrationists have experienced in linking their illegitimate complaints about immigration to 
legitimate complaints about welfare services and state spending. One way of doing this might be 
to directly address the concerns about welfare services in areas of high immigration; certainly, 
services around the UK have been stretched by systematic underfunding, and increased funding 
may well serve to eliminate complaints about immigration in these areas entirely. If not, 
improving welfare services would at least serve to highlight the inherent racism of such 
complaints if they remain in the absence of any legitimate claims.  
Certainly the left ought not to adopt the opposite tactic: to reject complaints about welfare 
services simply because they have been attached to complaints about immigration. That is, any 
and all statements by anti-immigrationists should not be treated universally with contempt even 
when they include otherwise legitimate concerns about access to health care, or education, or 
housing. While hate speech and racially-targeted violence are, and ought to be, illegal, opponents 
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of anti-immigrationism do themselves no favours when they lump in those who support violence 
with those who express their views by means of ballot box and petition. Similarly, members of 
the left damage their own cause when they conflate individuals who have misdiagnosed the 
cause of poor hospital services as immigration with those who advocate for white supremacy. If 
individuals are made to feel that their concerns are seen as abhorrent by the establishment even 
when they reference issues that are meant to be legitimate political concerns, they will make no 
efforts to reconcile themselves to that establishment, and indeed may be drawn to precisely those 
extremes to which critics had accused them of belonging. It may well be that the exclusive 
definition of Britishness that has operated for so long means that opposition to immigration is, or 
will become, a permanent feature of British society. If members of British society would like to 
change this, they would do well to be attentive to those arguments which have previously proven 
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Appendix: Selected Dates in Immigration History 
 
 
1946   Canada passes the Canadian Citizenship Act  
1948   British Nationality Act passes 
1948   Arrival of the SS Empire Windrush at Tilbury docks 
1951   Conservative government under Winston Churchill elected 
1955   Conservative government under Anthony Eden elected 
1955   Cyril Osborne introduces bill to limit Commonwealth immigration (fails) 
1958   Riots in Notting Hill, Nottingham 
1959   Conservative government under Harold Macmillan elected 
1962   Commonwealth Immigrants Act passes 
1964, October  Labour government under Harold Wilson elected 
1964, October  Peter Griffiths elected MP for Smethwick 
1965, February Malcolm X visits Smethwick; is assassinated 
1965  1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act is renewed with the support of 
Labour 
1965  Race Relations Act passes 
1966  Labour government under Harold Wilson elected 
1967  Jomo Kenyatta introduces a process of “Africanisation” in Kenya, 
precipitating the Kenyan Asians crisis 
1968, February  Commonwealth Immigrants Act passes 
1968, April Martin Luther King, Jr. is assassinated 
1968, April Enoch Powell delivers the “Rivers of Blood” speech 
1968, October Race Relations Act passes 
1970  Conservative government under Edward Heath elected 
1971  Immigration Act passes 
1972  Idi Amin expels those of Asian origin from Uganda, precipitating the 
Ugandan Asians crisis 
1974, Feb/Oct Labour government under Harold Wilson elected (first hung parliament, 
second majority)   
1976  James Callaghan becomes leader of Labour government  
1976  Race Relations Act passes 
1979  Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher elected 
1981  Riots in Brixton, Moss Side, Toxteth 
1981  British Nationality Act passes 
 
